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may I disappear in order that those things that I see 
may become perfect in their beauty from the very fact 
that they are no longer things that I see1
1. Law and the Senses
Philosophy tends to relegate senses to the realm of phe-
nomenology, experience or subjectivity. By contrast, 
critical theory has gradually eroded the holy opposition 
between knowing and sensing, to the extent that new 
speculative trends are now seeking to rebuild it. While 
the social sciences endeavour to frame sensing within 
socio-historical genealogies, scientific research draws 
deterministic connections between our sensing the world 
and the neuro-physics hardware. At the same time, plan-
etary modifications gesturing towards the seemingly una-
voidable extinction of humanity, suggest literally ‘post’ 
 1 Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace (London: Routledge, 2002), 42.
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human ways of sensing, with novel technologies that 
enable us to understand things that escape the human 
capacity to sense, thus widening perception to inhuman 
scales and temporalities. Meanwhile, capitalism relent-
lessly crafts our sensorial immersion into hyperaesthetic 
atmospheres, mirrored by art’s ongoing fetishisation of 
site-specific sensoriality.
Law is present in all this, and with a complexity that is 
yet to be addressed in the current sensorial turn in legal 
thinking.2 In fact, law and the senses have been mostly 
explored within the usual law vs. ‘what escapes law’ frame-
work, one that characterises many of the ‘law and…’ 
approaches (e.g. law and space, law and materiality etc.). 
In other words, the tendency in most cases has been to 
remain trapped within a phenomenological understand-
ing of senses, oscillating between two sides (law vs. the 
senses) of an unquestioned opposition, occupying each of 
the sides of the partition, without fully exploring its prom-
ising threshold.3 This has generated a series of compelling 
but ultimately limited narratives. Namely, law is assumed 
to be the anaesthetic par excellence, constantly numbing 
 2 We are not the first to deal with this. See Lionel Bently and Leo 
Flynn, eds, Law and the Senses: Sensational Jurisprudence (London: 
Pluto Press, 1996); Bernard J. Hibbitts, ‘Coming to Our Senses: 
Communication and Legal Expression in Performance Cultures’, 
Emory Law Journal 41, no. 4 (1992): 873-955. See also the ongo-
ing project ‘Law and the Regulation of the Senses: Explorations 
in Sensori-Legal Studies’, coordinated by David Howes at the 
Centre for Sensory Studies,  http://www.centreforsensorystudies. 
org/related-interest/law-and-the-regulation-of-the-senses- 
explorations-in-sensori-legal-studies/
 3 For a recent attempt in this direction see Sheryl Hamilton et al., 
eds., Sensing Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).
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the polymorphous realm of the sensorial in order to assert 
the rational domain of normativity. According to this nar-
rative, the legal project is a  systematic attempt to depu-
rate law from any compromise with the sensible and its 
contingent imprecision. The violence, coldness and aliena-
tion of legal abstraction, and its systematic denial of the 
polymorphous and sensual spontaneity of life, are the de 
rigueur accusations addressed to law, whose failure the 
critical thinker is quick to point out: senses are not ame-
nable to legal machinations, they always escape its cum-
bersome and sad, to put it à la Spinoza, apparatus.
Hence the call to re-materialise, re-spatialise, re-sensitise 
law: to let law come to its senses, that is. Except that law 
has never been outside of senses. Its way of making sense 
of the world is always premised on its sensorial immer-
sion in the world itself. This appreciation requires not only 
thinking law differently, but also thinking senses differ-
ently. This could open a path, we argue, towards exploring 
the sensoriality of law, both in the epistemological way in 
which law engages with, and indeed senses the world, and 
the ontological emergence of law from the sensorial con-
tinuum of the world itself. Senses, no longer an anarchic 
escape from law, thus become a way to explore the func-
tioning, limits and possibilities of law, questioning how 
law works and deals with senses, how law senses, how 
law makes sense. This series intends to pursue this path 
through four intersecting conceptual endeavours.
First, to disarticulate the sensorial from its reduction to 
the phenomenological, the subjective, the personal and 
the human dimension. This reductionism, of which law is 
simultaneously responsible as well as in denial, underlies 
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the majority of approaches dealing with law and the senses, 
and constitutes the unspoken fissure around which the two 
realms are split. Disarticulating the senses from their direct 
subjective and phenomenological relevance may enable 
them to appear as a gateway to a posthuman and ecological 
understanding of the spatio-legal, thus repurposing them 
as a promising tool with which to investigate the material-
ity of law’s relation to the world. At the same time, gesturing 
towards the inhuman dimensions of sensing that climatic 
catastrophes, technological innovations, and philosophical 
and artistic praxis hint at may allow us to think novel ways, 
subjects and objects of sensing, whose impact on questions 
of agency, responsibility and politics is paramount.
Second, to dismantle the law/senses separation by 
widening the fissure into a complex ontology, and thus 
revealing the necessary but ultimately insufficient critique 
to law’s ‘anaesthetising’ enterprise. This entails challeng-
ing the taken-for-granted presupposition of the law as a 
systematic attempt to purify itself from any compromise 
with the sensible and its contingent frictions. This, in fact, 
is only a part of the story. Law is certainly an anaesthetis-
ing project aimed at manipulating, governing, and chan-
nelling the senses into precise categories, boundaries and 
definitions, protecting from and numbing the sensorial, 
the bodily, the libidinal. Yet law is also an emerging pro-
cess, that is, a diffuse normativity emerging out of the 
intermingling of bodies and senses that constitutes our 
being-together, and as such inseparable from it. The rela-
tion between law and the senses is not one of straightfor-
ward oppression or control of the latter by the former, but 
rather a surface on which sensorial law (law folding into 
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senses) and legal senses (senses folding into law) are recip-
rocally affected, and on which surface each fold pursues 
its own mythology of origin, meaning, direction, teleol-
ogy. The law-senses assemblage should be thus addressed 
by fully tackling the consequences of the unavoidable dis-
crepancy between the de-sensitising project of legal con-
trol and the multi-sensorial process of legal emergence.
Third, and expanding on the foregoing observation: to 
expose the role of law in keeping this very dichotomy in 
place. By suggesting that, beneath law itself, unruly senso-
rial freedom would lie, the law perpetuates a grand trick, 
an anarchic illusion apparently offering critique with an 
easy target (law’s supposed denial of senses), which is 
only a decoy, however, in which critique all too easily ends 
up ensnared. Law’s attempt to manipulate senses should 
not be underestimated or simplified. In a sense, law is 
constantly engaged in numbing the senses into common 
sense by manipulating, channelling and controlling the 
sensible; inserting properties and forbidding contacts; 
dissimulating violence, regulating sounds, defining taste. 
More precisely, law constructs its meaning (its sense, its 
direction) by orchestrating the senses in three ways. First, 
the law ‘names’ the senses, puts them into categories, 
thereby adding the moral weight of its sensorial judge-
ment. Second, the law controls when senses should be 
kept apart and when blended, thus encouraging synaes-
thesia (coalesced sensorial modalities that encourage the 
attribution of one sensorial stimulation to another sense), 
or anaesthesia, depending on the way it adjusts its uni-
versal teleology to the particularity of the situation. In so 
doing, the law dissimulates the fact that these senses are 
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blended or anaesthetised by something other than the 
individual herself. In other words, the law maintains an 
illusion of phenomenological perception and evaluation 
of senses, while on another level, the law works hard to 
build socio-political and cultural receptacles of sensorial 
taste construction that dissimulate the fact that the law 
is behind all this, deftly orchestrating both senses and 
its very own apparent absence of involvement. Finally, 
law elevates the phenomenology of senses to the corol-
lary of the liberal individual’s sense of personal freedom: 
what best exemplifies freedom than sensorial taste of 
food, colouring, odours, materials? The law manages to 
fool us by allowing us to think that we own our senses 
in full phenomenological immersion, whilst all along, the 
law inverts their ‘sense’, by constructing their origin and 
facilitating a fake causality from senses to atmosphere, 
rather than from the legally constructed, preconscious 
atmosphere in which senses come to be perceived as indi-
vidually owned.4 This complex interplay of intervention 
and disappearance obviously requires much more than 
simply assuming senses as a dynamic excess to law’s static 
numbness. As much as overestimating it, underestimat-
ing law is a perilous strategy.
Fourth, to envisage an approach to law beyond these 
strictures, unfolding alternative strategies and method-
ologies to which law attuned to its senses may open up. 
We do not simply wish to push legal thinking beyond 
its comfortable socio-legal and critical methods. This 
 4 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘Atmospheres of Law: Senses, 
Affects, Lawscapes’, Emotion, Space and Society 7 (2013): 35-44.
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series rather intends to pursue a constructive endeavour, 
namely ushering law into a different mode of dealing with 
the world: one which is tentative, tempting, reflexive and 
uncertain, a mode of sensing, that is, which sanctions the 
impossibility for law to avoid its own materiality. This 
requires emphasising at the same time both the posthu-
man and the inhuman quality of law, and understanding 
its relations to senses accordingly. On one level, in fact, 
law emerges out of the coming together of human and 
nonhuman bodies, spaces and times. On another level, 
law pretends to address a purely rational and disembod-
ied, inhuman subject, namely a fully institutionalised sub-
ject whose ‘humanity’ is constructed to the extent that it 
is useful to the institution. Both dimensions are crucial. 
The first suggests that law is not a socio-cultural construct 
that is superimposed over inert matter, but a normativ-
ity made of flesh and stones, thought and water streams, 
cosmic and everyday interaction, human and non-human 
sensing: a way in which the ‘world’ is organised. The sec-
ond points to the fact that law is a force of abstraction 
and, insofar as abstract, plays a generative role in creating 
and giving consistency to identity, relations, spaces and 
worlds.5 Thinking the post-human and inhuman dimen-
sion of senses thus permits rethinking law’s sensorial 
engagement and entanglement with the world, at the same 
time gesturing towards different ways to use legal abstrac-
tion, beyond their absolutisation or dismissal.
 5 Derek P. McCormack, ‘Geography and Abstraction: Towards an Af-




In the history of Western thought, the sense of vision 
occupies the height of the sensorial hierarchy. The sense 
of clarity and purity, it is the one most explicitly associ-
ated with knowledge and truth. Whatever the epistemo-
logical considerations about the reality which the seer 
would be able to perceive within, through or beneath 
the appearance, seeing is configured as the most objec-
tive of senses, the one that most powerfully reasserts the 
ontological separation between subject and object, seer 
and seen, the perceiving eye and inert matter. Of course, 
from Gestalt theory to magicians’ tricks, vision has been 
demonstrated as deceiving in many ways. Yet this has 
been normally assumed to be a localised impairment, a 
personal myopia, a temporary hallucination. Sight may 
often be impaired by physical imperfection or the foggy 
turbulence of a medium; yet, in theoria (meaning to look, 
to see), once the obstacles are removed, the unimpaired 
vision will allow the observer to fully see and know the 
object. This implicit understanding grounds the reliance 
on technological apparatuses, whose inhuman capacities 
supposedly allow for overcoming human flaws in order to 
fabricate ever finer approximations to truth.
Truth is to be found beyond the sensible, Plato argued, 
‘to be apprehended  by reason and intelligence, but not 
by sight’.6 Theoria is the intellectual vision of ideas. Such 
rational vision would be able to overcome the fallibility of 
perception, guarantee that transparency would reign, and 
 6 Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: 
Random House, 1920), 529.
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thus reach the ‘adaequatio rei et intellectus,’ the conform-
ity of things and intellect, that the Scholastics equated 
with truth. Not so dissimilarly, Newtonian mechanics, 
today updated by neurological reductionism, assumed 
human vision as a complex machine to be explained inde-
pendently from the subjective act of seeing, by turning 
the gaze to its hidden ‘levers and screws’.7 Different were 
the conclusions to which the late Kant came. Sketching 
the prototype of a phenomenology to come, Kant turned 
phenomena from appearances of ideas to manifestations 
(apparitions), thus putting them in relation to the condi-
tions of possibility of appearing itself. This transcendental 
move, dislocating the centripetal pretence of the Carte-
sian I think, constructed the subject in the form of a radi-
cal passivity, in which the me realises (apperceives) the 
radical anteriority of an external I which affects it.
The question of self-awareness of one’s own sensing has 
been a longstanding one in the history of philosophy. Aris-
totle explored it in some key passages of On the Soul, and 
commenting on it, Alexander of Aphrodisias wrote, ‘for 
to everyone who senses something there comes about, in 
addition to the apprehension of the thing that he is sensing, 
also a certain self-awareness of [the fact] that he is sensing.’8 
A synaesthetic apperception, that is, a term coined by 
 7 ‘The dismemberment of nature ‘with levers and screws’ is a theoreti-
cal error because it is an aesthetic error.’ George Simmel, quoted in 
Éric Alliez, The Brain-Eye: New Histories of Modern Painting, trans 
Robin Mackay (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 3.
 8 Alexander of Aphrodisias, quoted in Nicola Masciandaro, ‘Synaes-
thesia: The Mystical Sense of Law’, The Whim (blog), 01 November 
2016, https://thewhim.blogspot.pt/2016/11/synaesthesia-mystical-
sense-of-law.html?m=1 (accessed 15 May, 2017).
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Alexander himself, to capture the sensing-with (sunaisthēsis) 
which characterises this peculiar instance of sensing the very 
act of sensing.9 This in-built détournement of sensation, in 
a spiralling interplay between perception and apperception, 
made the Kantian apparatus vacillate. What if, similarly to 
Arthur Rimbaud’s je est un autre formula, vision comes from 
an external, alien I-eye which digs inside me a crack, and on 
whose denial the scaffolding which support the subject is 
constructed?10 The principle of the transcendental subject 
helped Kant secure his edifice against the seismic threat of 
the outside. The I-subject remained the centre, subjecting 
the sensible matter to the unifying form of its representation. 
Moreover, with the common sense reached through shared 
agreement, further ground would be provided to universal-
ise the confusing sensing-with of synaesthetic apperception 
into an uncontroversial con-sensus.
Phenomenology drew the consequences of the Kantian 
correlation, denying the ‘dismemberment of nature’ of 
mechanicism and the unifying representation of the tran-
scendental subject. The consciousness explodes towards 
the outside: as Jean-Paul Sartre wrote, it throws us ‘into 
the dry dust of the world, on to the plain earth, amidst 
things … rejected and abandoned by our own nature in 
an indifferent, hostile, and restive world.’11 Perception 
 9 Masciandaro, ‘Synaesthesia’.
 10 “I is another”, Rimbaud’s famous formula that Deleuze would use 
to explain the de-subjectivising role of apperception in Kant, in 
Gilles Deleuze, Deuxième leçon sur Kant, Vincennes, 2 March 1978, 
http://www.le-terrier.net/deleuze/ (accessed 25 May, 2017).
 11 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Intentionality: a fundamental idea of Husserl’s 
phenomenology’, in The Phenomenology Reader, eds. Dermot Moran 
and Timothy Mooney (London: Routledge, 2002), 383.
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means ‘taking in’ (capere) reality, ‘entirely’ (per). And 
yet perception, human perception, is always an excep-
tion: it takes in an ‘outside’ (ex), yet never in its entirety. 
It includes, by excluding. To the phenomenologist, vision 
is dependent on the exceptional flashlight of conscious-
ness, which illuminates the world, fleetingly rescuing it 
from darkness, only to throw around more shadows in 
the process. As Gilles Deleuze writes,
the whole philosophical tradition … placed light on 
the side of the spirit and made consciousness a beam 
of light which drew things out of their native dark-
ness. Phenomenology was still squarely within this 
ancient tradition: but, instead of making light an in-
ternal light, it simply opened it to the exterior, rather 
as if the intentionality of consciousness was the ray 
of an electric lamp (‘all consciousness is conscious-
ness of something’…)12
Yet in the same way, perhaps seeing does not come from 
my eye. Perhaps images, before becoming images of my 
consciousness, are images in themselves: a paradoxical 
oxymoron that could rescue vision from its dependence 
on a subject, a consciousness, an I-eye. This is how Henri 
Bergson broke with the common sense: matter is image, 
image is matter, the world is made of matter-image, beings 
that are a pure appearing in themselves before being cap-
tured into a subjective consciousness.13 In fact, conscious-
ness itself is an image, a thing of this world. Rather than 
 12 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (London: Blooms-
bury Academic, 2013), 60.
 13 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory (New York: Cosimo Classics, 
2007).
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being ‘exploded’ into the dry dust of the world, it is the 
dry dust of the world: not a centre of intentionality but 
a thing among other things, caught into the continuous 
flux of self-subsistent matter-images.14
Things are luminous in themselves without anything 
illuminating them: all consciousness is something, it 
is indistinguishable from the thing, that is from the 
image of light. But here it is a consciousness by right 
[en droit], which is diffused everywhere and yet does 
not reveal its source [ne se révèle pas]: it is indeed a 
photo which has already been taken and shot in all 
things for all points, but which is ‘translucent’.15
So, even when we remove the spotlight of the Leibnizian 
God, the floodlight of the transcendental subject, the 
flashlight of the phenomenological consciousness, we 
are not left in the dark: the kaleidoscope of a multiplic-
ity of points of view emerges. Not before us, however, 
since we are part of them too. Everything is illuminated. 
Liberated from its dependence on transcendent sources, 
the light floods the whole ontological plane. In the inter-
action between light and matter, images are thus pro-
duced. Pier Paolo Pasolini once wrote that ‘the whole 
life, in the entirety of its actions, is a natural and living 
cinema … an infinite single-take [piano sequenza]’.16 
‘What is the real before the human eye comes to rela-
tivise it?’– asks Rocco Ronchi: ‘nothing but cinema, an 
ensemble of images that exist in themselves, spectacle 
 14 Rocco Ronchi, Gilles Deleuze (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2015), 108.
 15 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 66.
 16 Quoted in Ronchi, Gilles Deleuze, 218.
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without spectator.’17 It is a flux of images in which per-
ception is impersonal, diffuse and anonymous, or the 
perception of ‘an inhuman eye … that belongs to no 
one’, of which the human eyes are simply local and tem-
porary crystallisations.18
As Eric Alliez explains in his engagement with Goe-
the’s theory of colour: ‘it is light that contemplates us, in 
an anonymous percept, as if the Eye were already among 
things and our own eye immersed in it, a retinal contrac-
tion in nature’s general vision.’19 The Eye of Nature which 
the Naturphilosophers speculated about, is an imper-
sonal eye to which we ontologically belong, since we do 
not produce or shed light on things: our eye is made of 
light, our vision dependent on its encounter with matter. 
This already resonated in Plotinus’ famous question: ‘If 
the eye were not sunny/How could we possibly perceive 
light?’20 Thus perception is radically reformulated. No 
longer a taking in, let alone entirely, an outside, it always 
emerges in the middle: ‘perception puts us at once into 
matter’, as a local rarefaction of the flux of images the 
human eye produces by cutting up a precarious vision 
from a circumscribed perspective. If the naturing nature 
is an infinite single take, then perception is the editing, 
the montage, performed by and from a body that, as a 
centre of action, produces a world by obscuring the real, 
 17 ibid., 110.
 18 Robin Mackay, ‘Preface’ to Alliez, The Brain-Eye, ix.
 19 Alliez, The Brain-Eye, 5.
 20 Plotinus, quoted in ibid., 6.
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perturbing and deflecting the plane of images, letting a 
point of view surface. 21
‘Motion and light destroy the materiality of bodies’, 
claimed the Futurists, thus implying as untenable any 
separation between objects and people, vision and real-
ity, as Riccardo Baldissone reminds us in his contribu-
tion to this volume. Vision is an action immanent to 
the world, Ben Woodard suggests in his chapter; not a 
reflection, but a diffraction, as Jelena Stojković explains, 
following Karen Barad, in her contribution. A haptic 
diving into an open materiality, that leaves no chance to 
obtain a safe, comfortable and distant point of view from 
which vision would be measured and assessed according 
to criteria of brightness, clarity and definition.22 Picpoet’s 
contribution to this volume diffracts seeing by allowing 
the textual to open up other simultaneous angles. Thus 
vision is emancipated from the human in at least two 
clear senses. First, because it is an emergent property of 
a post-human assemblage, in which perception surfaces 
out of the singular point of view that a body occupies.23 
Second, because this localised and tentative vision is 
always an actualisation of a virtual Eye. ‘If from the point 
of view of the human eye – Deleuze clarifies – montage 
 21 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1991), 25; see also Quentin Meillassoux, ‘Subtraction and Contrac-
tion: Deleuze, Immanence and Matter and Memory’, in Collapse, 
III: Unknown Deleuze, ed. Robin Mackay (Falmouth:  Urbanomic, 
2007).
 22 On the haptic quality of vision, see Andrea Mubi Brighenti, Visibility 
in Social Theory and Social Research (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010). 
 23 See Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Metafísicas Canibais. Elemen-
tos para uma Antropologia Pós-Estrutural (São Paulo: Cosa Naify, 
2015).
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is undoubtedly a construction, from the point of view of 
another eye, it ceases to be one; it is the pure vision of a 
non-human eye, of an eye which would be in things.’24 
This is not, to be sure, the all-seeing eye of a god, but 
a virtual, inorganic, inhuman eye by which human per-
ception is not determined but unavoidably exceeded, and 
thus shaped.
This Eye, in Keith Woodward’s words, ‘concerns an 
emerging situation’s ‘making-available’ a multiplicity of 
viewpoints (potentially) to the bodies (humans, bits of 
matter, animality, languages and so on) that compose it’.25 
A multiplicity of viewpoints which perception occupies 
every time. Seeing, in other words, depends simultane-
ously on the concatenations in which one is taken (a 
relation), and a virtual multiplicity that always remains 
excessive to this concatenation (a non-relation). Thus, we 
move from the external viewpoint of a subjective or objec-
tive viewer, to an always-compromised one, immerged 
within, and co-substantial with, a field of vision, simulta-
neously exceeded by the virtual viewpoint of an inorganic 
eye.26 Seeing is immersed into a post-human and hetero-
geneous relationality as well as exceeded by the virtual 
event of its taking place. Thus, Spinoza’s maxim resonates 
in all its might: we do not know what a body can do, we do 
 24 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 81-3.
 25 Keith Woodward, ‘Events, Spontaneity and Abrupt Conditions’, in 
Taking-Place: Non-Representational Theories and Geography, eds. 
Ben Anderson and Paul Harrison (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 331.
 26 ‘[T]he view from the event is the aggregate view, the wordly per-
spective, of divergent perspectives  ... a manifold of changing per-
spectives, forces and relata. The event is not simply non-representa-
tional, it is non-presentational,’ ibid., 331.
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not know what a body can see, since only the event could, 
the inhuman ‘eye of matter, the eye in matter.’27
Let us qualify, however, that matter is never flat, 
‘objective’, neutral or homogenous. Quite the contrary, 
it is heterogeneous, traversed, twisted and tuned by 
social, historical, affective, geological and cosmic forces. 
Power structures and asymmetries are inscribed within 
matter, shaping the way in which its interaction with 
light occurs. The surfacing of vision is always tuned 
by normative trajectories. Every apparatus of seeing is 
entangled with this complex heterogeneity, and emerges 
out of it as an attempt to order and control it. In other 
words, every apparatus of seeing is entangled with the 
process through which it enacts vision, that is, with the 
process through which it shapes how visions ought to 
be in order to be perceived as such, or how it builds its 
own specific regime of visibility, that is, its internal nor-
mativity.
3. Law and Seeing
Typically ocularcentric, the law is a quintessential opti-
cal dispositif that visibilises and invisibilises the social 
through its normative gaze. Legal perception is always 
an exception, premised on the Olympian viewpoint from 
which law would supposedly project its light onto the 
world, leaving the rest in its shadows. Hence law’s car-
tographic faith in its capacity to capture the world into 
a re-presentation, by unifying the multiplicity of its 
 27 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 81.
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sensorial perception into an exceptional juridified image. 
Law’s perspectival gaze is, however, bound to be betrayed: 
perception always puts us at once into matter, and the 
mismatch is unavoidable between the perception and 
representation of law. Yet although legal representations 
may thus be inaccurate, they are productive of real effects 
on the world, and this aspect is easily missed if we stop 
at pinpointing the said inaccuracy. As Regis Debray puts 
it, ‘the capacity of an idea to put a mass in movement, to 
modify the balance of a field of power or to induce this or 
that behaviour is not dependent on its truth-value.’28
In this volume, Woodard transversally engages with this 
aspect through a passionate defence of idealism against its 
common misunderstanding as a theory that would place 
at its centre an all-ingesting mind, swallowing the world 
and reducing it to its own substance. There is another way 
to understand the mind-like form of the world that ideal-
ism postulates, Woodard observes: rather than a reduc-
tion of the world to a mere fabrication of the mind, the 
assumption of both the mind and the world as sharing the 
same substance. Understood in this sense, idealism would 
take a rather different form from the caricature to which 
post-structuralist and post-modern critique has usually 
reduced it. Not a naïve philosophy equating representa-
tion with the represented, but a perspective that assumes 
representation, and vision, as actions and things of this 
world. In this sense, the task would no longer be that of 
denouncing idealism by unveiling representations and 
 28 Regis Debray, Critique of Political Reason (New York: New Left 
Books, 1983), 116–17.
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their supposed mismatch with reality. Whether ‘appar-
ently ideal, or purportedly human capacities for regulat-
ing, or normalising our experiences, are part of the same 
world to which nature belongs’, Woodard argues, the 
question is to understand ‘how does representation, as a 
part of the world, function as just another thing.’
The significance of this question cannot be underes-
timated. Law is a thing of this world, and representation 
is the mechanism through which law frames, senses and 
sees reality. Whilst aware of the limits and the dangers 
that any enterprise aimed at absolutising and fetishising 
representations harbours, we may follow this perspec-
tive into developing a strategic investigation of the real. 
In so doing, we must resist simply pretending that legal 
representations and their effects on the world would dis-
solve, once revealed, deconstructed, or forgotten. Thus we 
may approach representations as veritable presentations 
that take place and, as Ben Anderson and Paul Harrison 
write, ‘in their taking-place … have an expressive power 
as active interventions in the co-fabrication of worlds’.29 
Likewise, we may understand the very process of legal 
abstraction – the process through which law supposedly 
extracts (abstrahere) itself from a concrete reality in order 
to gain an Olympian view of the world – not as a simple 
illusion, but rather the necessary mechanism through 
which law sees, senses and makes sense of the world. A 
mechanism which emerges out of the world, rather than 
 29 Ben Anderson and Paul Harrison, ‘The Promise of Non- 
Representational Theories’, in Taking-Place: Non-Representational 
Theories and Geography, eds. Ben Anderson and Paul Harrison 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 14.
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being simply superimposed onto it, in a recursive process 
of coding, re-coding and over-coding between sensing and 
knowing, whose ‘geological layers’, Woodard continues, 
sustain ‘the capacity of judgement higher up the ladder.’
Thus law appears as the ordering and re-ordering of 
the field of vision, ‘a seeing of ideas as rules and the con-
struction of rules for ideas’, an apparatus that normal-
ises through the world as much as it is normalised by the 
world. Or, paraphrasing Stojković, law as photography: 
an inscription of normative light and shadows onto mate-
rials, which is at the same time made of materials, and 
makes with materials. It is exactly the normative quality of 
photography to be what the art of ‘abstract photography’ 
engages with, Stojković argues in her chapter, by allowing 
to see ‘the entanglement of the photographic image with 
the technology and material that produce it, but also with 
the norms and effects that the same technology and mate-
rial impose on our daily life.’ In other words, it is both the 
normalising force of photography as a dispositif aiming 
to control, isolate, ‘tame and discipline light’, as well as 
the coming together of light and material that produces 
the photographic image out of its immersion in the real. 
A coming together that is never obvious and smooth. In 
fact, Stojković places the accent on the frictional quality 
of the encounter between light and material, assuming 
vision not as the reflection of an object, but the diffrac-
tion and perturbation of a field, a haptic diving into a het-
erogeneous materiality that produces diffracting waves.
This opens at least two compelling avenues. First, the 
potential abstract photography plays in questioning the 
internal normativity of photography itself. What this 
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branch of photographic art is particularly apt to express, 
is the role photography plays in distributing the sensible, 
to use Jacques Rancière expression, by reinforcing given 
(socio-cultural, political, legal) orderings. Abstract pho-
tography makes visible this ‘internal law’ of photography. 
Whether photography is a quintessential instrument of 
sense-making (as its widespread and often uncritical use 
within legal praxis testifies), abstract photography thus 
harbours the potential to un-make this (common) sense. 
In the compelling photographic experiments of Taisuke 
Koyama and Nihal Yesil that Stojković explores, we find 
expressed the potential of an abstract(ing) praxis that in 
contrast to the ‘mechanisms for looking at or looking 
through … offer[s] a means for looking with,’ thus short-
circuiting representation and its inscribed normativity.
Second, the methodological suggestion of Stojković 
can be carried all the way into the exploration of the ‘pho-
tographic’ dispositif of law itself, exploring legal abstrac-
tions, as suggested above, as a tool to understand how law 
sees the world and to problematise the material basis of 
law’s exceptional perception, rather than simply dismiss-
ing it in the name of a more authentic, organic, or human 
vision. Paraphrasing Paolo Virno, it is not by ‘looking 
for the dirty laundry that lies behind the categories of ’ 
the law, that we are able to account for their ontological 
force, but rather by exploring the ‘abstract connections … 
that pervade society and make it cohere’.30 Accordingly, 
a proper exploration of legal vision – in the attempt to 
both see the law and understand how it sees – becomes an 
 30 Paolo Virno, ‘The two masks of materialism,’ Pli 12 (2001): 167-69. 
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attempt ‘to both reveal how abstraction works and to gen-
erate alternative abstractions as part of a necessarily criti-
cal praxis.’31 This is the potential of abstract photography 
Stojković is able to unfold: by not presenting us ‘with any-
thing recognisable but a pattern generated through the 
play of light and’ a material, in fact, abstract photography 
makes us see the patterns themselves, the abstract con-
nections that make the image cohere. This ‘vision without 
the eye’, as her title goes, makes visible the condition of 
possibility of its very visibility: a glimpse into the inhu-
man, virtual eye out of which singular points of view or 
visions contingently surface.
This is something like a darkness that allows for the 
visibility of a situation to shine, as in Giorgio Agamben’s 
reflection on the contemporary, the one ‘whose eyes are 
struck by the beam of darkness that comes from his own 
time,’ a gaze able to neutralise ‘the lights that come from 
the epoch in order to discover its obscurity, its special 
darkness.’32 Seeing through this obscurity is not simply a 
feat in becoming accustomed to the dark, nor imagining 
what its ambiguous shadows could represent. It is perhaps 
the ability to penetrate the limits of vision, and imagina-
tion, so as to force it to reorient sur place. This is the qual-
ity of utopian thinking according to Frederic Jameson: 
not the positive capacity to envisage a better future, but a 
negative, suffocating force that, by reaching the limits of 
imagination, and triggering its failure, propels it further. 
 31 McCormack, Geography, 722.
 32 Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus? And Other Essays, trans. 
David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2009), 45.
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It is through the blindness of vision and the impotence of 
imagination that ‘the ideological closure of the system in 
which we are somehow trapped and confined,’ becomes 
visible: a necessary premise for the imaginative produc-
tion of alternative realities.33
Conversely, the contemporary political imagination is 
mainly oriented towards the task of producing images of 
a future world to come, in which present plights will be 
somewhat overcome. This is what Stacy Douglas explores 
in her chapter, delving into the muddy rhetoric of the 
contemporary US political debate. On the one hand is 
the nostalgia for a great America to be restored, loudly 
championed by Donald Trump’s rhetoric. On the other, 
is the progressive projection of a post-Trump America 
in which individual freedoms would be restored, as pro-
duced by the liberal left imagination. Between them, the 
same mechanism of symbolic projection that situates 
a political solution in the future, relying on ‘the weird 
assumption’ – to echo Nicola Masciandaro – that ‘jus-
tice might be satisfied in a world that ought to be oth-
erwise’.34 Yet, as Masciandaro biblically continues, ‘hell is 
only destroyed by entering it, by staying in it’.35 That is, 
following Jameson, by keeping the eyes transfixed on the 
power-structured rifts and fences and barriers that neu-
tralise the power of imagination itself.
 33 Fredric Jameson, ‘The Politics of Utopia’, New Left Review, 25 
(2004): 46.
 34 Nicola Masciandaro, ‘The Sweetness (of the Law),’ Non Liquet: 
The Westminster Online Working Papers Series, Law and the Senses 
 Series: The Taste Issue, (2013): 45
 35 ibid., 56
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Douglas explores the theoretical base of these converg-
ing rhetorics by engaging with Drucilla Cornell’s theory 
of legal transformation, which, following Immanuel 
Kant, emphasises the positive force of ‘moral images of 
freedom’ in producing the condition for changing a given 
situation, by creating platforms for alternative possibili-
ties of meaning to emerge. Positive projections of a future 
world to come, however, systematically erase the present 
and its complexity from the picture, providing cloying 
futures on which to indulge, while the asymmetries of the 
present are left untouched. This is evident in the two hats 
which Douglas employs as visual summaries to the right 
and left rhetorics involved: the red ‘Make America Great 
Again’ hat worn by Trump supporters, and the pink knit-
ted ‘pussyhats’ worn at the national women’s march that 
took place against Trump, on the day after the inaugura-
tion. As Douglas observes,
Neither symbol forces an estrangement with the ex-
isting political-legal institutional reality via an expo-
sure of the class composition of their context, which 
might allow for the ideological conditions of the pre-
sent state of things to be exposed; instead, both rely 
on the Kantian-inspired deployment of the positive 
image and its role as a catalyst for transformation.
‘A politics of emancipation does not seek the happiness of 
people but rather seeks universal disquiet’, writes Quentin 
Meillassoux.36 The disquiet that unavoidably stems from 
 36 Quentin Meillassoux, ‘The Immanence of the World Beyond’, in 
The Grandeur of Reason: Religion, Tradition and Universalism, eds. 
Peter. M. Candler and Conor Cunningham (London: SCM, 2010), 
475.
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the piercing acknowledgement of the inability to produce 
positive images in the here and now. As Doc Emmett 
Brown explained at the blackboard to a puzzled Martin 
McFly, we cannot go back to the future from a distorted 
present. Unless what makes it distorted is made visible, 
and thus dismantled, we are condemned to reproduce it. 
An act of creation, Deleuze reminds us, only ‘takes place 
in bottlenecks … a creator who isn’t grabbed around the 
throat by a set of impossibilities is no creator. A crea-
tor’s someone who creates their own impossibilities, and 
thereby creates possibilities.’37 This capacity to mobilise 
a friction within the present, an engagement with the 
ontological structures of a given reality, is what seems to 
be lacking in the strategies of symbolic projection that 
Douglas investigates, where the present remains comfort-
ably in the dark.
An instance of what such a strategy may entail is 
explored by Riccardo Baldissone in his contribution to 
this volume. Baldissone deals with the special darkness 
of past events that still beams its obscure rays into a for-
getful present. These are large-scale traumatic events 
such as South African Apartheid, the Rwandan and the 
Indonesian genocides, and specifically the question of 
reconciliation in the face of these collective traumas. In 
these instances, reconciliation is normally articulated 
as a revelatory enterprise aimed at exhuming the Truth, 
implicitly understood as a static, inert and immutable 
object lying in the obscurity of the past, and which it is 
 37 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972-1990 (New York: Columbia 
 University Press, 2005), 133.
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the Commission’s task to illuminate with the light of rev-
elation. Reconciliation is expected to occur out of such 
a quest, recognising guilt, overcoming resentment, and 
possibly allowing for forgiveness to surface.
Baldissone proposes a different strategy of reconcilia-
tion, one in which the revelatory work of truth-disclosure 
is substituted by the task of letting memories resurface by 
re-enacting them in the present, that is, putting them at 
play as agentic matter-images, rather than keeping them 
confined as inactive postcards of the past. This is what 
historians do, Baldissone continues: they communicate 
with, let speak, and thus give back life to, the dead. In 
the face of appalling injustices endured by some, Meil-
lassoux argues, justice cannot occur through forgiveness 
or grief, since these practices, let alone their actual pos-
sibility, only concern the living. True justice may only 
occur by assuming that ‘it is not the living who need help 
but the dead,’ recognising ‘that some lives are entitled to 
begin again so as to overcome the atrocious end inflicted 
upon them.’38 Evidently, in this peculiar reformulation of 
the theory of eternal return, there is no space for the all-
too-human and moralising questions of guilt, resentment 
or forgiveness, which are the only options the model of 
reconciliation-as-truth presents.
This is precisely what Adi, the brother of a victim of 
the Indonesian genocide, expresses in Joshua Oppenhe-
imer’s documentary, aptly titled The Look of Silence. Here, 
Baldissone explains, Adi is not looking for an impersonal 
truth, a reconstruction of the past, or an admission of 
 38 Meillassoux, ‘The Immanence’, 453.
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guilt. Instead, he is ‘battling the apparent impossibil-
ity to share his present with his brother’s unprosecuted 
murderers, the surviving bystanders, the other victims’ 
relatives, and his brother’s memory.’ If justice must also be 
justice for the dead, then reconciliation can only occur by 
resuscitating the dead, that is, resuscitating dead memo-
ries, by making them alive and visible, and putting them 
at play into a space that does not exist in the present, and 
therefore must be collectively constructed. This tentative, 
performative, and conflictual strategy may be useful to 
assess, Baldissone continues, ‘whether the authority of 
truth is used to silence alternative positions, or to make 
previously invisible stances come to light.’
Michael Taussig observes that witnessing, differently 
from seeing, is something akin to vision hallucinat-
ing on itself. It requires letting a shock remain, rather 
than looking away, by refusing to allow the abnormal to 
pass into normality, the horror into banality, the mem-
ory into the past: that is to prevent the normativity of 
vision from normalising itself.39 Writing from the field 
of  ethnography, Taussig proposes to use drawing as an 
alternative to taking notes or pictures, as a ritual whereby 
the spiritual forces and special darkness of contingency is 
captured, generating a vision that, to paraphrase Deleuze, 
‘is not surprising that we have to construct [it] since it is 
given only to the eye which we do not have.’40 Whether 
truth-seeking is tied to the questions of forgiveness (or 
 39 Michael Taussig, I Swear I Saw This. Drawing in Fieldwork  Notebooks, 
Namely my Own (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
 40 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 81.
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the refusal thereof) and resentment, memory resuscita-
tion is a sorcery which relies on fabulation. This is what 
the actor or the mime do, Deleuze maintained: they are 
able to release the possibility of the event by re-enacting 
not ‘what occurs’, but what is ‘within what occurs’.41 This 
happens in Oppenheimer’s documentaries, where the 
perpetrators themselves are put in the situation of ‘mim-
ing’ their past actions, and thus forced to ‘look’ at their 
‘silence’, dealing with the past event by re-enacting and 
somehow re-mobilising it into a novel encounter.
Representation in this sense is no longer a means to 
reveal or reflect on, but rather a way to perturb and diffract 
the past, generating aesthetic effects whose legal potential 
may spill beyond the pretence of a given Truth, towards 
a tentative and perilous, collective and constructive, pro-
cess of truth-making. Thus, Baldissone argues, we may
envisage a double task for legal activities: on the one 
hand, legal actors at large may relinquish as untena-
ble the claim to the monopoly of memory as a single 
legal truth, and they may work instead to produce 
the visibility of the plurality of the past; on the other 
hand, legal experts may then facilitate the negotia-
tion between the representatives of this plurality in 
the present.
To be sure, the notion of truth is not in this way neces-
sarily abandoned, but perhaps reoriented. Paradoxically, 
 41 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense (London: Continuum, 2004), 
134. If properly ‘used’, Deleuze continues, representation becomes 
a vehicle enveloping the event of the past and allowing it to be ex-
pressed, ‘averting its sclerosis’ by releasing the darkness that the 
light of its historical state of affairs occluded, not to reconstruct the 
past, but rather to construct it anew. Ibid., 146.
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we may argue that it is still concerned with achieving 
a conformation to reality (adaequatio), and yet a real-
ity that is radically different from the stable Order of 
Being preached by the Scholastics. First, this truth is not 
beyond, but rather within the sensible, object of a theo-
ria that does not erase but is firmly situated within vision 
itself. Second, reality is not separated from us, but is the 
radically open materiality of which we are part. In this 
sense, conformation means to be faithful to this differen-
tial, plural and open reality: ‘whereas reflection is about 
mirroring and sameness – Stojković writes – diffraction 
attends to patterns of difference.’ Thus the task of pursu-
ing truth through an open conformity to reality becomes 
the constructive work of sculpting truth in complicity 
with the anonymous materials at hand. Seeing, just as 
carving wood,
surrendering to the wood, then following where it 
leads by connecting operations to a materiality, in-
stead of imposing a form upon a matter: what one 
addresses is less a matter submitted to laws than a 
materiality possessing a nomos.42
As Woodard observes, if we take ‘the force of law as a type 
of vision’ then this force may be understood as ‘one of 
collective apparatuses more than a groundless violence’. 
Whether we reformulate vision from revelation to co-
construction, from reflection to diffraction, we are served 
with another legal praxis, one in which the optical dis-
positif of law is reoriented, and representation is reworked 
 42 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia (London: Continuum, 2004), 408.
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away from an exceptional perception of reality, towards a 
tentative and haptic praxis to ‘touch-see’ the real.
In this sense, could a blindfold be a tool, rather than an 
impairment? In his contribution, Marcilío Franca focuses 
on the iconographic tradition of apposing a blindfold 
over the eyes of justice. The eye of the law, or the eye of 
justice, is a ‘long-lived cultural constant in the Hellenis-
tic-Roman-Christian world.’ It is ‘in its eyes’ that all citi-
zens are equal, the 1789 Declaration spells out. Within 
these eyes are enshrined the qualities that define the 
internal normativity of vision: brightness, clarity, defini-
tion. A ‘crystal-clear, sharp, unblocked sight’ is the quin-
tessential prerogative of the all-seeing divine gaze. In the 
Middle Ages a blindfold began to be applied over the eyes 
of justice, at first as a mockery, the cunning strategy of a 
jester aimed at keeping the carnivalistic bouleversement 
of the world out of her judgemental gaze. Yet, from the 
16th century the blindfold begins to assume a novel mean-
ing, from a means to disorient, to a tool to orient justice, 
by means of guaranteeing her incorruptibility.
Justice, we may argue, was in this way humanised: under-
stood as a corruptible being, she now requires a prop, a 
blindfold, to be able to impartially decide. As for Oedipus, 
the blindfold becomes less a negative impairment than a 
positive tool to see through: ‘it is necessary not to see to 
be able to see better,’ Franca writes. What if we push this 
interpretation further? Justice is to be opportunely blind-
folded, not because that which she may see would prevent 
her from seeing the truth, but rather because her task is a 
paradoxical one: that of making visible the conditions of 
possibility for her vision, the special darkness of the spatial 
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contingency in which she is thrown. Justice would be the 
vision of a world that is not seen by the moralising gaze of 
the human and its meaning-making projection, but rather 
the ‘vision without the eye’ of a world that remains not 
amenable to human sense. Perhaps the blindfold then is a 
call for constructing a novel optical apparatus for law, one 
able to reorient its all-appropriating gaze towards a world 
not for law, that is, towards the very event of its encounter 
with a non-juridifiable world. The focal point then would 
not be for law to see better, but to modify its own idea, and 
praxis, of seeing itself.
Law’s obsessive iconophilia is problematic, both in the 
sense of positioning vision at the height of the hierar-
chy of senses vis-à-vis its capacity to reveal truth, and in 
shaping, within vision itself, a normative hierarchy that 
prioritises brightness, clarity and definition. Deviancy is 
defined accordingly, pathologising the subject (myopia, 
astigmatism, blindness), or discriminating the object, as 
messy, confused, impressionist.43 This is particularly sig-
nificant in relation to the current image-obsessed capital-
ist condition, in which a visual economy tied to a logic of 
resolution and exchange value irremediably de-prioritises 
 43 The term impressionism was notably used used derisorily by critics 
at the first ‘Impressionist’ exhibition in Paris. Thus, Emile Cardon 
wrote: ‘‘This school does away with two things: line, without which 
it is impossible to reproduce any form, animate or inanimate, and 
colour, which gives the form the appearance of reality. Dirty three-
quarters of a canvas with black and white, rub the rest with yel-
low, dot it with red and blue blobs at random, and you will have 
an  impression  of spring before which the initiates will swoon in 
 ecstasy.’ Emile Cardon, ‘The exhibition of the Revoltes’, La Presse, 
29 April 1874, http://www.artchive.com/galleries/1874/74critic.
htm ( accessed 25 May 2017).
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those images that are undefined, blurred, literally poor, 
almost embodying an inherent myopia that makes them 
immediately aberrant, either to be treated (enhanced, 
photoshopped), or erased. Yet the relation between high 
definition and truth is far from being transparent. See the 
recent research showing how the use in court of high-
quality, slow-motion videos tends to distort understand-
ing of criminal responsibility. By allowing for a vision 
beyond the human threshold of detectability, slow-motion 
prolongs the temporality of crime footages, inducing the 
impression of premeditation on the part of the perpe-
trator: slow motion increases perceived intent.44 We are 
reminded of Eyal Weizman’s compelling exploration of 
the use of aerial images in court in order to detect whether 
a building has been hit by an illegal drone strike. Here, the 
law imposes a threshold of detectability (the legal resolu-
tion of aerial images, established at 50cm/pixel) which is 
meant to protect individual privacy (a pixel roughly cor-
responds to the size of one person), but at the same time 
allows for violence to slip beneath such a threshold (the 
pixel is also the size of the holes produced by drone strikes 
on civil roofs). The internal normativity of the digital 
image (its pixelated ontology) thus intersects the external 
normativity of Law, determining the use of ‘poor images’ 
that indirectly become enablers of violence.45
 44 Eugene M. Caruso, Zachary C. Burns, and Benjamin A. Converse, 
‘Slow Motion Increases Perceived Intent’, PNAS 113 (2016): 9250-
9255.
 45 Eyal Weizman, ‘Violence at the Threshold of Detectability’, 
E-flux Journal 64 (2015), http://www.e-flux.com/journal/64/60861/ 
violence-at-the-threshold-of-detectability/ (accessed 25 May 2017).
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Yet what if it is not a human eye, but the inhuman, 
digital and rhizomatic eye of the web that contemplates 
images? In this case, a wholly other normativity to which 
images must approximate emerges. In her essay In Defense 
of the Poor Image, Hito Steyerl reflects on the power that 
poor images assume in the Web 2.0, as the sheer materi-
ality of their low resolution disarticulates the neoliberal 
flow of commodified images, releasing ‘another form 
of value defined by velocity, intensity, and spread’. Fully 
exploiting the velocity, intensity, and spread of the visual 
economy of the Web 2.0, in the contribution to this vol-
ume picpoet takes pictures with the iPhone, writes the 
accompanying text on the spot, and then deterritorialises 
the resulting text-image by uploading it on the author’s 
Instagram account and website. Picpoetry, the author 
explains, is meant to be a process ‘of combining iPhone-
ography and instant text writing’ so as to produce a pic-
poem, a mixture of words and picture that hold a strong 
spatio-temporal relation with the event of its taking place. 
A work consistent with an understanding of vision that 
does no longer depend on human demand for clarity but 
rather on an inhuman demand for levity and portability, 
to the point of prompting a re-calibration of the visual 
economy itself, now ready to appreciate these blurred, 
shaky and indefinite images and footages as provided 
of a somewhat higher level of truth.46 Shakiness and low 
quality in fact may also carry a truth-value that, unlike 
 46 Hito Steyerl, ‘In Defense of the Poor Image’, E-flux Journal 10 (2009) 
http://www.e-flux.com/journal/10/61362/in-defense-of-the-poor-
image/ (accessed 25 May 2017).
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definition, is associated with risk and danger. As Michel 
Foucault observed in his discussion on parrhesia, ‘in its 
extreme form, telling the truth takes place in the ‘game’ 
of life or death’.47 The raw quality of such images may be 
said to embody truth in its most visceral form, as if, just 
like the parrhesiastes, such images would speak candidly, 
with open heart and mind, expressing truth in its most 
direct form.
If the point of parrhesia was to eschew any artifice 
so as to employ ‘the most direct words and forms of 
expression’,48 the use of words by picpoet may be said to 
perform a curious inversion. Whether there is an undeni-
able truth that any image carries, and a truth-value that 
any smart-phoned image conveys, picpoet’s texts seem 
to hinder and problematise the linearity of this assump-
tion. If these images are not shaky, blurred or grainy, 
the texts paired to them have the task to shake and blur 
them. ‘The connection between the textual and the visual 
is tight and parallel, yet not descriptive’, picpoet writes. 
Neither accompanying nor overlooking the images, these 
texts try to pierce them, whilst being flooded and dislo-
cated by them in return. A turbulent back-and-forth that 
splays out any truthfulness the image normatively holds, 
refraining from revealing, and rather endeavouring to 
diffracting the image itself, whilst simultaneously deny-
ing to the text any paternalistic pretence to describe it or, 
worse, explain it away.




Discussing the traditional art of textual commen-
tary, Masciandaro argues that this does not lie in going 
beyond, behind or below the text, so as to find its hidden 
meanings.49 A true commentary remains faithful to the 
text by staying within the text and, while avoiding ending 
up entrapped into its quicksand, holding it open to the 
other flows with which a text always entertains ‘relations 
of current, countercurrent, and eddy – to follow Deleuze – 
flows of shit, sperm, words, action, eroticism, money, 
politics’.50 Neither a description, nor an explanation, a 
commentary is best understood as a praxis of encircling 
the text, erecting ‘more and more perceptual enclosures, 
spaces within which the unrepresentable is brought into 
presence’.51 We may argue this is what the words do here, 
generating frictions at the encounter between words and 
images within each picpoem, as the text keeps chasing 
and encircling the image, without providing any explana-
tion but rather diffracting their sense into multiple points, 
their two-dimensional staticity into a three-dimensional 
atmospherics. These diffractions, the author explains, 
‘[allow] questions on the relevance of the law in terms of 
affective, embodied and spatialised movements to emerge 
both pictorially and textually, and ultimately left unan-
swered.’ They allow, that is, the discovery of a way law 
functions within the visual that is of another kind than 
 49 Nicola Masciandaro, ‘Becoming Spice: Commentary as Geophi-
losophy’, in Collapse, VI: Geo/Philosophy , ed. Robin Mackay (Fal-
mouth: Urbanomic, 2010)
 50 Gilles Deleuze ‘Letter to a Harsh Critic,’ in Deleuze, Negotiations, 
8-9.
 51 Masciandaro, ‘Becoming Spice’, 30.
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the abstraction dissected by Stojković, emergent, con-
fused, blurred.
In this sense, picpoet’s attempt is close to what Kathleen 
Stewart describes as a ‘writing and theorising that tries to 
stick with something becoming atmospheric [...] approach-
ing the thing that is happening by attuning to it’.52 By attuning 
to the normative tuning of an atmospherics that is present 
and yet invisibilised by the law, what each picpoem seeks 
to unfold are the traces of law’s own invisibilising work, the 
unrepresentable pull of the normative tensions holding us 
together, while ripping us apart. As the words, joining the 
pictures, let surface to sensoriality the ‘summer breeze’ of 
which we are just a ‘whiff ’, or the inhuman scream that the 
all-too-human vision strives to silence, at times a nostalgic 
tone transpires, as a murmured mourning the crumbling 
of humanity, individual agency, the possession and control 
over one’s own senses, releasing a bitter awareness, that ‘our 
happiness was easy, precious and polluted’.
Only that, of course, nothing is lost, because nothing 
was possessed in the first place. Certainly not seeing. The 
nostalgia here, rather than the unproductive yearning for 
a lost authenticity, becomes a productive mood through 
which the loss is turned into a visible presence, the visible 
as an ontological surface in which we dive, the text as a 
matter-image conspiring with the light, sculpting instants 
of eventful atmospherics in which seeing is infinitely dif-
fracted into post- and inhuman points of views, independ-
ent from the possibility of being, at some point, occupied.
 52 Kathleen Stewart, ‘Atmospheric Attunements’,  Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 29, no. 3 (2011): 450.
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Vision Without the Eye :  
Following the Material of  
Abstract Photography
Jelena Stojković
‘Because we believe it, we think we are seeing it.’
Vilém Flusser
0.0 Premise // Vision
Digital vision, Sean Cubitt writes, begins with a withdrawal 
of the eye.1 The machine, on which we are ever so increas-
ingly relying for visualising the world, self-evidently, does 
not and cannot see in the same manner as the eye, and 
this factual situation determines the status of our now pre-
dominant vision. The machine continues to collect, com-
pare and assemble visual data, but the articulating role 
that the eye performed in the past is now taken over by 
 1 Sean Cubitt, The Practice of Light: A Genealogy of Visual Technolo-
gies from Prints to Pixels (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 2014), 108.
40 Jelena Stojković
entirely automated systems of measurement and statisti-
cal  comparison.2 Not only that, but increasingly, our every 
interaction with the machine feeds precisely that system. 
As Hito Steyerl warns us, we are becoming accustomed to 
not seeing anything intelligible, as the processes of filtering, 
decrypting and pattern recognition replace vision itself.3
This is, of course, nothing new. As Gilles Deleuze 
famously pointed out, the machine evolves together with 
us; its mutation is our mutation.4 That we cannot write it 
out from the manner in which we see is already accepted 
in the concept of machinic vision, which John John-
ston (following Deleuze and his work with Félix Guat-
tari) defined as not only implying a type of seeing that 
is enabled by the machine but also in relation to it.5 The 
complicity of the camera in the historical development of 
this vision does not need to be reasserted: the apparatus, 
described as the most extraordinary invention in vision 
in possibly the whole of human history, was supposed to 
deliver the promise of technology’s ability to enrich and 
improve human sight.6 The ‘mechanical retina’, a term 
associated with the camera in the nineteenth century, ren-
dered visible what was invisible to the eye – the  surface of 
 2 Ibid.
 3 Hito Steyerl, ‘A Sea of Data: Apophenia and Pattern (Mis-) 
Recognition’, E-flux Journal 72, (April, 2016) http://www.e-flux.
com/journal/72/60480/a-sea-of-data-apophenia-and-pattern-mis-
recognition/ (accessed 22 January 2017)
 4 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, October 59 
(1992): 6.
 5 John Johnston, ‘Machinic Vision’, Critical Inquiry 26 (1999): 29.
 6 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-
Century French Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993), 124.
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the Moon, or the movements of a trotting horse’s hooves, 
for instance – but it also became entangled with the sys-
tems for measuring, classifying and the ordering of the 
world through images. The medium’s capacity to offer 
photographic evidence placed it in the centre of the tech-
niques of representation and regulation that are central to 
the network of such modern and disciplinary institutions 
as the police, the prison, the press, the asylum, the family, 
the hospital, the school or the courtroom.7
0.1. Argument // Material
In ‘Some Propositions on Photography’ (1965), American 
photographer, experimental filmmaker and writer, Hollis 
Frampton, describes photography as a term that brackets 
a number of activities: an industry, a craft, a technology, 
a tool, a science, a racket, a hobby, and a national pas-
time.8 Last of all, there is an art of photography, an activ-
ity that not only consumes the least material and funds, 
but is also the least noticeable. The main paradox with the 
art of photography is that regardless of the comparatively 
small territory that it occupies with regard to the other 
photographic ‘activities’, it carries a responsibility for the 
entirety of this field, or, in Frampton’s words, ‘its merits 
and defects, its entire possible manifestations’.9 Differently 
said, photography’s vast resonance for not only culture 
 7 John Tagg, The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and 
Histories (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 5.
 8 Hollis Frampton and Bruce Jenkins, On the Camera Arts and 
 Consecutive Matters: The Writings of Hollis Frampton (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2009), 5-6
 9 Ibid., 6.
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but also science and trade, as well as its encompassing of 
such a diverse range of genres as fashion photography, 
portraiture, or snapshot, are intrinsic to photography as 
a fine art practice. Photography is the starting point for, 
and the necessary restraint of, the art of photography, as 
the ties between them are too entwined to sever.
It is that practice of photography (as fine art) that will 
be discussed here in terms of the machinic conditions 
of digital vision. The digital ‘turn’, just in case the reader 
might need to be reminded, has brought about a sig-
nificant discussion since the 1990s about photography’s 
ontology, or what it might be and do within changed 
technological parameters. Despite the initial concerns 
that photography as we know it might become obsolete, 
the prevailing verdict at the moment seems to be that the 
‘turn’ enabled another transformation and proliferation 
of the medium, which assumed a central role in the com-
puterised networks of image production and dissemina-
tion.10 The fact that this optimism might be at odds with 
the warnings against the disorienting nature of digital 
vision brings us back to Frampton’s now fifty years old 
diagnosis: if we were to look for any radical envisioning of 
photography’s ability to make or unmake sense of vision 
as we now encounter it, it is the often marginalised fine 
art practice that should offer us clues.
Two photographic series, Taisuke Koyama’s Light Field 
(2015) and Nihal Yesil’s Leaping Field (2015), will thus 
 10 Alexandra Moschovi, Carol McKay, and Arabella Plouviez, eds., 
The Versatile Image: Photography, Digital Technologies and the In-
ternet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2013); Daniel Rubenstein, 
Jonny Golding, and Andy Fisher, eds., On the Verge of Photography: 
Imaging Beyond Representation (Birmingham: ARTicle, 2013).
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provide a focus in what follows, regarding their histori-
cal and theoretical contexts as photographic abstractions. 
However, in addition to looking closely at what we see in 
those photographs we will also problematise their mate-
rial basis, as in a recently posed question: what does it 
mean to ‘follow’ (and ‘act’ with) the material?11 Such a ‘fol-
lowing’ of the material, clearly, draws from a well-known 
and often quoted passage from A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1980), where Deleuze and 
Guattari assert that matter is always in movement and 
flux, and that such a ‘matter-flow’ can only be followed.12 
Jussi Parikka takes up a similar route in his recent study 
of the ‘geology of media’ and points at the fact that, seen 
from this perspective, the historical account of photog-
raphy can be read as a story of chemicals rather than 
simply of inventors, experimenters, or, we might add, 
artists.13 Within the focus on photography as fine art the 
task of ‘following’ the material will here be taken some-
what differently, claiming that photography is not only 
made of materials but that it also makes with materials, 
as any other fine art practice does. To act out this claim 
and point in the direction of a possible way out of digi-
tal vision’s normativity, we will engage with photographic 
history and criticism alongside not only media studies 
 11 Petra Lange-Berndt, ed., introduction to Materiality (London: Wh-
itechapel Gallery and Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
2015), 13.
 12 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1987), 409.
 13 Jussi Parikka, A Geology of Media (Minneapolis: University of 
 Minnesota Press, 2015), 55.
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but also the area that is still termed new materialism, and 
especially the writing of Karen Barad.
1.0 Surface // Light
In Light Field, Koyama places crumpled sheets of trans-
parent cellophane on a flatbed scanner and then employs 
a handheld scanner to document the process of its work-
ing, simultaneously redirecting and recording digital light 
as it passes through the transparent material ( Figure 1). 
The transparency of cellophane is read in negative in 
this process, whereas the movement of Koyama’s hand 
displaces the linear motion of the flatbed scanner’s LED 
lamp into what we see as a zigzagging line intersected by a 
rainbow of primary colours. The creases of cellophane are 
rendered into a nondescript mesh, unevenly distributed 
across the image, while an additional line registers as a 
coupling, shadow companion to the main, reflecting the 
body of the handheld scanner.14
Light conditions all vision, and as its title indicates, Koy-
ama’s series is made both about and from light. But what 
is digital light, and how is its status manifested in Koy-
ama’s work? We know since Isaac Newton’s experiments 
with optics in the seventeenth century that a ray of light is 
made of colours, that diffuse once they encounter a trans-
parent obstacle – a piece of cellophane for instance – as 
we can observe in Koyama’s series. Early physics believed 
 14 I am grateful to Taisuke Koyama for explaining the details of this 
series in our e-mail correspondence in April 2016. Light Field is 
published together with Photons by Taisuke Koyama Projects in 
2015. 
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that light behaves like a stream of solid particles which 
becomes noticeable in its reflection on a mirror or glass 
surface.15 The fact that light would not be blocked by a 
 15 Günter Leising, ‘Light and Order’, in Light Art from Artificial Light: 
Light as a Medium in 20th and 21st Century Art, ed. Peter Weibel 
(Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2006), 57.
Figure 1: Taisuke Koyama, Light Field 012, 2015.
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transparent object was one of the reasons for early doubts 
in this theory and the basis for Thomas Young’s nine-
teenth century ‘double slit experiment’, which proved that 
light also behaves as a wave.16 In order to approach the 
question of digital light, we first need to establish a dif-
ference between the understanding of light as a prime 
carrier of information about the world in a broad sense – 
as that which we see and the means by which we see – 
and the optic fibres that carry digital information in the 
modern world through an electrical process based on the 
switching between two states (one for on, and zero for 
off).17 Digital light, understood in this way, essentially 
stands for the ‘digital control of the emission of light’.18 
The word that needs to be stressed here is ‘control’, as it is 
the control of light, and not light itself, that is the actual 
foundation of contemporary, digital vision.19
In this sense, Koyama’s series can be understood as the 
documentation of the working of digital light, or the flat-
bed scanner’s LED lamp. However, more than simply pho-
tography, Koyama’s series evokes the process of painting or 
drawing: it is his operation of the handheld scanner that 
determines the texture, density and distribution of the 
LED lamp’s light that we see in the image. His work also 
involves an element of sculpting: the sheets of cellophane 
are placed between the two scanners in order to construct 
 16 Stephen Jones, ‘What is Digital Light?’, in Digital Light, eds. Sean 
Cubitt, Daniel Palmer, and Nathaniel Tkacz (London: Open 
 Humanities Press, 2015), 84.
 17 Ibid., 83-87.
 18 Ibid., 90.
 19 Sean Cubitt, Daniel Palmer, and Nathaniel Tkacz, eds., introduction 
to Digital Light (London: Open Humanities Press, 2015), 9.
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a multi-layered object for the self-induced and self-con-
tained diffusion, distribution and recording of digital light. 
In both instances, it is the hand and not the eye that takes 
the lead in the production of the image; the photographer 
simply operates the machine in search of the ultimately 
contingent visual inscription. Before coming back to the 
figure of the operator, Koyama’s series is important to us 
here for two other, intertwined elements. Firstly, what we 
see does not fall under the aesthetic category of represen-
tation but that of abstraction: we are not presented with 
anything recognisable but a pattern generated through the 
play of light and cellophane. However (and secondly), it is 
precisely this pattern (or the entanglement of light with cel-
lophane) that we see, and it is far from being nothing.
1.1 Cellophane // Abstraction
Judith Brown insists that the contemporary eye has lost 
a capability to empathise with the excitement associated 
with cellophane in the past, or to read the dated ‘semiot-
ics’ of the material.20 ‘La Cellophane’ (combining the first 
syllable of cellulose with the final syllable of diaphane, 
for ‘transparent’), the company that Jacques Brandenberg 
set up in Switzerland in the 1910s after isolating trans-
parent sheets of viscose, mostly sustained its business by 
offering the product as luxury packaging.21 The ‘luxury’ 
embedded in this early history of cellophane connoted 
 20 Judith Brown, Glamour in Six Dimensions: Modernism and the 
 Radiance of Form (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 145.
 21 Kit L. Yam, ed., The Wiley Encyclopedia of Packaging Technology 
(Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 527. 
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not only its practicality – a convenient means of wrap-
ping, guaranteeing freshness of the product it contained – 
but also its visual properties, as it offered an entry point 
for the increasingly consumerist eye into the shape, form, 
and sheer materiality of what it desired, functioning as 
an ever-so-slightly thin line of separation. Cellophane 
achieved its success in the 1930s, when the company 
expanded its operations in the US by providing a wrap-
per for cigarette brands such as Camel and Lucky Strike, 
and the popular Whitman’s chocolates. Cellophane sub-
sequently became a ubiquitous household item, in such 
products as Scotch tape, but was pushed out of the pack-
aging market by readily available alternatives like plastic 
wrap. The material is completely biodegradable and is 
therefore a subject of renewed interest, inviting specula-
tion about how its ‘luxury’, associated with the nascent 
consumerism on the 1900s, could be reinterpreted in 
environmental terms.
More to the point, Brown also indicates the resem-
blance between cellophane and photography: ‘cellophane 
arrests the gaze at its glittering surface, becomes a ver-
sion of the photograph, emptied of content and form 
[…], a blank surface that is endlessly appealing, seduc-
tive, though it transmits little beyond the wonder of its 
alchemy’.22 It is the blankness of this transparent surface 
that Brown reads as a symptomatic condition of the twen-
tieth century, as a ‘nothingness’ of a ‘formless void’, or the 
terrifying absence of meaning that the consumerist cul-
ture ultimately stands for. That this blankness registers in 
 22 Brown, Glamour in Six Dimensions, 151.
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Koyama’s series in negative is one thing. The other is that 
Brown’s binding of photography and cellophane, through 
their symbolical value to stand in for nothingness, also 
becomes pertinent to consider vis-à-vis what is broadly 
associated with the representation of nothingness, or the 
rendering of abstraction in fine art practice.23
Lyle Rexer, in his study of abstraction in photography, 
highlights the fact that the medium has always had a differ-
ent relationship to abstraction from painting.24 Photogra-
phy’s mechanism for recording light forever ‘wedded’ it to 
the world, and what is most frequently termed as its ‘index-
ical’ nature places it in a specific position: photography is a 
tension between what is seen and what is understood about 
that which is seen in an image.25 No matter how empty an 
image might seem, or how nothing-like it might appear, 
through its nuptial relationship to the world, a photograph 
is always about looking. Rather than mechanisms for look-
ing at or looking through, abstract photographs offer a 
means for looking with.26 Going back to Koyama’s series, 
although we are presented with a seemingly unintelligible 
abstraction, conventionally understood as a representation 
of nothing, and conveniently rendered visible through a 
material that brings forth similar associations, where does 
it take us as a tool for looking with?
 23 Kirk Varnedoe, Pictures of Nothing: Abstract Art Since Pollock 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
 24 Lyle Rexer, The Edge of Vision: The Rise of Abstraction in Photogra-
phy (New York: Aperture, 2009), 15.
 25 Ibid., 15-16.
 26 Ibid., 11.
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2.0 Outside // Patterns
To follow this line of argument a little further, let us 
consider another photographic series, James Welling’s 
seminal Aluminium Foil (1980-1981). The visual simi-
larities with Koyama’s Light Field are stark, almost to 
the point of regarding the latter as a direct citation of 
the former. However, they are essentially very different 
projects, as Welling is using the simplest of photographic 
methods – close-up zooming and cropping – to max-
imise the abstract potential of the photographic surface. 
The series was produced in the artist’s studio over several 
months after Welling became preoccupied with alumin-
ium foil by noticing how it behaves as a packaging for 
butter, and was presented in 1981 at his first solo exhibi-
tion. As many writers have noted, in the close-up render-
ing of aluminium foil’s creases, these photographs invite 
an associative viewing experience, something that Steyerl 
recently wrote about in terms of ‘apophenia’, or the per-
ception of patterns within random data.27
Photography’s ability to exactly re-produce patterns, 
or as Geoffrey Batchen frames it, to visualise mathemati-
cal information, was evidenced early on in its history.28 
 27 For instance, James Crump notes: ‘The Aluminium Foil pictures 
play with the surface of a known material that, when stressed and 
crumpled and then photographed, is capable of conjuring an image 
poles apart from the referent object. With surfaces on which he has 
amassed mesmerising quantities of detail, these photographs hold 
the possibility of endless readings, and […] they rely on the be-
holder to fill in meaning’, as per: James Crump, ed., James Welling, 
Monograph (New York: Aperture, 2013), 65; Steyerl, ‘A Sea of Data’. 
 28 Geoffrey Batchen, ‘Electricity Made Visible’, in New Media, Old Me-
dia: A History and Theory Reader, eds. Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and 
Thomas Keenan (New York: Routledge, 2006), 31.
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For Batchen, it is Henry Fox Talbot’s experiments with 
 camera-less photography, and the resulting imaging of 
pieces of lace produced in the 1840s, that offer the point 
of departure for examining the tension between the pho-
tographic surface and the material that it presumably only 
renders visible. In the process of ‘photogenic drawing’ 
that Talbot uses, the images of lace become integrated in 
(rather than just on) the paper that contains them: ‘figure 
and ground, image and support, fibres and tone, touch-
able reality and optical simulation, are here all collapsed in 
the same visual experience’.29 Elsewhere, Batchen explains 
a range of similar photographic experiments (both his-
torical and contemporary) through two defining charac-
teristics: their embodiment of the duration of the action 
that they record and their signification of their own com-
ing into being.30 This definition goes against the widely-
adopted understanding of photography as a ‘slice of time’ 
that refers to something outside of itself and the result, 
often an abstract pattern, becomes ‘a picture of nothing, 
that is, but its own capacity to represent anything’.31
Batchen’s writing helps us to test out the situation that 
Steyerl describes in photographic terms, as Welling’s 
series deliberately invites and thereby reflects on the 
experience of ‘apophenia’. Such inviting of what is more 
commonly referred to as ‘free associations’, is one of the 
defining characteristics of abstraction and has been inte-
gral to this pictorial tradition throughout the twentieth 
 29 Ibid., 30.
 30 Geoffrey Batchen, ‘“Photography”: An Art of the Real’, in What is a 
Photograph?, ed. Carol Squiers (Munich: Prestel, 2013), 48.
 31 Ibid., 54.
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century.32 Furthermore, in its registering of mathemati-
cal data, photography was not only always digital but was 
also always able to represent anything.33 Batchen high-
lights this intrinsic potential of photography by using 
inverted commas, terming it ‘photography’, to stress its 
cultural and material basis. In his view, Rexer’s definition 
of abstract photography becomes a philosophical ques-
tion: by asking us to think about how we are seeing, such 
photography, he claims, ‘asks us to see what is right in 
front of our eyes’.34
2.1 Foil // Entanglement
What do we see right in front of our eyes if we continue to 
‘follow’ the material of abstract photography in Welling’s 
series? Talbot’s choice of the material was not divorced 
from the historical conditions of the machine-made lace 
industry in England at that time.35 In Welling’s case, this 
makes us wonder whether it is only through its abstract 
rendering of the aluminium foil’s surface that the art-
ist is conveying his postmodernist criticism.36 As Mimi 
Sheller showed in her extensive study of aluminium, the 
material is possibly the richest one to ‘follow’ for a correct 
 32 Varnedoe, Pictures of Nothing, 3.
 33 Cubitt, Palmer and Tkacz, Digital Light, 11.
 34 Batchen, ‘“Photography”: An Art of the Real’, 60.
 35 Batchen, ‘Electricity Made Visible’, 31.
 36 Welling’s practice is customarily read as an essential part of the so-
called ‘pictures generation’ of postmodernist photographers in the 
US. For a well-known reference to the Aluminium Foil as ‘pictures 
of nothing’ in such a context see Abigail Solomon-Godeau, ‘Playing 
in the Fields of the Image’, Afterimage, 10, 1-2 (1982): 10-13.
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 understanding of modernist logic. Although iron or plas-
tics had their prominent roles to play in the material cul-
ture of the last century, it is aluminium that enabled the 
lightness and speed of the car, the train, the space shuttle, 
or the bomb, with which we now associate that century. On 
the other hand, aluminium also brings to the fore a specific 
twenty-first century conundrum: although its extraction 
continues to divide the ‘developed’ from the ‘underdevel-
oped’ countries and continues to play an essential part in 
warfare, it is increasingly becoming an essential part in the 
design of the new sustainable technologies.37
By the beginning of the 1980s, this conundrum had 
already made itself apparent. We can think of the famous 
décor of Andy Warhol’s first ‘Factory’ (1962-1968), plas-
tered in aluminium foil and silver paint to construct a 
dazzling, light-reflecting surface, as conveying the tension 
entangled with aluminium in the 1960s. Warhol saw the 
décor of his studio both as a futuristic setting – evoking 
astronaut suits or such comic book characters as ‘Silver 
Surfer’ – as well as an homage to the ‘silver screen’ of Hol-
lywood.38 This tension translates into Welling’s series, as 
it invites the viewers to project their free associations not 
only into an abstract pattern but into the particular mate-
rial through which it takes shape; one that has already 
become emblematic of futurity and progress. What inter-
ests Welling is to engage visually with those materials that 
are in one way or another allegorical of photography (in 
 37 Mimi Sheller, Aluminium Dreams: The Making of Light Modernity 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2014), 4.
 38 Arthur Danto, Andy Warhol (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2009), 93.
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the same way that cellophane might be), and this inter-
est is explored in his subsequent work. In this sense alu-
minium foil not only features a similar versatility and 
reflectivity to photography, but also, intentionally or not, 
invites the same type of progressive, futuristic and tech-
nocratic free associations as the medium that renders it 
visible. What we ‘see in front of our eyes’ in Welling’s case 
is the entanglement of the photographic image with the 
technology and material that produce it, but also with the 
norms and effects that the same technology and material 
impose on our daily lives.
3.0 Inside // Camera
This detour allows us to realise that Koyama’s series 
brings into the present much of photography’s historical 
and cultural baggage, and this makes us question what 
else we might find entangled with it if we continued to 
‘follow’ the material. With this question in mind, let 
us now come back to Yesil’s Leaping Field, in which we 
encounter the digital camera’s recording of fluorescent 
light as it bounces around the surface of a piece of wavy 
PVC (Figure 2). Although the image does not appear in 
the viewfinder in the process of Yesil’s photographing, it 
reveals itself when stored in the camera’s memory. As an 
abstraction, it invites similar projections or associative 
readings as to the cases of Koyama’s and Welling’s pho-
tographs. Similar to Koyama’s series, the images are pro-
duced autonomously by the apparatus – in this instance 
the camera – as it is assigned the role of capturing the 
image through its registering of a contingent, abstract 
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pattern. Yesil, again similar to Koyama, does not seem to 
be photographing in a traditional sense but more to be 
operating the camera-machine, pointing it in the direc-
tion of the light source but letting it assume responsibility 
for the capture of the abstract pattern.
Figure 2: Nihal Yesil, Leaping Field, 2015.
56 Jelena Stojković
The figure of the operator has been in use in the photo-
graphic jargon for some time now. It is a preferable term 
for Roland Barthes in his Camera Lucida: Reflections 
on Photography (1981), and features heavily in Vilém 
Flusser’s Towards a Philosophy of Photography (1983). In 
his theory of gestures, the operator is described by Flusser 
as somebody who takes up an active part in the optical 
process of photographing, a gesture that Flusser consid-
ers to be of looking; this figure searches for and takes up a 
specific position, cuts through and manipulates the scene, 
and reflects on every decision as it is made.39 This opera-
tor, on the other hand, can also be related to the gesture of 
making, as this gesture involves the hand rather than the 
eye.40 The gesture of making involves the hand’s ‘grasp-
ing’, ‘evaluating’ and ‘informing’ of an object, but it is also 
based significantly on the raw material’s ‘resistance’ to 
the hand that is attempting to impress it with value.41 The 
photographic apparatus, or the camera, is a ‘tool’ that ena-
bles the gesture of photographing, which is also a gesture 
of making. The tool (the eye) and the body (the hand), for 
Flusser, are so enmeshed that assigning one or the other a 
specific function is pointless: defining photography as an 
improvement or outer-bodily extension of human sight 
can only be understood as a figure of speech.42
The ‘raw material’ evoked, in both series in question, 
is undoubtedly that of light, an essential component 
 39 Vilém Flusser, Gestures (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2014), 72-85.
 40 Ibid., 32-47.
 41 Ibid., 40.
 42 Ibid., 80.
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of both photography and vision. It is light that enables 
and constitutes them, entangling the operator and the 
recording apparatus in the process of its own entangle-
ment with another material. In both cases, however, the 
artists seem to be operating the apparatuses through 
which light is already captured and controlled: the digital 
emission of LED light but also the camera itself, which 
is another apparatus that isolates and disciplines light.43 
In such terms, Yesil’s artistic intervention not only con-
sists of letting go of the control over the framing of the 
image but also of her ascribing to the ‘field’ indicated in 
the title of the series the kinetic ability of ‘leaping’. We can 
consider this ability of a ‘field’ for movement and action 
to be related to the feature of surfaces that Tim Ingold 
describes as ‘leaking’.44 Ingold’s argument departs from 
the old Aristotelian dichotomy between form and mat-
ter in which an agent imposes a form on a passive matter 
with a particular end or goal in mind. The similarity with 
photography is here straightforward, with the role of the 
agent played by the classical figure of the photographer, 
whereas the photograph can be considered to be a form 
imposed on the material, or matter that it renders visible. 
For Ingold, however, who also ‘follows’ the material in the 
sense suggested by Deleuze and Guattari posited above, 
the interest of an artist is not in this imposition but in 
 43 Tim Ingold, ‘Bringing Things to Life: Creative Entanglements 
in a World of Materials’, NCRM Working Paper Series. ESRC 
 National Centre for Research Methods, (July 2010)  http://eprints.
ncrm.ac.uk/1306/1/0510_creative_entanglements.pdf (accessed 
22  January, 2017)
 44 John Tagg, The Disciplinary Frame: Photographic Truths and the 
 Capture of Meaning (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 1. 
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what he describes as: ‘bringing together diverse materials 
and combining or redirecting their flow in the anticipa-
tion of what might emerge’.45
We can also read the ability for ‘leaping’ of (a field of) 
light in Yesil’s series as evoking a ‘quantum leap’, or a pro-
cess of change induced by an abrupt movement. In both 
cases, it primarily indicates an interest in the merging of 
the materials (light-photography), within the understand-
ing of the photographic medium as a gesture of not simply 
photographing but also making. However, for us to fully 
establish how this situation occurs in photography specifi-
cally, or how the materials not only entangle in the image 
but also in the apparatus that produces it, we also need to 
‘follow’ the material that Yesil is photographing.46
3.1 PVC // Display
Poluvinyl chloride, better known as PVC, or just vinyl, 
is the second largest volume-produced plastic, character-
ised by toughness, low cost and the ability to modify its 
physical properties.47 We would normally encounter it in 
housing materials or telecommunication wire coatings 
or in such ubiquitous products as credit cards or plastic 
 45 Ibid., 9. 
 46 Yesil’s particular interest in PVC began in 2007, when she bought 
fourteen rolls of PVC in different colours from a shop in Istan-
bul located on a street only selling plastic. It was also used in her 
 previous series of images, Narrow Fields (2007), in which two layers 
of PVC sheets were photographed on top of each other under direct 
sun light. I am grateful to Nihal for explaining her interest in PVC 
and the details of her work to me in our e-mail correspondence 
in April 2016. Leaping Field is published together with Murmuring 
Field by Even Press in 2016.
 47 Yam, The Wiley Encyclopedia, 963.
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bottles. The development of PVC, first produced in Ger-
many in the 1930s, is, however, inseparable from the 
wider history of plastic, the material that came to domi-
nate our everyday life to such an extent that we are con-
sidered to be living in the ‘Plastic Age’. Plastic has been 
studied extensively, and the seminal texts include Roland 
Barthes’s writing (1957) as well as Jeffrey Meikle’s book 
about the material’s integration with American culture.48 
The most recent research describes the centrality of plas-
tic to the processes of contemporary socio-material living 
as not only a synonym for environmental degradation but 
also a catalyst of causal and political reverberations that 
give shape to the ways we think and act.49
In addition, we cannot but notice the role that pho-
tographic technology played in the history of plastic’s 
gradual takeover of everyday life, and vice versa. It was 
the popularity of photographic film, after all, that helped 
market the early uses of celluloid, regardless of its thermal 
instability.50 On the other hand, although analogue pho-
tography is conventionally associated with photographic 
chemicals and photosensitive paper, it is celluloid film 
and the Bakelite cameras that popularised the technolo-
gy.51 The history of photography, undoubtedly, is also a 
history of plastic. Therefore, that plastic plays a decisive 
 48 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, (London: Vintage, 2009), 117-119; 
Jeffrey Meikle, American Plastic: A Cultural History, (New Brunswick, 
NJ Rutgers University Press, 1995). 
 49 Jennifer Gabrys, Gat Hawkins, and Mike Michael, eds., Accumula-
tion: The Material Politics of Plastic (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 
2013), 2-4.
 50 Ibid., 19.
 51 Stephen Fenichell, Plastic: The Making of a Synthetic Century (New 
York: Harper Business, 1996).
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role for not only how images are captured but also for 
how they are most often displayed and viewed in modern 
culture – through digital interfaces infused with plastic 
and often navigated by touching as much as by looking – 
is another nodal point of entanglement that the PVC used 
in Yesil’s series makes us account for.
4.0 Summary // Field
According to Peter Galassi, the ultimate origin of photog-
raphy needs to be looked for in the invention of linear per-
spective in the fifteenth century.52 Unlike those accounts 
that establish photography’s emergence in the technologi-
cal development of the camera obscura since the Renais-
sance, this one insists that photography’s coming to being 
was not divorced from a more general history of seeing. 
As is well known, this invention brought about the order-
ing of what was visible in the perceptual field in relation to 
not only modern science but also emerging capitalism.53 
If we take it that such an ordering – of the field of vision, 
its digital constitution in light, or its material basis – 
continues to determine digital vision, we might presume 
that abstract photography, the ‘pictures of nothing’ that 
we encountered here through the work of Koyama and 
Yesil, suggest an antagonistic or an oppositional intention. 
In order to accurately understand where precisely these 
artistic interventions take place, however, we now need to 
 52 Peter Galassi, Before Photography: Painting and the Invention of 
Photography (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1981), 12.
 53 Jay, Downcast Eyes, 57.
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turn to what is understood by ‘nothingness’ in quantum 
physics, as explained to us by Karen Barad.
For Barad, to even start thinking or speaking about 
nothingness implies asking what is the measure of noth-
ingness according to which we might grasp it.54 Measure-
ments, however, require specific measurement apparatus 
and their working cannot be understood in terms of an 
interaction with what is being measured but rather as 
intra-action, in that observation is inseparable from what 
is observed.55 Importantly for us, it is light that Barad 
takes as an example of this claim: as the ‘wave-particle 
duality paradox’ evidences, when the electrons of light 
are measured using one kind of apparatus they are waves, 
but when they are measured with another (complemen-
tary apparatus) they are particles.56 In such a manner, it 
is indeterminacy that lies at the core of quantum physics’ 
understanding of nothingness, but this indeterminacy 
signals not an absence, but a radical kind of openness, 
characterised by an infinity of possibilities.57
What does this mean to us? We can regard indeter-
minacy vis-à-vis photography’s self-entanglement that 
Frampton helped us to identify – the inability to divorce 
‘fine art’ from ‘evidence’ – which is still at the core of the 
medium’s misinterpretation, even in the digital ‘turn’.58 
Following Batchen, however, we can safely conclude that 
 54 Karen Barad, What is the Measure of Nothingness? Infinity, Virtuality, 
Justice (Osfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2012), 5.
 55 Ibid., 6.
 56 Ibid.
 57 Ibid., 16.
 58 Martin Lister, ed., The Photographic Image in Digital Culture (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1995), 16.
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even when operating at the ‘edge of vision’ – as fine art 
and abstraction – photography never escapes the order-
ing and re-ordering of the field of vision, of which it is 
always a part, and which is always already controlled by 
the apparatus that tame and discipline light. Indeter-
minacy, however, has larger implications for us here in 
terms of the entanglements that we identified to be cen-
tral to photography’s practice: between the operator and 
the machine, as well as between the technology and the 
material. ‘Following’ the material, or beginning to do so 
(in the cases of cellophane, aluminium foil and PVC but 
also light), we established that especially the latter entan-
glement operates on multiple levels in photographic 
terms. Photography does not simply represent materials 
but is equally made of them. Furthermore, the materials 
that photography represent and of which it consists are 
not only intrinsically unstable and in constant flux, but 
are sometimes allegorical of each other or literally one 
and the same. Finally, photography also makes with the 
material, that of light, and this fact potentially places the 
medium in an important relation to what Barad terms to 
be radical openness at the core of all matter.
4.1 Proposition // Waves
Barad’s project of agential realism is based on a strong 
commitment to, what she defines as, ‘accounting for 
the material nature of practices and how they come to 
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matter’.59 The first step for the development of this project 
is a strong critique of representationalism, or a distinc-
tion that is customarily made between representations 
and that which they aspire to represent in Western philo-
sophical thought.60 Here we find a very potent framework 
for better understanding the position of our two series, 
as Barad takes up the working of the scanning tunnel-
ling microscopes (STM) to demonstrate her criticism. 
Although normally associated with the processes of see-
ing, these machines are essentially based more on the 
sense of touch than sight and are described as forming 
images of atoms ‘in a way which is similar to the way a 
blind person can form a mental image of an object by feel-
ing the object’.61 Moreover, the STM operator does more 
than simply ‘push a button’ for an image to appear; the 
‘seeing’ of an atom is not simply a process of magnifica-
tion but involves a series of practices, including complex 
and detailed preparations of both the microscope and the 
specimen. This leads Barad to conclude that, ‘images and 
representations are not snapshots or depictions of what 
awaits us but rather condensations or traces of multiple 
practices of engagement’.62
For photography, a quintessential instance of the prac-
tices of representation, this statement holds significant 
repercussions that lie beyond the two series of our interest, 
 59 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and 
the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2007), 45.
 60 Ibid., 46.
 61 Ibid., 52.
 62 Ibid., 53.
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but which they can be seen to be exemplary of. In terms 
of those series in particular, they seem to be positioned in 
the channels of ‘tunnelling’ through which STM functions, 
as the process allows particles to traverse energy barriers 
that Newtonian physics imposes on them.63 STM, in other 
words, not only requires the apparatus to ‘touch-see’ the 
object but also the object to come and ‘meet it’, and this 
point of intra-action, in Barad’s terms, is where both Koy-
ama and Yesil base their artistic interventions: as primarily 
photographic experiments, they do not take place outside 
but inside the phenomena that they represent. By doing 
so, and by functioning as tools for looking with, they push 
open the door into a possible rethinking of their medium 
and, implicitly, into the very understanding of digital vision.
Here, it is time for us to come up with a preliminary 
proposition. As Orit Halpern also suggests, digital vision, 
in its entanglement with data visualisations that increas-
ingly require haptic forms of interactivity, cannot be 
taken to be an isolated form of perception but needs to 
be understood as inseparable from other senses.64 Barad 
herself has already demonstrated the limitation of the 
concept of machinic vision, recognised also by Johnston 
at the moment of its definition, which becomes ostensi-
ble when placed in constellation with such non-human 
agents as animals.65 If by this we succeeded in attending, 
 63 Ibid., 52.
 64 Orit Halpern, Beautiful Data: A History of Vision and Reason Since 
1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 21.
 65 Karen Barad, ‘Invertebrate Visions: Diffractions of the Brittlestar’, in 
The Multispieces Salon, ed. Eben Kirksey (Durham: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2014). For Johnston, the limitations of machinic vision 
become apparent in terms of the inevitability of artificial, or vir-
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at least to some extent, to the problem of representation, 
we are still left with the one of regulation that we started 
from, and our proposition then requires one final stretch. 
In order to deliver her critique of representationalism, 
Barad turns to the principle of diffraction, a phenomenon 
that is of central importance to her project. She explains 
diffraction in terms of physics as a particular behaviour 
of waves, which combine and overlap once they encoun-
ter an obstruction.66 This behaviour is central to all kinds 
of waves, whether water, sound or light, and differenti-
ates them from particles: unlike particles (material enti-
ties occupying a point in space and time) waves are not 
things per se but rather ‘disturbances that propagate in 
a medium’ (and that can overlap at the same point in 
space).67 Diffraction plays a role in nearly all optical phe-
nomena, and we can observe it in our two series not only 
through what we come to see but also through how we 
come to see it, as diffraction poses a limit to the resolving 
power of a lens or any other visualising system.68
Diffraction is not only an optical phenomenon that 
Barad helps us to understand but also a methodological 
approach that she adopts from Donna Haraway. Follow-
ing Haraway, Barad proposes diffraction as an alternative 
to the optical metaphor of reflection, in that: whereas 
reflection is about mirroring and sameness, diffraction 
tual reality that the digital image foreshadows. For the resonance of 
Barad’s writing in this field see: Jane Prophet and Helen Pritchard, 
‘Performative Apparatus and Diffractive Practices: An Account of 
Artificial Life Art’, Artificial Life 21, no. 3 (2015): 332-343.
 66 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 74.
 67 Ibid., 75.
 68 Barad, ‘Invertebrate Visions’, 231.
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attends to patterns of difference.69 This suggestion is of 
huge resonance and offers us with a starting point to rede-
fine nothing less than the very basis of science and ethics. 
And it appears to indicate that by ‘following’ the material 
we find ourselves questioning the essential parameters of 
both vision and ethics. Rather than risking over-simplifi-
cation and analogy at this point, it seems more appropri-
ate that we leave it at that, in an open ending that also 
reads as a beginning.
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The Self-Chasing Instrument : 
Idealism, Vision, and Judgement
Ben Woodard
While much phenomenology, particularly in its more 
theological variants, has made various cases for how we 
can supposedly perceive the imperceivable, or the invis-
ible, this is often done despite, or in direct confrontation 
with, the claims of the natural sciences. Some inherent 
human capacity to perceive or sense (often via a tran-
scendental ego or more general account of the given and 
givenness) is set against the purported limitations and 
dangers of the scopic or, more generally, of the very func-
tion of representation.
In the following I hope to address how vision, or repre-
sentation generically construed, can benefit from a con-
joined idealist skepticism and a naturalist materialisation 
by way of F.W.J. von Schelling’s work. Schelling’s Natur-
philosophie, rather than being a reductionist naturalism, 
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or an idealism about nature, attempts to articulate how 
we conceive of a nature which philosophises and senses 
through us. In this regard, the various senses of the 
human body, the natural capacities for sensation which 
phenomenology attempts to de-materialise, function as 
nature attempting to access itself through the production 
of experiences, cognitions, and representations. Thus, our 
various complex capacities to abstract and perceive such 
abstraction are not in spite of nature, or in phenomeno-
logical isolation from it, but because of nature’s generative 
complexity.
By creating a feedback loop between naturalism and 
idealism, Schelling’s work generates a very particular 
form of second-order empiricism in which apparently 
ideal, or purportedly human capacities for regulating, 
or normalising our experiences, are part of the same 
world to which nature belongs. Schelling therefore 
resists a form of judgement, or law, which is merely the 
force of the normative removed from sense. In this way, 
vision and representation become actions in the world 
that create as much as they discover things supposedly 
‘above’ it. In this regard, the abstract becomes a function 
whose morphology is difficult, but not impossible, to 
determine. If thinking is that form of vision which ‘sees’ 
thought, then we can investigate idealism as that form of 
thought which attempts to track and legislate the ways 
in which thought attempts to see itself, and importantly 
judge itself, as thought. In the following discussion we 
will investigate a narrow instance of this, namely, what 
the normative becomes which naturalism is broadly 
expanded.
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1. Idealism and Vision
As a philosophical tradition, idealism is generally reduced 
to two related forms, one ontological and the other epis-
temological. The first strain of idealism is generally taken 
to mean that what exists, or what is, is mind. Or, slightly 
more specifically, the general thesis of ontological ideal-
ism would be that what exists is mind dependent (i.e., 
what I think is, or what god thinks is). Various caveats 
and questions can be raised immediately but, importantly, 
this is often taken, at least by the numerous critics of ide-
alism, as self-evidentially problematic. The ontological 
idealist, her enemies assume, believes straightforwardly 
that reality pours out of the mind of beings (human or 
otherwise). The second form, the epistemological one, 
claims that all we can know is mind-dependent, or what 
we know is always constructed by minds without making 
deeper claims about substance or the ontological consti-
tution of the world.
Some figures have argued for one form and not the 
other while Berkeley, at least as it is traditionally stated, 
argued that you could not adhere to one form without 
adopting the other. This division of idealism into onto-
logical and epistemological variants covers over several 
problems and complications which are directly relevant 
for our investigation here regarding the relationship 
between vision and judgement (which must necessarily 
pass through vision). Immediately one can notice that 
the general outline of the ontological and epistemological 
strands of idealism says nothing about what mind is using 
to construct the world; whether we admit there is only 
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my mind, or many minds; how is it that minds communi-
cate if there are only minds; and whether many ontologi-
cal idealists emphatically state that the world is mind or 
merely is mind-like?
In relation to the latter point, that the world may be 
mind-like, this can be taken as a claim following scep-
ticism regarding the role and function of substance, or 
matter, as having an explanatory role. That is, in saying 
the world is mind-like, many idealist philosophers are 
simply claiming that things (or objects, or matter) are 
potentially secondary while processes, flows, dynamisms, 
et cetera are primary. In this regard, the mind-depend-
ence of the epistemological claim shifts parameters. 
Mind-dependence does not mean that one claims that 
the world is constructed entirely out of my, or anyone’s, 
head substance, but that common features of our visible 
world, or pragmatic world, should not be taken as ready-
made, but must be taken as being actively coded by our 
senses which are themselves not giving us direct relations 
to the world but are instead producing conceptually over-
loaded entities that we engage as immediate experience.
An immediate wrinkle in the general critique of ide-
alism, particularly in numerous post-structuralist or 
post-modern thinkers, becomes apparent. Many of these 
critiques would assert that idealism equates representa-
tions with the represented yet, given the deep scepticism 
in nearly every form of idealism, a scepticism that main-
tains a difference between mind-like and not mind-like 
processes, such an idealism would become a direct real-
ism and could no longer be considered an idealism. The 
crude caricature of ontological idealism would make it 
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impossible for either ontological or epistemological ide-
alists to make judgements, even in the most basic sense of 
things, or processes, being mind-like or minded.
That visual (and all other forms of) phenomena involve 
our active participation is a philosophical claim most 
recognised as belonging to Kant, that our faculties build 
the world out of more rudimentary relations to the world 
as it is. Traditionally, the general idealist epistemological 
claim that we actively participate in the construction of 
the world was taken as one of hubris, when in fact, it was 
directed against empiricists, as well as objectivists who, in 
the view of idealism, were attempting to paint an image of 
experience that was decidedly simple and unproblematic.
In this sense, many idealists (from Berkeley up to Brad-
ley if not after) did not see their form of philosophy as 
opposed to any kind of realism, but rather to a crude 
materialism that attempted to dismiss or overly psychol-
ogise experience. This is evident in the fact that thinkers 
such as F.H. Bradley argued that experience was our most 
direct access (in a realist form) to reality but that, never-
theless, this access was incomplete and required exten-
sive methodological rigor, and the use of sciences such as 
logic, to widen the ambit of experience in order to better 
understand the levels of appearance which had long set-
tled on the surface of the world undulating beneath it.
For nothing is actually removed from existence by 
being labelled ‘appearance.’ What appears is there, 
and must be dealt with; but materialism has no ra-
tional way of dealing with appearance. Appearance 
must belong, and yet cannot belong, to the extended. 
It neither is able to fall somewhere apart, since there 
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is no other real place; nor ought it, since, if so, the 
relation would vanish and appearance would cease 
to be derivative. But, on the other side, if it belongs 
in any sense to the reality, how can it be shown not to 
infect that with its own unreal character?1
Another way of complicating the caricature of idealism as 
merely fabricating the world in total, which is directly rel-
evant to our goal here, is to examine the general relation 
between idealism and the sciences. Berkeley, who is often 
taken as the most subjective idealist (even by other ide-
alists) wrote a tract on vision entitled An Essay Towards 
a New Theory of Vision (1709). While some historical 
hand-waving has been done to claim that in this initial 
text Berkeley worked as a scientist while in his later work 
he functioned as a pure idealist, this lacks any significant 
proof that I can find. Berkeley begins his text with the 
idea that while we experience distance we cannot really 
see distance as such. He follows this up by saying that dis-
tance, as an experience, is a judgement that is not given to 
us by our senses. The great space where we place various 
objects (apartments, streets, garbage bins) is constructed 
to orient the space around us which is a judgement our 
mind makes on our visual experience and not, again in 
the general idealist tradition, one ready-made.
Berkeley writes:
Now though the Accounts here given of perceiving 
near Distance by Sight are received for true, and ac-
cordingly made use of in determining the apparent 
Places of Objects, they do nevertheless seem very 
 1 F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay ( London: 
George Allen, 1893), 15.
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unsatisfactory: And that for these following Reasons. 
It is evident that when the Mind perceives any Idea, 
not immediately and of itself, it must be by the means 
of some other Idea: Thus, for Instance, the Passions 
which are in the Mind of another, are of themselves 
to me invisible. I may nevertheless perceive them by 
Sight, though not immediately, yet by means of the 
Colours they produce in the Countenance. We often 
see Shame or Fear in the Looks of a Man, by perceiv-
ing the Changes of his Countenance to Red or Pale.2
Several points need to be clarified. First, as Berkeley makes 
clear, the word Idea he takes to be as generic as the use 
of the words Thing or Object, but merely with the added 
emphasis that our mind is coding, or actively adding to, 
that which we encounter as an instance of individuated 
experience. Furthermore, while our experience consists 
of chaining together these ideas to give us perception, or 
vision, we are still aware of the fact that certain chains of 
Ideas point to barriers and boundaries which our vision 
is attempting to shortcut, whether the notion of how 
distance relates to clarity or obscurity, or whether the 
expression on someone’s face is indicative of a mental or 
behavioural state.3 One way Berkeley argues we can parse 
this difference is by marking a difference between tangi-
ble magnitude and visual magnitude.4 Berkeley believes 
we need these senses to check, or articulate one another’s 
 2 George Berkeley, An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision 
( London: Classical Reprint, 1709), 13.
 3 We will see below that the very operation of a mind productively 
chaining together experiences is something the later idealists see as 
a fatal flaw not only to Berkeley, but to the empiricist tradition as a 
whole.
 4 Berkeley, Theory of Vision, 15.
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limitations, because while we may scientifically under-
stand optics or geometry, we also know that we add these 
formulations after the experiences they explain.
Despite the general treatment of idealism as anti- 
scientific, Berkeley is not dismissing science as useless 
at all, as he would not celebrate numerous treatises on 
optics or studies of the eye if this were so. Rather, Berke-
ley thinks there are means of explaining vision internal to 
the experience of it which have a different (not better, or 
more advanced) way of explaining our articulation of the 
senses as part of, but not all of, experience. For Berkeley, 
if the mind adds something to the visual experience, the 
mind still relies upon the data that vision provides. An 
experience of vision would be the constructive capacities 
of the mind combined with the act of seeing.
For instance, Berkeley says it is absurd to think that we 
experience multiple objects, or that an object (or Idea) 
has multiple simultaneous forms. Yet our senses give us 
very different perceptions of the same object. Berkeley 
gives the example of a coach passing in the street below 
one’s window. The way I see the distance the coach is 
moving with my vision, and the way I track it by ear it 
are different for me, yet both give more or less accurate 
perceptions that the coach is moving.5
Berkeley argues that our tactile experience of the world 
checks and balances out the visual (or for that matter 
auditory) depictions of it. For instance, Berkeley argues 
that someone who had just been given sight would not 
understand perspective or magnitude across distances 
 5 Ibid., 13.
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without having moved through the world and interacted 
with it by grasping, moving, and examining it.
Despite the usual critique and/or dismissal of Berke-
ley as over-emphasising the visual account taken in the 
phrase ‘to be is to be perceived,’ his notion of percep-
tion falls closer to that of representation than it does to 
a particular account of vision, or to even an individual’s 
account of perception. Thus vision, perception, repre-
sentation and judgement would seem to slide into one 
another, but Berkeley argues that each sense is a type of 
perception. Perceptions, when taken together, give the 
material for experience but this material requires a judge-
ment on our part.
2. Vision and Representation
In his Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley continues 
the discussion of perception with being, or existence, as he 
states that it is unintelligible to say that things could have 
existence without being in a perceptual relation with some 
spirit, some active representer (which need not be human). 
Immediately, it would appear that Berkeley is embodying 
the worst of his stereotypes: that if all the perceivers of the 
world disappeared then there would be no world. But we 
must always take care to keep in mind that this is impos-
sible for Berkeley because of his insistence that the two 
strains of idealism mentioned above, that of the ontologi-
cal and the epistemological, must be tied together.
In other words, Berkeley does not think the world 
would disappear without perceivers but that the notion of 
world is unintelligible without a notion of representation 
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congealing the various senses in the minds of those per-
ceiving.6
This fact is further evidenced by the way in which 
Berkeley insists that natural order, and natural law, exist 
and are both distinguishable from imaginary things, or 
conglomerations of sensed things. Nature imprints on 
us ‘real things’ of which images or ideas are only copies.7 
Berkeley then begins listing possible objections to his 
general theory of the fundamentality of sense, and of the 
consequences of his immaterialism. To quote at length:
First then, it will be objected that by the foregoing 
principles, all that is real and substantial in Nature 
is banished out of the world: and instead thereof a 
chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things 
that exist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are 
purely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, 
moon, and stars? What must we think of houses, riv-
ers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own 
bodies? Are all these but so many chimeras and illu-
sions on the fancy? To all which, and whatever else 
of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by 
the principles premised, we are not deprived of any 
one thing in Nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or 
anywise conceive or understand, remains as secure 
as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a rerum natura, 
and the distinction between realities and chimeras 
retains its full force.8
Thus, while imagined fancies and sensed things exist 
equally in the mind (and here Berkeley is in general 
 6 Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1710/1996) 26-27.
 7 Ibid., 37.
 8 Ibid., 38.
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agreement with Hume) there is an externally designated, 
though not necessarily material, order to things, and this 
order is real. Thus, despite the use of the world essence, 
Berkeley is not making any strong claims about the onto-
logical or metaphysical claims about the world; to make 
such claims, again generally following Hume, is simply 
to add more confusion to human existence, confusion 
which leads us into sceptical loops and a pervasive sense 
of unhappiness.
Following this, we could argue that Berkeley’s only 
ontological or metaphysical claims are negative ones: if it 
is not perceptible it is not useful to speak of it. It remains 
a debate, then, whether Berkeley carries a strong episte-
mological idealist position (all we can know are ideas) as 
well as a weak ontological position (what exist are ideas 
and minds). The upshot of Berkeley’s claim, and one that 
is common to idealist philosophies in general, is a for-
malisation of existence that emphasises ontological parsi-
mony. Again, to quote Berkeley:
in this sense, the sun that I see by day is the real sun, 
and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the 
former. In the sense here given of reality, it is evident 
that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general 
each part of the mundane system, is as much a real 
being by our principles as by any other.9
The general idea that both reflection and perception 
merely pick up on a deeper ontological or objective 
structure in the world is a persistent thread in idealism. 
Whether Hegel’s identity-in-difference, Schelling’s Law of 
 9 Ibid., 39.
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the World (or Weltgesetz where everything is what it is to 
the extent it is not something else10), or Bosanquet’s real-
ity principle (everything is real so long as you do not take 
it for more than it is)11, the basic ontological claim of the 
idealist tradition becomes one of pseudo-holistic preser-
vation: that ontological existence is to be distributed, or 
at least engaged with as distributed, is a problem which 
seems at odds with the limited and particular view of a 
thinking person entering, and at least partially construct-
ing, their world.
It is here that representation becomes as necessary 
as it is problematic. Not only does it become necessary 
to explain the means by which ideas are copies of what 
occurs in reality, as well as being tied to reflection (the 
rational process by which we separate mere chimeras 
of the mind from ideas as sensed), but it is necessary to 
explain how is it that representation functions as part of 
reality, as part of the real. Even if, following Berkeley, we 
do not want to admit that representation functions on its 
own, that is, that all abstractions are merely the abuse of 
words, the extension of a word’s function beyond its use-
ful remit, representation presents us with a specific prob-
lem. The question is not only how is it that representation 
functions in relation to the real things, sensed things, and 
imaginary things (all being equally existent in the mind) 
 10 F.W.J. von Schelling, Darstellung der rein-rationalen Philosophie 
(SW II/1, 492) quoted in Iain Hamilton Grant, ‘The Law of Insu-
perable Environment: What is Exhibited in the Exhibition of the 
Process of Nature?’, Analecta Hermenutica 5, (2013): 3-4, accessed 
February 19, 2017.
 11 Quoted in Iain Hamilton Grant, ‘Everything’, The Monist 98, no. 3 
(2015): 156-167, 156.
The Self-Chasing Instrument 83
but how does representation, as a part of the world, func-
tion as just another thing?
Here we return to the question of how representation 
functions in relation to perception, to how representa-
tion is a rarefied form of perception but also its unify-
ing power. Judgement synthesises experience as we know 
it by combining sense data and our intuitions. But, and 
this is particularly evident in objective idealism (Schell-
ing and Peirce), we cannot definitively fix the source of 
either the origin of sensations, their organisation as per-
ceptions, as well as the ultimate source of our intuitions.
This is not to throw up our hands and abandon any 
progressive or constructive aim at knowledge, or at bet-
ter explaining our perceptual capacities, or our normative 
capacity for judgement, but only suggests that generic or 
axiomatic claims arise when an ultimate ground is deemed 
impossible or simply hard to find. The way in which these 
capacities check and bolster, or ground and unground one 
another, shifts of course from thinker to thinker. While 
Kant was rather certain regarding the self-grounding 
nature of judgement, he was far more cautious regarding 
the source and location (less so the function) of the imagi-
nation or the human capacity to schematise. For Kant, 
such a capacity resided in the depths of the human soul.12
Schelling, as well as many purportedly anti-idealist 
thinkers who would follow him (such as Helmholtz and 
Oersted) deepen the effect of sense and the external 
world on the apparatuses of the self and how this intake 
 12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp 
Smith (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1929), A141/B180-181.
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of sensory data is processed and fed into a less and less 
internalised capacity for mapping, navigating and judg-
ing which action to take.13 In Schelling’s thought, as well 
as Peirce’s and other objective idealists, this means that 
idealism is not simply opposed to naturalism, but that 
any naturalism adequate to its own foundational explana-
tory claim must allow for minds and thoughts to emerge.
It is in this regard that the closeness of the ontologi-
cal and epistemological relation of types of idealism must 
be questioned contra Berkeley. Since, if thought and the 
logic of the mind emerges from nature this does not, 
following Schelling for instance, entail that the rules or 
means of explaining nature’s various domains necessarily 
apply to thought as well. Just as the domains of nature are 
more or less accurately described according to fields of 
knowledge (biology, chemistry, physics and so on), so too 
should the behaviour and function of the mind require a 
different set of tools and theories (psychology, sociology, 
mythology etc.).
But beyond merely endorsing the cognitive sciences, 
Schelling’s claim (which of course historically predates 
cognitive science) is that transcendental philosophy 
implies a different method, since the object of investiga-
tion is also that which is doing the investigation and thus 
a certain failure is built in to the depth of the examina-
tion. This is not because there is something specific about 
the structure of mind but that, for Schelling, nothing 
can fully become an object to itself at the level of nature. 
 13 See Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature after Schelling 
(London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006).
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Furthermore, this is not to simply endorse a defeatist 
attitude, since Schelling’s accompanying claim is that the 
clues to the mind can be also found in a diagonal manner, 
in the function and behaviour of non-minded nature.
This in turn complicates the self-regulatory powers 
of the mind. While Kant is comfortable saying the self-
grounding status of natural cognition proves adequate 
to explain the reach and power of judgement, Schell-
ing’s naturalisation of cognition, as well as his assertion 
regarding the fundamental limit of self-access, provides a 
messier picture of what judgement could be.
One avenue worth taking, for our purposes here, is to 
explain how Schelling sees judgement as merely the draw-
ing of conclusions, the temporary isolation of a thing to 
leap off from it in the form of an experiment.14 Thus, while 
we can argue that our various senses and their coordina-
tion can give us a crude psychological or sociological pic-
ture of the human, it does not clearly give us a ground for 
the construction of theories, or judgements, within those 
fields on their own terms. The development of such theo-
ries requires a disentanglement of the ontological and the 
epistemological, since we cannot know, prior to the result 
of the experiment (whether cognitive or physical) what 
the consequences will be.
Idealism suspends the claim that such experiments 
must necessarily have ontological consequences while at 
the same time attempting to explain how new methods 
 14 See F.W.J. von Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, trans. 
Errol Harris and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 10-11.
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are needed to explain how ideas and concepts behave 
within theories. This leads us to the second-order empiri-
cism mentioned above. The construction of theories, 
through reflection and judgement but built upon sensory 
experience, gives us a different kind of experienceable 
material from which to develop our theories and make 
our judgements about the broader picture of the world.
3. Judgement and the Morphology  
of the Abstract
If, as we have suggested following Schelling, the inves-
tigations of mind require a different methodology and 
engine of investigation (transcendental idealism) then 
how do we come to terms with seemingly purely ideal 
functions (such as judgement) when they are made upon 
a supposedly external world? This is even further compli-
cated if the capacity to judge something to be this or that 
is ungrounded, unstable, and yet simultaneously a distant 
relative of more original natural processes. That is, the 
ideal isolation of an object from its environment seems 
to remove it twice over. In seeing it as an isolated object 
one must suspend, or at least limit, questions regarding 
its origin and effects. Following this, the object is judging 
according to our (the thinking agent’s) criteria thereby 
dislocating the object from real space altogether.
To get a foothold in experience, to find a rung for our 
hand to grasp, so to speak, must we formally excise our-
selves from experience, and is this excision itself only 
an excision formally? This would seem merely to exac-
erbate the problem noted above regarding the failure 
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of self-access. If nothing can be an object to itself, then 
jumping ‘further’ out of the relation via the use of formal-
isms, such as logic, does not immediately appear as help-
ful. However, formalisms can be effective when one takes 
into account exactly what the failure of self-access entails, 
what logic means for the idealist tradition, and how this 
feeds into a particular notion of judgement which could 
be taken to be material or perhaps embodied (following 
our above appeal to an extended naturalism).
The strange attitude towards formalism is particularly 
evident in the work of Bradley.
Bradley, and the idealist attitude towards formalism 
generally (whether logic or of the mental faculties) was 
that it froze and shattered the world only to reconstruct 
it in an incomplete manner. Kant’s purported unity of the 
mind was too problematic an assertion for T.H. Green, 
Bradley, and even earlier in the case of Schelling. A 
well-known quote by Bradley from his massive text on 
logic is illustrative here:
Unless thought stands for something beyond mere 
intelligence, if ‘thinking’ is not used with some 
strange implication that never was part of the mean-
ing of the word, a lingering scruple still forbids us 
to believe, that reality can ever be purely rational. 
It may come from a failure in my metaphysics, or a 
weakness of the flesh which continues to blind me, 
but the notion that existence could be the same as 
understanding strikes as cold and ghost-like as the 
dreariest materialism. That the glory of this world is 
in the end appearance leaves the world more glori-
ous, if we feel it is a show of some fuller splendour; 
but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, 
if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some 
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spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or un-
earthly ballet of bloodless categories.15
This is not to say that a methodological or formal 
self-excision from the world does not have its uses, so 
long as it is not taken for more than it is (again following 
Bosanquet’s reality principle). Similarly, Bradley states 
that it is nonsensical to claim that appearances can be 
conjured away, or that they have no use. Appearance is a 
part of reality for Bradley; the question is how to engage 
with appearance in a way that does not collapse the lim-
its of our knowing with the limits of reality, either in a 
way that artificially halts our knowing, or that mystifies 
the world in such a way that we can be content with its 
unknowability.
For Bradley, feeling as immediate experience, while 
insufficient in the forming of an argument or a judge-
ment, carries with it a volition which codes the thoughts 
and the appearances, and the thoughts on the appear-
ances that follow an experience that is felt. In essence, 
the immediacy of feeling cannot be removed from our 
experience but the error lies in thinking that this notion 
of immediate experience can be expanded to all of reality 
as such. To do so would either fall into solipsism (all real-
ity is my reality) or it would equate thinking with being 
in a manner such that the difference between the two, 
between thought and the thing it thinks, would disappear, 
thereby eliminating both.
 15 F.H. Bradley, Principles of Logic (Oxford University Press, 1922), 
533.
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This somewhat abstract formulation of feeling and its 
limited immediacy relates to Schelling’s theory of judge-
ment. As Marcela Garcia has brilliantly examined, Schell-
ing’s judgement cuts or separates terms to re-unify them 
into a higher form. But the lower forms are not replaced, 
nor are they destroyed; they become the geological layers 
of the ground which sustains the capacity of judgement 
higher up the ladder.16
As Garcia goes on to discuss, judgement, in Schelling’s 
sense, cannot be tied to any notion of immediacy, of vision 
functioning to give oneself instant knowledge. Judge-
ment involves making explicit the capacity of what has 
already been represented as ground.17 Thus the opposition 
between naturalism and idealism, or between the original 
and the derivative, brings with it a further complication 
regarding how one orders (or judges) the relation of the 
pre-conceptual and the conceptual. As we have already 
seen, a methodological difference seems required but 
this does not tell us how judgements treating judgements 
should be viewed in relation to naturalism, for instance, 
nor how judgements treating natural processes should be 
perceived as either natural processes or judgements.
This requires demonstrating the simultaneous additive 
and subtractive character of vision, of the experience of an 
image. Quite straightforwardly, the judging of an image 
would seem to take place after a series of preceding steps 
which would occur so quickly as to remain invisible in 
 16 Marcela Garcia, ‘Schelling’s Theory of Judgment and the Interpreta-
tion of the Copula’, Schelling-Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift zur 
klassichen deutschen Philosophie 3 (2015): 25-49, 27.
 17 Ibid., 28.
90 Ben Woodard
the present moment of the perception. The steps of this 
process are themselves only ordered as such following a 
latent judgement. The forces of physics, biology, and neu-
rochemistry play an entangled role long before we register 
an image of anything. But by the time we see this image it 
has already been pre-processed by our conceptual appara-
tuses (if we take Sellars’ myth of the given seriously)18 and 
then we reflect upon the image as if it is free and naked 
before us, an object just meeting our perception, a percep-
tion which is taken generically as ‘an experience.’
But these experiences vary in length and seem to seep 
out of any conceptual definition applied to them. These 
events, or presents, seem to have a geometry in which 
the passage of time appears absolutely non-discrete (one 
could take James’ image of the specious present as a 
saddle as one such example). In other words, I may not 
take notice of the past seven moments but I fixate on an 
object before in the eighth moment and it ‘seems’ to go 
on forever. Explaining this difference in terms of quan-
tity of time is difficult, given that the measure is taken 
and experienced by the same ‘clock’ (my perception). 
Despite James’ pragmatism, his spatialising of experience 
shares much in common with his idealist forebears and 
 18 Sellars’ myth of the given argues that we cannot rely upon experi-
ence as given to us fully formed and then analyzed by our cognitive 
capacities. Rather, if we accept that we are trained to process evi-
dence, that our conceptual capacities are learned not innate, then 
we cannot assume that evidence presented before us is not taken 
apart by that mental training before we have consciously decided to 
evaluate it. See Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image 
of Man’, in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (London: Rout-
ledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1963).
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contemporaries. James’ and Bosanquet’s concerns regard-
ing the shape (or morphology) of intentionality, of the 
directed thinking toward an experience, appear to pro-
ductively dovetail.19
Given the various shapes of experience, which can be 
ordered and remade based on how much of the above 
series of moments we grasp, we can determine what form 
of the time series can be re-inserted (however imper-
fectly) into one of its contained parts. Or, in other words, 
how do we recognise ‘the pivotal moment from the sense 
data’ and what changes when we ‘play back’ the memory 
chosen to be pivotal? Judgement can be said to be one pass 
across such an experience that is subsequently offered up 
for collective judgement, whether such acts express, or at 
least potentially express, a sense or feeling of the greater 
landscape.
Thus, long-standing critiques of an over-reliance on 
vision, or on the weight of reflection in post-Kantian 
thought, generally assume an immediacy or a clarity 
which those philosophies have never admitted. One of 
the most central aspects of idealism, and of post-Kantian 
idealism especially, was that numerous structural issues 
impeded not only thought but any processes from being 
simply self-standing or exhaustive. Quite importantly, 
however, and what has generally been lost in the neglect 
of idealism, is the particular way it attempted to map the 
behaviour of ideas in a spatio-historical sense.
 19 James himself admits this much in his essay ‘How Two Minds Can 
Know One Thing’, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific 
Methods 2 (7) (1905): 176-181 
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Again, following Garcia, the complexification of vision 
and its purported immediacy relates directly to the prob-
lem of the functional relationship of the normative and 
the non-normative, and of the pre-conceptual and the 
conceptual.20 Or, in relation to the above discussion, law 
(as the force of the normative) and non-law (the mate-
rial which is judged) maps onto the normative and non-
normative whereas the distinction between sense and 
experience maps (albeit difficulty and imperfectly) onto 
the pre-conceptual and the conceptual. Going back to the 
opening pages of this essay, these divisions manifest in 
the problem of the ontological and the methodological, 
whether any of these divisions can be said to be made 
from a neutral position, or whether they are made from 
one side. In other words, many of those thinkers who fol-
low a particular form of Kantianism (P. F. Strawson, Sell-
ars, McDowell, Brandom) suggest that the cut between 
the non-normative and the normative is made from the 
position of the normative. Essentially, according to those 
on the side of normativity, we must say that the normative 
decides its own beginning in order for us to make sense of 
the world through patterns, rules, and laws.
The emergence of patterns, rules, and laws is taken to be 
groundless from the point of view of the non-normative, 
and a necessary set of judgements from the position of the 
normative which, since it has only normative standing, 
 20 Karen Barad’s consistent claim that reflection is a relatively straight-
forward process that over-simplifies reality is a prime example of 
this. See her Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and 
the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2007).
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becomes auto-generating. In the case of law, while prece-
dence can be taken into account for a law’s effectiveness and 
modification, it does not justify the law’s existence. Only 
authority, itself not strictly legal in the same sense, does this.
But can this game be played so that the normative 
always avoids non-normative grounds, or can the norma-
tive always be tainted by what it wishes to keep outside?
4. Conclusion or Vision of Law
While the normative (at times) appears to be made of the 
non-normative, so, too does sense appear to fully com-
pose the bedrock of experience. The wrinkle is that we 
do not encounter this relationship in this way; rather, 
we have to reverse engineer it. In other words, we do not 
sense sense as sense but we instead have an experience 
which allows us to dig into the functions of sense. The 
difficulty, again to state the obvious, is to what degree can 
we strip experience of experience to experience sense 
without either deluding ourselves to think we can ‘get out 
of our own heads’ or to think we can never think the non-
conceptual or pre-conceptual?
It is perhaps not surprising that Kant, partially in order 
to avoid such headaches, wished to hold on to a por-
trait of reason that operated as its own judge and jury, to 
argue that only reason can stand as arbiter over reason. 
As has been frequently noted, Kant was fond of the legal 
claim, of adding philosophical charge to the question of 
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justification: Quid Juris? (by what right, or, what is lawful) 
is central to Kant’s philosophical project.21
One pertinent question would be the difference between 
the general structure of judgement as merely the capacity 
to draw conclusions, and the judgment of the court, of the 
relation between collective normativity and the precedent 
which functions as the material, as the background, of the 
judgment. In order to take judgement into question as a 
form of data, it is required to view the capacities of rea-
son, of which judgment is merely one, as a collection of 
senses comprising a vision of the mind. How would one 
construct a vision of the law in this manner?
If the force of law is taken to be not merely autoch-
thonic, or self-grounding, nor as merely ontological, 
guaranteed by an in-built democratic principle (such 
as Schelling’s Weltgesetz or Bosanquet’s reality principle 
taken as totalising), then law becomes a seeing of ideas as 
rules and the construction of rules for ideas. The ramifi-
cations for such a project may be difficult to ascertain at 
this brief glance but idealism remains the proper tool for 
a philosophy of law that takes the inscription of norma-
tivity into legality as an experiment on the flexibility of a 
concept as a regulator of space (both ideal and real).
Taking the force of law as a type of vision emphasises 
its force as one of collective apparatuses more than a 
groundless violence. Furthermore, and again nodding to 
objective idealism and its Naturphilosophical roots, such 
 21 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited by 
Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
219, (A84/B116).
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force is only possible according to rules that precede its 
own rules: the patterns of nature. Thus, while representa-
tion and thus appearance seem necessary components of 
reality, the form of judgement necessary for thought is far 
from having been effectively, and collectively, articulated.
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Does Reconciliation Need Truth? 
On the Legal Production of the 
Visibility of the Past*
Riccardo Baldissone
νῦν τὴν καταλλαγὴν ἐλάβομενa
A truth that’s told with bad intent / Beats all the lies 
you can inventb
My work is not about xxxxxxx it is after xxxxxxxc
 * I would like to thank Doris Pichler and Silke Panse, who introduced 
me to the work of Milo Rau and Joshua Oppenheimer respectively; 
and an anonymous reviewer, who rightly claimed more visibility for 
visibility.
 a [N]yn tēn katallagēn elabomen, now we have received reconcilia-
tion, in Paul, Romans 5.11. Katallagēn originally means change: in 
the late fifth century BCE it is first attested with the sense of change 
from enmity to friendship, that is reconciliation, for example in 
Aristophanes, Birds 1588.
 b William Blake, ‘Auguries of Innocence’ 53-54, in The Complete 
 Poetry and Prose of William Blake, ed. D. V. Erdman (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008), 491.
 c Christian Boltanski’s correction of his written interview: the twice 
deleted word is Holocaust. In Christian Boltanski, ‘An Interview 
with Georgia Marsh’, in Reconstitution, Exhibit Catalogue, Christian 
Boltanski (London: Whitechapel Art Gallery, 1990), 10.
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In the first chapter of Ulysses, Stephen Dedalus, probably 
mindful of Laforgue,1 complains that history is a night-
mare from which he is trying to awake.2 Stephen, inas-
much as he is the younger alter ego of James Joyce, shares 
with him the burden of the past as a representation that is 
frozen and glorified by academies and museums.
Contemporary Italian Futurists feel similarly oppressed 
by the load of the glorious but cumbersome Classical and 
Italian artistic legacy. They react to the canon of art by con-
trasting the static representation of things by traditional 
painting and statuary with their dynamic work: in particu-
lar, they attempt to visually capture motion as a compres-
ence of subsequent images of a moving object on the same 
canvas,3 as a multiplicity of forms in the same statue, as a 
visual rendering of sounds with written words, and as a dis-
placement of words and even letters on the written page.4
The Futurists claim the power of visual means to oper-
ate a reconstruction not only of the world, but, following 
their taste for hyperbole, of the entire universe.5 With the 
 1 ‘L’historie est un vieux cauchemar bariolé qui ne se doute pas que les meil-
leures plaisanteries sont les plus courtes,’ History is an old gaudy night-
mare who does not suspect that the best jokes are the shortest. In Jules 
Laforgue, Mélanges Posthumes (Paris: Mercure de France, 1903), 279.
 2 James Joyce, Ulysses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 34.
 3 ‘[U]n cavallo in corsa non ha quattro gambe [sic]: ne ha venti,’ a 
running horse has not four legs, but twenty. In Umberto Boccioni 
et al., Pittura Futurista. Il Manifesto Tecnico [Futurist Painting. The 
Technical Manifesto] (Milano: Uffici di Poesia, 1910). 
 4 See Filippo Marinetti, Zang Tumb Tumb (Milano: Edizioni Futur-
iste di Poesia, 1914). By striving to express ‘the dynamic sensation 
itself,’ the futurists actually also provide us with a more dynamic 
rendering of the past.
 5 See Giacomo Balla and Fortunato Depero, Ricostruzione futurista 
dell’universo [Futurist Reconstruction of the Universe] (Milano: 
 Direzione del Movimento Futurista, 1915).
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Futurist Manifestos, for the first time artists claim their 
share in ideological leadership inasmuch as they are art-
ists. Moreover, the Futurists’ insistence on the political 
relevance of vision renews the millennial tradition of dis-
putes on the use of images.
In the Christian world, the issue of the public role of 
images is first raised in the eighth century by Byzantine 
iconoclasm, and it is then rekindled in the sixteenth cen-
tury during the Reformation. However, these debates 
focus on the use of images tout-court, whilst the Futurists 
are rather concerned with the specific quality of images as 
a contribution to a global transformation of reality.
Though ‘painters always showed us things and persons 
placed before us,’6 the Futurists contend that objects and 
people actually compenetrate each other, because ‘motion 
and light destroy the materiality of bodies’7: hence, the new 
art is aimed not at reproducing but at reinventing reality. To 
this end, it also relies on the dynamism of the new mechan-
ical production, and even on the destructive power of war.
And yet, after the technology-enhanced disasters of the 
two world conflicts, and the double industrial annihilation 
of human lives by concentration camps and aerial bombing, 
the beacon of progress becomes dimmed. Paradoxically, it 
is in our residual flatland of actually existing consumerism 
that history may no longer be a burden, and it may even 
raise us above the eternal present of c ommodification.
The reconsideration of the past appears to be an even 
more urgent task outside the mostly pacified West, where 
 6 ‘I pittori ci hanno sempre mostrato cose e persone poste davanti a noi,’ ibid.
 7 ‘[I]l moto e la luce distruggono la materialità dei corpi.’ In Pittura 
Futurista. Il Manifesto Tecnico.
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the creeping Third World War does not stop claiming its 
toll of humans and things. From the perspective of this 
other world, the Western condition of perpetual eco-
nomic struggle (and its promise of social mobility) is a 
mirage of safety and plenty. Western standards – even in 
their current combination of civil peace and pervasive 
economic war – are assumed as the reference condition 
and the normative background for the tribunals that have 
been assessing large-scale traumatic events and circum-
stances, such as South African apartheid and the Rwan-
dan massacres. These variously horrifying exceptions are 
evaluated against Western or Westernised rules, which 
conjoin economic conflict and political peace.
It is then not surprising that the most relevant attempt 
at dealing with past traumatic social events was con-
ducted by the 1995 South African Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission, a name that reveals both Western 
philosophical and theological legacies. Actually, as early 
as in 1990, Chilean president and Christian Democrat 
leader Patricio Aylwin established an investigative body, 
which was defined as Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Rec-
onciliación, National Commission of Truth and Recon-
ciliation. The commission reported on the horrific crimes 
committed under the military dictatorship led by General 
Augusto Pinochet between 1973 and 1990.8
 8 By the irony of history (or one of its bad jokes) it was the same 
Patricio Aylwin who said in an interview with The Washington Post 
on August 26, 1973 (sixteen days before the military coup) that if he 
had to choose between ‘a Marxist dictatorship and a dictatorship of 
our military, [he] would choose the latter.’
Does Reconciliation Need Truth? 101
In the case of South Africa, the Anglican archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, who was the main inspirer and chairper-
son of the commission, insisted on the closeness of the 
commission’s guiding principles to Ubuntu,9 the African 
sense of human interconnectedness. Be that as it may, 
the notion of reconciliation has a distinctively Christian 
overtone, which harks back to the foundational text of 
Christianity, Paul’s letter to the Romans.
Paul triumphantly claims: νῦν τὴν καταλλαγὴν 
ἐλάβομεν10 [nyn tēn katallagēn elabomen], ‘now we have 
received reconciliation’, as the death of Jesus overcame the 
long postlapsarian enmity between humans and god. In 
this context, truth is identified with the word of god, and 
even with god himself, whom, in the person of Jesus, John 
makes later declare: ἐγώ εἰμι (…) ἡ ἀλήθεια11 [egō eimi 
(…) hē alētheia], ‘I am the truth’.
Of course, truth is no longer construed as a divine per-
son, at least not in its current judicial version. And yet, 
truth continues to share its transcendent quality with its 
Johannine personification. In the words of Tutu, truth 
is concealed, and its acknowledgement requires it to be 
unearthed; truth not only must come out, but it would 
prevail.12
 9 ‘One of the sayings in our country is Ubuntu – the essence of being 
human. Ubuntu speaks particularly about the fact that you can’t 
exist as a human being in isolation. It speaks about our intercon-
nectedness.’ Desmond Tutu, 2008. Ubuntu Women Institute USA 
(UWIU) with SSIWEL as its first South Sudan Project, http://www.
ssiwel.org (accessed 20 April 2011)
 10 Romans 5.11 (Nestle-Aland).
 11 John 14.6 (Nestle-Aland).
 12 [T]his is a moral universe and truth will out.’ In Desmond Tutu, No 
Future Without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999), 87.
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One may observe that all the previous expressions 
show no distinctive theological features, and that they 
are instead commonplaces: apart from Tutu’s optimistic 
and teleological claim of the eventual prevalence of truth, 
the latter’s independence from subjective constructions is 
widely acknowledged. For example, the Oxford English 
Dictionary defines truth both as ‘[s]omething that con-
forms with fact or reality,’13 and this very conformity.
If compared with the previous Johannine statement, 
OED’s painstaking mapping of English language appears 
to register a double substitution: truth is no longer identi-
cal to the divinity, but it conforms to reality. Whilst the 
replacement of god with reality seems to confirm the 
modern claims of secularisation, the notion of truth as 
conformity is a restatement of a Scholastic assumption.
In the thirteenth century, the Dominican friar Aquinas 
quotes Isaac Israeli’s definition of truth as ‘adaequatio rei 
et intellectus,’14 conformity of things and intellect. More 
recently, this correspondence is embraced by Bertrand 
Russell15 as constitutive of truth,16 and it is still popular 
 13 ‘[T]ruth, n. and adv. (and int.).’ OED Online. Oxford University 
Press, March 2016.
 14 Thomae de Aquino (Thomas Aquinas), Summa Theologiæ, Pars 
1, Quaestio 16, Articulus 2, http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/
sth1015.html (accessed 11 May 2016). The original statement has 
not yet been located in Israeli’s work. 
 15 Bertrand Russell, ‘On the nature of truth and falsehood,’ in id., 
Philosophical Essays (New York: Simon and Schuster: 1910).
 16 Whilst this approach was supposed to derive from Plato and Ar-
istotle, it probably stemmed from Plotinus’ request for the eye to 
be sun-like in order to see the sun (Enneads 1.6.9.31-32), which 
in turn found a more abstract expression in Proclus’ definition of 
truth as ἐφαρμογή [epharmogē], agreement or adjustment between 
knower and the known (In Tim. 2.287.1). Epharmogē is already set 
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with English speaking philosophers,17 whose belief in this 
regard seems generally pretty much in line with the wider 
language use, provided that such use conforms to its rep-
resentation by the OED.
However, from the specific angle of truth and reconcili-
ation commissions, the notion of truth is concerned with 
the re-evaluation of past actions and events: hence, it may 
be worth briefly considering the involvement of Western 
historical investigations with truth.
In the sixth century BCE, Hecatæus ushers in West-
ern historical discourse with a declaration of disbelief 
in Greek stories18: however, neither he nor most subse-
quent historians base their claim to validity on the direct 
appeal to the notion of historical truth. For some twenty-
four centuries, the work of the historian remains τῶν 
τέ γενομένων τό σαφές σκοπεĩν19 [tōn te genomenōn to 
saphes skopein], ‘to investigate the certainty of the events’ 
(Thucydides), ὡς ἐπράχθη εἰπεῖν20 [ōs eprakhthē eipein] ‘to 
tell how things happened’ (Lucian), and to show the past 
as the final existential task in Porphyry’s compilation of Plotinus’ 
Enneads (6.9.11.25).
 17 See, for example, the 2009 PhilPapers Survey taken by 3226 re-
spondents (nearly 70% of them from English-speaking countries), 
including 1803 philosophy faculty members and/or PhDs and 
829 philosophy graduate students. An impressive 50.8% of the re-
spondents indicated their preference for a correspondence theory 
of truth. In David Bourget and David J. Chalmers, ‘What Do Phi-
losophers Believe?’, Philosophical Studies 170, no. 3 (2014): 465-500.
 18 ‘Thus speaks Hecatæus of Miletus: I write what follows as it seems 
to me to be true; for the logoi of the Greeks are, as it seems to me, 
many and ridiculous.’ In Early Greek Mythography, ed. Robert L. 
Fowler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Hecatæus fr. 1.
 19 Thucydides 1.22.5.
 20 Lucian of Samosata, Quomodo historia scribenda sit 39.
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‘wie es eigentlich gewesen,’21 ‘how it really was’ (Ranke). 
Twentieth-century historians not only generally continue 
to keep the philosophical constructions of the notion of 
truth at arm’s length, but, as in the case of Michel Fou-
cault, plainly reject historical universals in general: and 
during the last forty years, more and more historians 
(Jenkins, Munslow, Southgate, Bunzl, and McCullagh 
among others) are embracing their inevitably perspecti-
val construction of the past.
Historians’ acknowledgement of their perspectival (a 
visual metaphor, again) relation with past events not only 
demands more sophisticated criteria for assessing his-
toriographical constructions, but it also resonates with 
some juridical constructions of specifically legal truth. 
For instance, Hans Kelsen grounds this specificity on the 
production of legal facts as a result of legal ascertainment, 
which ‘replaces the fact in itself that in nonjuristic think-
ing is the condition for the coercive act.’22
More recently, Jack Balkin is adamant in advocating the 
productive character of law: ‘law creates truth - it makes 
things true as a matter of law. It makes things true in the 
eyes of the law.’23 Here the boldness of Balkin’s first state-
ment is somewhat defused by his further specifications, 
 21 Leopold von Ranke, ‘Preface: Histories of the Latin and Germanic 
Nations from 1494-1514’, in The Varieties of History: From Voltaire 
to the Present, ed. Fritz Stern (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), 57.
 22 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. Max Knight (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967), 240.
 23 Jack M. Balkin, ‘The Proliferation of Legal Truth’, Harvard Journal 
of Law and Public Policy 26, no. 1 (2003): 6. http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/jbalkin/articles/proliferationoflegaltruth1.pdf (accessed 
11 April 2016). 
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which also recur to a reassuring metaphor of the old, 
namely, the eyes of the law.24 However, by hinting to truth 
as a visual effect, Balkin subordinates both truth and true 
things to a specific perspective, which, mutatis mutandis, 
may appear to evoke Futurist contentions.
Moreover, in Balkin’s sentence the word ‘things’ may 
well be understood in an extended sense, as legal con-
structions also legally define the truth of legal subjectivi-
ties: for example, both in Chile and South Africa, different 
legal approaches can shape the apparently same subject as 
either a patriot defending his country from the contagion 
of communism with all available means, or a brutal and 
insensitive torturer and murderer.
It is not by chance that these alternative subjectiva-
tions echo the bifurcation between the prosecution and 
defence arguments at the Nuremberg trials25 (and in some 
way also the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem). Jean-François 
Lyotard evokes this lack of common ground by recover-
ing the French legal term differénd,26 which defines a case 
of conflict that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of an 
encompassing rule of judgement.
 24 The OED dates the first written occurrence of the phrase ‘in the eye 
of the lawe’ to 1538. In ‘eye,’ OED Online. Oxford University Press, 
March 2017.
 25 Probably, the only commonality between all the parts represented 
by the prosecution and the defence was the perpetration of the 
same war crime of mass murder by aerial bombing, which was pru-
dently left out of the list of accusations.
 26 See Jean-François Lyotard, Le Différend (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 
1983); Eng. trans. id., The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. 
Georges Van Den Abbeele. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1988).
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Tutu describes the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission as a third way between the Nuremberg trials 
and blanket amnesty (or national amnesia)27: amnesty is 
offered to the perpetrator in exchange for truth, provided 
that the applicant makes ‘full disclosure of all of the facts 
relevant to the incident in question.’28
The very wording of the Commission remarks how the 
access to past events is to be realised as the removal of 
the obstacles to the unobstructed view of the past itself: 
the current use of the term ‘disclosure’ is a later29 figu-
rate sense of the literal action of unlocking, and it well 
describes the sharing of memories otherwise confined 
within the perpetrators.
Moreover, the exchange of disclosure for amnesty 
implies some kind of forgiveness on the part of the vic-
tims, generally in the person of their relatives and friends: 
yet, inasmuch as having Ubuntu means participating in a 
greater whole, to forgive is not just to be altruistic, but it 
is the best form of self-interest.30
Here, African and Christian idealisations clearly over-
lap, and yet, they may help in achieving the practical 
task of emotional closure, which the mother of a victim 
also describes as a double restitution: ‘he [the murderer] 
 27 Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, 30.
 28 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of South Africa Report, vol. 6 (Cape Town: Juta & Co, 
2003), 10.
 29 The OED reports a 1525 written evidence of the figurate sense of 
the word ‘disclosure,’ which appears in a text presumably composed 
in 1489. In ‘disclosure,’ OED Online. Oxford University Press, 
March 2017.
 30 Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, 31.
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becomes human again, this man, so that I, so that all of us 
get our humanity back.’31
Whilst this restitution risks being offered as a sort of 
Christian atonement and accepted instead as a profit-
able transaction, the possible specific imbalance of the 
exchange is transcended by the more general advantage 
of a shared political sense, which escapes the pincer of 
ideal principles and Realpolitik. It may even be argued 
that the transactional practice of these transitional meas-
ures immediately produces a shared political dimension.
Of course, not everyone may be inclined to forgive: 
as dryly stated by Charity Kondile - the mother of 
another victim - whilst Mandela and Tutu lead vindi-
cated lives, nothing has changed in hers, therefore she 
cannot forgive.32 Indeed, Tutu himself describes both 
his sight of freedom coming and his involvement in the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a ‘spectacular 
vindication.’33
However, and more important, both Kondile’s and 
Tutu’s considerations reveal a shift of focus from the past 
to the present: what appears to be at stake is not simply the 
recovery of traumatic events, but the role that their mem-
ory is allowed to play in the present. If this holds true, here 
truth is a misleading task, and its pursuit a mere verbal 
re-enactment of the Western theologico-philosophical 
 31 Cynthia Ngewu, mother of the murdered Christopher Piet, quoted 
in Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull (Johannesburg: Random House, 
1998), 109.
 32 Charity Kondile, quoted in Antjie Krog, ‘The Parable of the Bicycle’, 
Mail & Guardian, February 7, 1997, http://mg.co.za/article/1997-
02-07-the-parable-of-the-bicycle (accessed 10 April, 2016).
 33 Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, 287.
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legacy. Given the actual practices of the Commission, one 
may legitimately wonder whether the word ‘truth’ made it 
justice, and whether a more appropriate definition would 
instead have coupled reconciliation with memory.34
The substitute name of ‘Memory and Reconciliation 
Commission’ is not just a retrospective suggestion, as 
unfortunately the series of crimes against humanity35 
gets longer and longer. If, as I hope, the example of the 
South African Commission will be further followed (as 
has already happened), a different definition of its scope 
may highlight the alternative between the pursuit of truth 
and the construction of memory. This alternative is not 
simply theoretical: whilst the emphasis on truth leaves 
the damaged ones the only choice of a more or less will-
ing acceptance of the past, the active task of constructing 
memory in the present turns inner and outer transactions 
into self-empowering opportunities of intervention.
 34 Tutu himself underlines the essential role of memory whilst 
 describing the condition of the traumatised protagonist of the grip-
ping play Death and the Maiden, in which the Chilean writer Ariel 
Dorfman stages the frightening re-emergence of the experience of 
politically justified terror, torture and rape. Tutu recalls that ‘she 
was, in a real sense, her memory’ (No Future Without Forgiveness, 
30). The denial of her memory not only challenges her sense of self, 
but it also forces her to continue to embody this memory, which 
literally entraps her within her own body. 
 35 The legal notion of crimes against humanity was first defined in 
the paragraph 6(c) of the 1945 London Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal, which was meant as the legal basis for the 
Nuremberg trials. It was again by the irony of history that one of 
the three drafters of the Charter, Major-General Iona Nikitchenko, 
had presided over some of the infamous Moscow Trials between 
1936 and 1938. Nikitchenko was also the Soviet Union’s judge at the 
Nuremberg trials, and he was president for their opening session in 
Berlin.
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On the horizon of truth, the only socially constructive 
intervention of the damaged ones is an act of forgive-
ness: this is why a refusal such as Kondile’s can only be 
either discarded as an incident in the process, or exalted 
as a symptom of the process’ general failure. Facilitating 
the construction of memory would instead help redress 
resilience as a productive factor, both in inner and outer 
transactions. And whilst the creation of legal truth is at 
perpetual risk of clashing with similarly totalising ethi-
cal, religious, political, philosophical and scientific truths, 
the legal production of memory would easily find allies in 
any conceivable field, including fiction.
On the horizon of the construction of memory, fiction 
would be a tool as important as supposed non-fictional 
renderings of the past: and it may be even more effective 
in producing the visibility of the past itself. For exam-
ple, when Swiss director Milo Rau staged in Moscow a 
re-enactment of the trial against the members of the 
punk-rock band Pussy Riot,36 the fictional tribunal pro-
duced a reconstruction of the facts, a discussion of the 
motivations, and a final judgement that shamed the pre-
vious proceedings of the official Russian court, which had 
charged the girls with a two-year sentence.
Rau’s aptly named Moscow trials underline their rather 
farcical repetition of the homonymous tragedy,37 namely 
the 1936-38 series of trials, during which most surviving 
Bolshevik leaders pleaded guilty to hyperbolic crimes 
 36 1-3 March 2013, Sakharov Centre, Moscow.
 37 In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon Marx famously de-
scribed the vicissitudes of Luis Bonaparte as the farcical repetition 
of the tragedy of his uncle Napoleon.
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against the Soviet state. Regardless of the enormity of the 
accusations, the Moscow trials shared with the Nurem-
berg ones not only one of the judges,38 but also their pre-
determined finale. And it may be argued that also in the 
case of the Stalinist purges, their most relevant treatment 
was a fictional rendering, namely Arthur Koestler’s 1940 
novel Darkness at Noon.
However, Rau dealt with tragic events too, such as the 
Rwandan genocide and its catastrophic follow-up, the 
Congolese civil war. In the first case, the core instigating 
apparatus of the Rwandan massacres is given a fictional 
visibility on stage well beyond its actual visibility as a radio 
broadcasting station.39 The audience is allowed to watch 
the otherwise invisible source of the systematic outpour-
ing of broadcasted hate speeches that prepare, prompt, 
guide and justify the bloodbath.
Rau’s screenplay adds a surprising layer to the con-
struction of the past: here the visibility of the events is 
even enhanced with respect to the actual experience of 
most direct participants, who were affected by the broad-
casted hate speeches as merely acoustic phenomena.
Rau then tackled the terrifying Congolese sequel of the 
Rwandan disaster with a theatrical enactment, which was 
modelled on the 1966-67 Russell tribunal on Vietnam. 
His Congo Tribunal40 takes further a series of Interna-
 38 See supra, note 35.
 39 Hate Radio: The re-enactment of an RTLM genocide radio show was 
first performed on the 2 November 2011 at the Bregenz Kunsthaus.
 40 The Congo Tribunal is a film and theatre production of Milo Rau 
and the International Institute of Political Murder (IIPM). It was 
staged in two sessions, 29 - 31 May 2015 in Bukavu, Collège Alfajiri 
(Eastern Congo), and 26 - 28 June 2015, Berlin, Sophiensaele.
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tional Criminal Court investigations and prosecutions, 
and it exposes local and international interests involved 
in the booming commodity trade in Eastern Congo.41
It would be difficult to trace a clear-cut boundary 
between fictional and non-fictional aspects in Rau’s trials. 
However, these acts and their filmed versions iterate the 
visual representation of the deployment of juridical pro-
cedures in the construction of memory. By doing so, they 
perpetuate and amplify, so to speak, the embodiment of 
recollection with the sound of words and the image of the 
performing bodies.
Though in court the re-enactment of the past is sup-
posed to rely on the cognitive function of words, the 
necessary embodiment of speech acts also inevitably 
expresses emotions and value judgements. These acoustic 
and visual components systematically exceed the merely 
factual rendering of the past as pursued by modern juris-
prudence.
Of course, acoustic and visual effects are standard tools 
of forensic rhetoric: already Aristotle associates this spe-
cific kind of rhetorical speech with the investigation of 
the past that takes place in a trial.42 This forensic speech 
can only be either an accusation or a defence,43 because 
 41 According to the press release (6), ‘[u]nlike the International 
Criminal Court or national courts, not only the local players, 
 rebel leaders and low-rank soldiers will be held accountable before 
the Congo Tribunal but also their international accomplices who 
provided the supply lines for this atrocious civil war or prevented 
its cessation.’ In http://www.the-congo-tribunal.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/05/150424_Kongo-Tribunal_pess-kit.pd (accessed 
13 May 2016).
 42 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.3.2.
 43 Ibid., 1.3.3.
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according to Aristotle a trial is necessarily antagonistic. 
And yet, the acknowledgement of this basic antagonism, 
and its expression through the strategies of persuasion of 
forensic rhetoric, is at odds with the fundamental crite-
rion of the just and the unjust, which the same Aristotle 
claims as the basis of court judgements.
This contradiction does not escape Aristotle’s attention, 
but it is promptly solved: ‘things that are true and things that 
are just are by nature superior to their opposites.’44 Despite 
its naiveté, Aristotle’s solution sounds obvious to us mod-
erns, and it even smacks of Panglossian eudemonism,45 
because Christianity endorsed its teleological perspective 
(and still endorses it, as in the case of Tutu).
The tension between the persuasive intentions of foren-
sic rhetoric and the pursuing of truth is similarly erased 
whenever a superior necessity inspires the judgement. 
Such a tragic bottleneck is clearly revealed by the farci-
cal enormity of the accusations (and self-accusations), as 
it happened in the various cases of medieval Inquisition, 
early modern witch hunts, and modern show trials: and 
regrettably, a similar logic informs even the best inten-
tioned international courts.
We no longer need to appeal to Carl Schmitt to acknowl-
edge the juridico-theological derivation of the strongly 
reductionist approach of modern legal systems. Forty years 
 44 τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων [te to 
physei einai kreittō talēthē kai ta dikaia tōn enantiōn], ibid., 1.1.
 45 Leibniz (and his well-intentioned Christian optimism) is notori-
ously and ferociously depicted by Voltaire in his novel Candide as 
the doctor Pangloss, who teaches that all is for the best in the best 
of all possible worlds.
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of generalised challenge to modernist biases have made 
us familiar with Schmitt’s contention that the omnipo-
tent lawgiver (and the omnipotent judge) re-enacts the 
omnipotent god in both Roman-derived and common-
law jurisprudence.46 However, though the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission partially restates 
this theological legacy with its pursuit of truth, by stressing 
reconciliation as a task it also acknowledges a plurality of 
subjectivating paths that cannot be immediately reduced 
to a common juridical logic.
I would like to be as optimistic as to construct some 
of the practices of the South African commission as an 
embryonic claim of a juridical logic of the differénd, 
which would be understood as the general norm of jurid-
ical practices rather than their exception. This reversal 
would imply that an encompassing juridical order may be 
produced as the ongoing result of negotiations between 
stakeholders, rather than as a postulation of principles, 
as according to the thousand-year tradition of juridical 
theology.47
Of course, such a de facto pluralism of values and prac-
tices is still a long way from obtaining a de jure recog-
nition. In the meantime, we may well begin not only to 
reclaim our inherited Aristotelian juridical assessment 
of the past, but also to reframe it as the contribution of 
 46 See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of 
Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1985).
 47 I argued for the significance of the notion of juridical theology in 
my essay ‘Mystical Bodies and Bodies of Law: On Juridical Theol-
ogy and the (Re)Foundations of the West’, in Fables of the Law, eds. 
Daniela Carpi and Marett Leiboff (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016).
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juridical practices to the construction of memory in the 
present. This double shift in time and scope would allow us 
to immediately recast past and present juridical practices.
It may be objected that a juridical reconstruction of 
memory requires an already established encompassing 
legal order: this order provides the legal framework for the 
activities of whatever ad hoc apparatus which is invested, 
generally after a political transformation, with the author-
ity to reassess the past, in the perspective of reordering 
the present. And even in this case, the juridico-political 
intervention may have to endure the constraints imposed 
by resilient agents, such as, for example, the Chilean army 
or the South African economic complex.
The effect of these constraints is well depicted by the 
South African parable of the bicycle. As reported by 
Antjie Krog,48 a boy steals the bicycle of a neighbour, and 
after a year of consequential enmity, he invites the victim 
to reconcile. Nevertheless, when asked to return the sto-
len bicycle, he retorts that his offer is about reconciliation 
and not bicycles.
One may expect that, just like the South African boy, 
not many perpetrators would be willing to talk about 
bicycles, as it were. Worse than that, the very bicycle is 
but a euphemistic representation of wrongs that unfortu-
nately go well beyond the appropriation or the destruc-
tion of objects. And unfortunately, humans cannot afford 
the luxury of waiting for an epochal transition that will 
let emerge a new historical sense: the human agenda of 
 48 Krog, ‘The Parable of the Bicycle.’
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survivors is dictated by the mere urgency of life, which 
often, to quote Brassens, ‘is their only luxury.’49
The construction of memory is needed precisely to 
engage at once with oneself and the others in the present. 
This need is powerfully expressed by the protagonist of 
Joshua Oppenheimer’s feature film The Look of Silence, 
which calls into question both notions of cinemato-
graphic representation and historical revisitation. In the 
movie, Adi Rukun plays himself and performs his actual 
conversations with those responsible for his brother’s 
death.
Such conversations make the audience aware of the 
alarming fact that the killing of Adi’s brother was not an 
isolated act of violence, but it was part of a huge carnage, 
which in 1965 and 1966 involved a large portion of the 
Indonesian population. An estimated minimum of a half-
million people were massacred with the collaboration of 
the army in pogroms operated by paramilitary forces, 
which were instructed to prevent an alleged communist 
uprising.
To describe Adi’s endeavour as a search for truth would 
be misleading: he is looking for more than something as 
impersonal as truth,50 and he is consequently rewarded, 
at times, with more than a mere reconstruction of the 
past. Adi is battling the apparent impossibility to share 
 49 ‘La vie est à peu près leur seul luxe ici-bas,’ life is more or less their 
only luxury down here. In Georges Brassens, ‘Mourir pour des idées’ 
(To Die for Ideas), Fernande (1972) Philips 6332 116.
 50 The divergence between the relational priority of Adi’s quest and 
the abstract appeal to truth, as enacted by the director who is dis-
mayed by the reiteration of denial, is staged in the cinematographi-
cally daring final scene.
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his present with his brother’s unprosecuted murderers, 
the surviving bystanders, the other victims’ relatives, and 
his brother’s memory.
The theological vocabulary of truth and justice is sim-
ply unable to address Adi’s conundrum, which is steeped 
in his relationship with himself and the others. And 
whilst Adi may seem only to dangerously confront the 
still influential perpetrators, he actually tries to engage 
them in a dialogue that at once makes room again for his 
brother (and for his murdered fellows), and repositions 
his interlocutors.51
Moreover, whilst the fictional re-enactment of the act 
of killing52 for the sake of explication seems just to put 
the perpetrators again at centre stage, paradoxically it 
instead makes the killed ones re-emerge, first as mere 
human bodies, and then as human beings. The killing is 
re-enacted in the present without the cover of the dehu-
manising strategy that in the past turned the victims into 
a less-than-human source of danger: hence, the reappear-
ance of the victims as human beings is now embodied by 
the perpetrators themselves, whose disconcert becomes 
sometimes visible.
According to Oppenheimer, visibility - in the literal 
sense - is not only a powerful aspect of his cinematic 
involvement with the Indonesian genocide, but also of 
 51 As Oppenheimer himself remarks, Adi’s gentle offer of dialogue 
is only minimally successful, because reconciliation cannot be 
achieved on a personal basis, but it has to become a political process.
 52 Oppenheimer mostly devoted his previous movie, The Act of Kill-
ing, to this re-enactment, albeit with a surreal twist. To underline 
the link between his two works, Oppenheimer presents them as a 
diptych. 
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film in general, which can make visible the stories that 
constitute our identity.53 Once made visible, these stories 
can be acted upon again, and indeed they have to be. For 
example, the visibility of the act of killing, however fic-
tional, inevitably exposes it to the considerations of the 
viewers, be they perpetrators, bystanders, victims’ rela-
tives or simply newcomers.
In general, cinematographic54 performances that re-
enact the past do construct memory by giving the past 
visibility in the present. More than that, all cinema, 
regardless of its content, produces memories through 
audio-visual synaesthesis: and inasmuch as these memo-
ries become part of our experience and reshape our hori-
zon, cinema realises on a mass scale the Futurist program 
of a visual recasting of reality.
We may compare this cinematic55 feat with another 
construction of memory, namely the juridical assessment 
of the past. I have already argued that, at least with regard 
to forensic rhetoric, the legal re-enactment of the past is 
not limited to a merely verbal exercise, because it entails 
the embodiment of the spoken word on the part of the 
lawyer. However, even if, in truly modernist fashion, we 
were to deem as negligible the contribution of the literal 
visibility of performances to the legal construction of 
 53 In the interview 10 Questions for Joshua Oppenheimer, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=MnerL5WBB2M (accessed 3 May, 2016).
 54 Of course, written narrations and theatrical representations also re-
enact the past and construct memory, but they cannot match the 
iterative mimetic ability of cinematographic fictions.
 55 Here I am also exploiting the old form of the term ‘kinematic,’ 
which in English retains the sense of motion of its Greek source 
κίνησις [kinesis], but not its meaning of ‘transformation.’
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memory, the mere evocative power of the lawyer’s speech 
acts would share with literature at large the effect of meta-
phorical visibility produced by words.
It may be observed that literary texts, unlike legal ones, 
do not necessarily owe allegiance to their outside,56 that 
is, the referent in the world, be it past or present: in the 
literary realm, Israeli, Aquinas and Russell’s notion of 
adaequatio would be as inadequate as simplistic, because 
literature is not necessarily bound to reproduce in words 
the world. On the contrary, as the very word ‘fiction’ 
reminds us, literary texts are also allowed to produce 
fictive, that is, non-existent characters, occurrences and 
worlds. Of course, within this realm, a realistic represen-
tation of the world is not at all excluded, but it is just an 
instance of a wider universe of possibilities.
The range of legal constructions of the past may be 
ranked somewhere in between the kaleidoscopic array 
of literary productions and the limited representations of 
the narrow world of philosophical realism. Legal practices 
generate a metaphorical visibility of the past that may be 
better compared to the similar visualisations of the past 
that are put forth by the historians. This closeness to 
 56 Borrowing Derridean terms, we may conceive of the outside-text 
(that is, the alleged absolutely objective referent of the text: for exam-
ple, the past, nature, facts, or god) as an effect of intertextual connec-
tions: the more the intertextual links multiply, the more the percep-
tion of their role in the construction of their common objects dims, 
and the more these common objects acquire the objective character 
of outside-text. Paradoxically, the efficacy of theoretical production 
is testified by the extent to which its products make themselves au-
tonomous, so to speak: its success thus coincides with its self-erasure. 
One may wonder whether it is possible to construct a memory that is 
not subjected to this dynamic of self-effacing success.
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historical evocations is even more evident when a wider 
legal understanding of the past is required to achieve 
some kind of reconciliation, which makes visible, such as 
in Adi’s conundrum, both the living and the dead.
In Western culture, the visibility of the dead has been 
long entrusted to historians, who since Hecatæus have 
competed for this role with the poets.57 In more colour-
ful terms, despite the later fierce competition of priests, 
historians are nowadays securely in charge of communi-
cating with the dead. More precisely, historians are not 
requested to speak to the dead, but rather to make the 
dead speak. This is not a ventriloquist’s trick, because 
historians do engage with the deeds of the dead through 
things.
An immense and expanding hybrid network links 
the dead, the things, their living orderers and variously 
integrating, overlapping and even conflicting ordering 
techniques. This network includes a bewildering amount 
and variety of internal connections, which also perform 
as cross checks. The vastness and the complexity of the 
network ridicule the claims of objective historical truth 
as presumptuous shortcuts.
Regardless of its metaphysical implications, the sim-
plistic notion of objective historical truth performs as a 
fig-leaf that covers the obscene reduction of the work of 
 57 This historical competition (which is also retrospectively construed 
by Plato as a feud between philosophers and poets) is generally 
 recast as the passage from mythos to logos, which is the founda-
tional narrative of Western thought. For a different reading, see 
Robert L. Fowler, ‘Thoughts on myth and religion in early Greek 
historiography’, Minerva 22 (2009): 21-39.
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the historian to the putting together of a jigsaw puzzle. 
On the contrary, we may well recover Balkin’s contention 
about the making of legal truth, and say that historians 
as well make things true in the eyes of history. And yet, 
in the light of our previous path, and also considering 
the powerful surge of cinematographic58 constructions of 
memory, a single past may not be enough. In particular, 
if the engagement with the past is part of a process of rec-
onciliation, we may wonder whether it would be enough 
for historians and legal scholars to produce truth – in the 
singular – in the eyes of history and law respectively.
As we saw, the juridical contribution to a reconciliation 
process appears to require more than a single truth. For 
sure, this requirement may be addressed in fairly differ-
ent ways. At the risk of oversimplifying, in the language 
of conflict, reconciliation may be either understood as a 
mere tactical expedient for dealing with the temporary 
obstacle of some irreducible other, or it may be construed 
as a strategic approach to face previous conflicts and try 
preventing future ones.
This strategic construction of reconciliation may strike 
a middle path between the mere plurality of the Aristo-
telian antagonistic legal agents, and the pre-established 
convergence towards the Aristotelian telos, the Christian 
divine person, and their various modern omnipotent ava-
tars. In this perspective, we may envisage a double task 
for legal activities: on the one hand, legal actors at large 
may relinquish as untenable the claim to the monopoly 
 58 Here I include in the category of ‘cinematographic’ not only movies, 
but also television and new media video shots.
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of memory as a single legal truth, and they may work 
instead to produce the visibility of the plurality of the 
past; on the other hand, legal experts may then facilitate 
the negotiation between the representatives of this plural-
ity in the present.
Whilst such a twofold approach could immediately 
inform the practices of transitional justice, it may affect 
an even wider legal horizon if, following Kathleen Daly, 
we would construct restorative justice as a mechanism 
of meetings of stakeholders, facilitated by a third party 
according to ‘rules and procedures that align with what 
is appropriate in the context of the crime, dispute, or 
bounded conflict.’59
However, in both contexts of transitional and restorative 
justice, the appeal to truth would be likely to resurface over 
and over during reconciliation processes: it would then be 
for the facilitating body to help assess whether the author-
ity of truth is used to silence alternative positions, or to 
make previously invisible stances come to light.
It would be worth clarifying the nature of this emer-
gence to light, though. Since Plato’s invention of the ideal 
dimension, which he fabricated with words borrowed 
from the lexicon of vision, the depiction of visibility as 
the disclosure of truth has been endlessly reiterated in 
Western thought. For example, I recalled how the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission particu-
larly focused on the full disclosure of facts. And yet, the 
 59 Kathleen Daly, ‘What is Restorative Justice? Fresh Answers to a 
Vexed Question’, Victims & Offenders: An International Journal of 
Evidence-based Research, Policy, and Practice, Special Issue: The 
 Future of Restorative Justice 11, no 1 (2016): 21.
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visibility of the past well exceeds a single dimension rang-
ing from emptiness to fullness. On the contrary, it may 
be time, at last, to take responsibility for what we make 
visible. It would be for each of us to acknowledge that pro-
ducing the visibility of the past means also producing the 
past itself as memory, or better, as memories, in the plural: 
and as different practices produce different memories, it 
would be for the law to help this plurality not only to take 
shape, but also to coexist.
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Law’s Transformative Power :  
Ideology, Utopia, and Donald Trump
Stacy Douglas
1. Introduction
The late American Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 
was a famed ‘originalist’. The term, familiar to legal schol-
ars in the United States, refers to an individual who 
believes that the Constitution should not be interpreted 
over time to fit a changing social, political, and economic 
context, but rather that it should always be read as it was 
written and signed in 1787. Although metaphors such as 
‘living’ and ‘growing’ normally abound in discussions of 
constitutional documents, originalists like Scalia believe 
otherwise: ‘The Constitution that I interpret and apply is 
not living but dead, or as I prefer to call it, enduring. It 
means today not what current society, much less the court, 
thinks it ought to mean, but what it meant when it was 
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adopted’.1 Scalia’s fidelity to the past and to an unchanging 
vision of the legal text, let alone his a-historical vision of 
American life, begs fascinating questions about law, tem-
porality and symbolism. For the notoriously conservative 
judge, the text stands as an immutable directive, to which 
social and historical context matters not. The US Consti-
tution is an unwavering set of commands and protections 
that echo steadily from the end of the American Revolu-
tion onwards. Interpretation, in this program, stems from 
authorial intent.
This attachment to authenticity – presumed as locat-
able in both the authors’ intentions and the document’s 
assumed unidimensional meaning – is hard for many 
to swallow. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear scoffs 
amongst liberal audiences at what is assumed to be origi-
nalists’ naiveté, and to feel a palpable disdain for a shal-
low thinking that refuses to consider historical context in 
juridical analyses. But this disposition is not isolated to 
Scalia and other worshippers of the drafters of so-called 
American democracy. Such loyalty to universally applied 
interpretive methods can also be found amongst liberal 
sceptics. Although deploying a different set of devices, 
the anti-originalist faction understands the Constitu-
tion according to its own creed, one that diminishes 
the authors’ intentions and asserts the importance of a 
socially-situated lens in all adjudicational situations. In 
both cases, legal scholars, although with opposing posi-
tions on the role of social-determination, hold firmly to a 
 1 Antonin Scalia, “God’s justice and ours”. First Things: A Journal of 
Religion, Culture and Public Life, 123, (2002): 17-21.
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belief in universally appropriate and applicable interpre-
tation, authorised by their own convictions. And, in fact, 
the specificity of these methods may be much closer than 
anyone would care to admit.
This chapter investigates these competing claims by 
looking to the election of Donald J. Trump as the United 
States of America’s 45th President in November 2016 and his 
winning campaign promise to ‘make America great again’. 
It seems that Trump’s own nostalgia for ‘originalism’ – 
both in his populist sloganeering, as well as his Supreme 
Court nomination to replace the late Scalia – have reso-
nance with a large swath of the American public. While 
anti-Trump voters ridicule this nationalist sentimentality, 
its prevailing popularity cannot be denied and, as such, 
it is deserving of critical investigation. The question for 
legal scholars is how to understand the power of original-
ism and its place in theories of transformation. How does 
the projection of an unmediated text or image of a ‘world 
to return to’, undergird these bold political claims?
It is key to remember, however, that such visions of 
change animate both originalists’ and anti-originalists’ 
imaginations. Indeed, both camps, despite their political 
divergences, often rely on symbolic projection in their 
philosophies of renewal. While Trump and his support-
ers use the image of an old (even if mythological) Amer-
ica, his opposition also deploys imagined visions of the 
future for inspiring and accelerating a world yet-to-come. 
In both cases, it is symbolic projection of a better world 
(with subjective content) that lies beneath the ideology. 
This chapter seeks to poke at this commonly shared visual 
strategy of transformation to ask whether or not there is 
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something important at stake in identifying this com-
monality, and whether there is not something pernicious 
about the method (not simply the content) itself.
In order to pursue these questions, the chapter explores 
a popular theory of legal transformation that depends 
on visual cues as articulated by philosopher Druci-
lla Cornell. Cornell, who draws on Immanuel Kant in 
constructing her theory, is wedded to the role of ‘moral 
images of freedom’ in creating positive change in the 
world. For her, it is such images that provide the space 
for imagined alternatives to oppressive and restrictive law 
and regulation; it is the imagination that is the source of 
freedom and, as such, must be protected. Below I trace 
the capacities and function of the image in Cornell, as it 
comes from Kant, to show precisely how and why it is so 
central for her. It is without doubt true that Cornell is an 
avowed leftist, deeply committed to creating a world that 
is more just and humane through this theory of transfor-
mation, as well as to ethical behaviour and political strug-
gle. However, this chapter wonders at the common use 
of image and imagination and their symbolic projections 
for both left- and right-leaning projects. Of course, one 
could say that it is not the method that is the problem, 
but the content. Indeed, nostalgic desire to return to an 
imagined past has long since been the subject of critique 
by anti-fascist theorists who have witnessed such desires 
transform into genocidal practices. To be sure, Cornell 
and others invested in the role of the symbolic are in no 
way perpetuating such myths.
In his influential text, The Political Unconscious, how-
ever, theorist Fredric Jameson suggests that the problem 
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may indeed be the method and not the content. He asks 
readers to consider the social and historical context of 
cultural products. He suggests that tropes articulated in 
one text cannot be easily transposable to other social and 
historical times. This is because each product contains its 
own set of historically determined assumptions and codes 
that cannot be universalised. As such, Jameson asks after 
the frame or method of interpretation, not only the con-
tent, and is one voice that gives us pause when consider-
ing the transplantation of the Kantian technique of ‘moral 
images of freedom’ from the German philosopher’s social 
and historical context in 1790, to the present day.
I contend that, ultimately, Cornell and Jameson give us 
varying but competing theories of transformation that 
rely on symbolic projection and utopian thinking, both 
of which are illuminating. Especially helpful about their 
work is that, when juxtaposed, the futility of attempting 
to pin the problem on merely the content or merely the 
form is revealed for the empty exercise that it is. This 
insight is helpful in contemplating both the resonance of 
contemporary originalism and Trump’s populist revival 
of its derivation via his claim to return America to its lost 
grandeur. Ultimately, this political development must be 
understood for both its form and content, and for what it 
says about the world we live in and the worlds we imagine 
we want to live in.
2. Cornell & the Image
Drucilla Cornell builds on Virginia Woolf ’s concept of 
‘a room of one’s own’ when she employs the ‘imaginary 
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domain’. For Cornell, the imaginary domain ‘allows the 
imagination to roam freely in the safety provided by the 
acceptance of play as crucial to sexual pleasure’.2 In other 
words, the imaginary domain is the psychic space that 
should be afforded – and guaranteed – to individuals in 
order for them to attain their somatic and sexual free-
dom. Cornell is deeply attached to the role of the imagi-
nation in her theory of transformation for two reasons. 
Firstly, because the imagination is where our ‘most pri-
mordial sexual formations’ take shape (both in ourselves 
and in the images that others have of us). Secondly, the 
imagination plays a central role in the acting out and 
performance of our ‘sexuate being’ as it is moulded and 
re-moulded throughout our lives. In short, for Cornell, 
the imagination links to the ‘possible field of play within 
sexual difference’ and is, therefore, a key site of individual 
and collective freedom, and must be defended as a matter 
of justice.3 In this way, Cornell is deeply Kantian.
Cornell draws on Kant’s last book, Critique of Judgment, 
in her lionisation of the power of the imagination. Kant’s 
third treatise differs from the previous two in that he no 
longer focuses on the role of rationality but on the capac-
ity of the imagination. Or that, put better, in the arena of 
aesthetic judgement, reason is shown to be a deficient tool 
on its own; judgement requires the imagination.4 Kant 
 2 Drucilla Cornell, Moral Images of Freedom: A Future for Critical 
 Theory (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2008), 13.
 3 Ibid., 15
 4 Immanuel Kant Critique of the Power of Judgment. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 29; Cornell, Moral Images of 
Freedom: A Future for Critical Theory, 29.
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contends that conceptualisation (i.e., the use of concepts) 
has no place in aesthetic judgement, and rather that the 
recognition of beauty comes from subjective feelings. 
In other words, we do not, Cornell says, know through 
learned categories that something is beautiful; we feel 
that something is beautiful: ‘for Kant, the powerful role 
of an aesthetic idea is that it activates the spirit and so as 
to make these great ideas come alive, irreducible to empty 
abstraction’.5.6 But he does not stop there.
Kant further claims that these mere subjective feelings 
are not quite enough. Once beauty is observed, absent 
of or without the assistance of previous schematisation, 
it must be related to a more general or universalisable 
ideal of beauty that can transcend the merely subjec-
tive experience. According to Cornell, ‘Kant calls us to 
form a universalisable ideal of beauty in each one of us 
as a guidepost for taste even as this ideal must be devel-
oped in each one of us independently.’7 Kant emphasises 
 5 Cornell, Moral Images of Freedom: A Future for Critical Theory, 14.
 6 For Kant, understanding and imagination must exist together in 
free play, therefore I do not mean to suggest that there is no role 
whatsoever for judgement, but rather that imagination in the deter-
mination of feeling plays a bigger role in Critique of Judgment than 
in the earlier texts: “while it is the imagination that produces the 
schemata that are to be recognised as exhibitions of what is thought 
in reflected concept, it falls to judgement to recognise the actual 
fit between apprehended particular and concept. In other words, 
judgement is required in order to be able to take what is exhibited 
by the imagination as instantiating what is thought in a concept”, 
Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique 
of Judgment. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 47. 
See also Ian Ward, “A Kantian (Re)Turn: Aesthetics, Postmodern-
ism and Law”, Law and Critique 6, no. 2 (1995): 257-271, 258.
 7 Cornell, Moral Images of Freedom: A Future for Critical Theory, 19.
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that this universalisable ideal cannot function as a set of 
rules (for that would create a set of categories for it to 
accord to, which he explicitly rejects), and that it can only 
be attained in a second step, after each individual devel-
ops their own subjective ideal of beauty.8 And yet there 
is a need to develop a communal ideal of beauty, what 
he refers to as the sensus communis. For Kant, the sensus 
communis means ‘the ability to judge by mere feelings in 
the absence of any conceptual grounds, and to do so uni-
versally in principle.’9 This universalisable ideal of beauty 
wards off entirely subjective aesthetic judgements, which 
Kant determines as ‘interested’ judgements, and ensures 
that these ideals are true judgements of taste.10 For Kant, 
aesthetic experience offers the possibility of getting out 
of one’s self and one’s own subjectivity by participating in 
the experience of judgement, which for him was neces-
sarily outwardly focused, requiring communication and 
sense-making with others.11
But what does all of this have to do with Cornell’s 
theory of transformation? Cornell contends that human 
imagination is necessary for conceptualising alternative 
possibilities. She draws on Kant’s important distinction 
between actuality and potentiality to elucidate the rea-
soning behind her investment in aesthetic ideas. But in 
 8 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 166-167; Cornell, Moral 
Images of Freedom: A Future for Critical Theory, 21.
 9 Cristian Nae, “Communicability and Empathy: Sensus Communis 
and the Idea of the Sublime in Dialogical Aesthetics”, Proceedings of 
the European Society for Aesthetics 2, (2010): 361–385, 373.
 10 Ibid., 373.
 11 Ward, “A Kantian (Re)Turn”, 262.
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order to understand the distinction between actuality and 
potentiality, and the role of the image, Cornell contends 
that we must first understand the role of the ‘schema’ in 
Kant’s work.
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant elucidates his the-
ory of ‘schematism’ as he explains his theory on the tran-
scendental faculty of judgement. Here Kant argues that 
schemas are necessary to make sense of the world; sche-
mas provide the conditions for sense to take place. Sig-
nificantly, this schema is not an ‘image’ per se, but rather 
a general way of conceiving of figures in space.12 Sabhajit 
Mishra explains that
a schema enables us to form an image of the con-
cept but is not itself an image. An image is particu-
lar whereas a schema is universal. If we think of ‘1’, 
‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’, ‘5’ we get an image of number 5. But if we 
think of number in general by which we can form an 
image not only of number five but any number what-
soever, we have a schema and not an image13
For example, Kant contends that the conception of a 
dog can conjure up a general idea of a four-footed ani-
mal (schema) without pertaining to an exact empirical 
example of a dog that may exhibit particular features (an 
image). He claims that,
the image is a product of the empirical faculty of the 
productive imagination – the schema of sensuous 
 12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Palgrave 
 MacMillan 2003), 180-187.
 13 Sabhajit Mishra, “Kant’s Schematism of Categories”, Indian Philo-
sophical Quarterly 7, no. 4 (1980): 489-500, 492.
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conceptions (of figures in space, for example) is a 
product, and, as it were, a monogram of the pure im-
agination a priori, whereby and according to which 
images first become possible, which, however, can 
be connected with the conception only mediately by 
means of the schema which they indicate, and are in 
themselves never fully adequate to it.14
In other words, schemas assist in the production of 
concepts that then allow us to think and communicate; 
schemas mediate humans’ knowledge of things. As Kant 
points out here, these schemas are never fully adequate to 
the thing, but merely provide a framework from which 
to build upon. These frameworks or schemas draw upon 
what Kant assumes are universalisable truths that most 
people experience:
an image cannot render the universality of a con-
cept possible. It is the schema which does so. Since 
schema is a rule by which different images are con-
structed it can realise all the possibilities that a con-
cept (e.g., that of a triangle) may have (whether it is 
right angled or obtuse angled). An image on the oth-
er hand, can realise only one of those possibilities.15
In her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Hannah 
Arendt explains the importance of Kant’s philosophy of 
 14 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 183.
 15 Mishra, Kant’s Schematism of Categories, 492. Mishra summarises 
succinctly: “…a schema is a universal procedure of producing ob-
jects i.e. images of different kinds. According to Kant, there are 
three things – concept, schema, and image. It is by means of schema 
that we get the image of the concept” (ibid., 492 (emphasis mine). 
However, there is some debate about this. For an explication of 
Kant’s own murky distinctions between schema, concept, and im-
age, especially regarding whether or not the schema is particular or 
universal, see ibid., 494-495.
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schematism for his ideas of communication and under-
standing:
What makes particulars communicable is (a) that in 
perceiving a particular we have in the back of our 
minds (or in the ‘depths of our souls’) a ‘schema’ 
whose ‘shape’ is characteristic of many such particu-
lars and (b) that this schematic shape is in the back of 
the minds of many different people. These schematic 
shapes are products of the imagination although ‘no 
scheme can ever be brought into any image whatso-
ever’. All single agreements or disagreements presup-
pose that we, who are many, agree, come together, on 
something that is one and the same for us all.16
Arendt’s summary highlights the way in which Kant’s 
schemas incline towards universalism. However, what 
both Kant’s and Arendt’s quotes above point to, is that 
his endorsement of universalism comes as a result of his 
prolonged attempt to explain how humans come to know 
the world. What Kant is explaining is what the empiri-
cists of his time such as Locke and Hume failed to address 
– humans’ increased capacity to move and think in the 
world as a result of transcendental schematic arrange-
ments.17 To return to the example of the dog, schemas 
 16 Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 1982), 83. 
 17 For example, as Professor Daniel Robinson claims in his lectures on 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, when we wake up in the morning 
to find that our car will not start, we do not immediately think that 
the laws of the internal combustion have ceased to be in operation. 
Rather, we presume that our car, and our car only, is broken. We are 
inclined to think that there is something wrong with it, rather than 
assume the failure of the universe in some more general way. D.N. 
Robinson, “Just What is Kant’s Project?” Lecture One on Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason” (Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University 
2011): 35”.
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allow us to think with broad categories of meaning that, 
in turn, allow us to communicate to each other. These 
schemas in turn allow humans to make judgements in 
the world. Without such schemas, we cannot experience 
phenomena.
Cornell turns to the work of Ernst Cassirer for further 
elucidation of the power of imagination in her theory 
of transformation. Cassirer took up Kant’s thought on 
schema, but made an important addition, according to 
Cornell. For Cassirer, as he elaborates in his four-volume 
text The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, language itself is 
a schema. Moreover, not only does language, as a set of 
symbolic forms, allow us to understand the world; it also 
crucially allows us to conceive of alternative possibilities 
to the world as it is presented to us. In other words, lan-
guage – as a schema – does not just make possible rep-
resentation through concepts and images but also, and 
simultaneously, it ‘abstract[s] from the reality which [it] 
seek[s] to represent’;18 language is ‘a means to new knowl-
edge and indeed allows us to disclose new worlds’.19 Elab-
orating on Kant’s ‘as-if ’ of the imagination, Cassirer tells 
us that symbolism always allows for more than just sim-
ple representation of actuality; it serves a double-function 
of serving as a platform for the possibility of understand-
ing, but also as a platform for revealing alternative possi-
bilities of meaning. Cornell explicates Cassirer’s thought 
by drawing on scientific hypothesis and political theory 
 18 Cornell, Moral Images of Freedom: A Future for Critical Theory, 14.
 19 Ibid., 85.
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that turns on this ‘as-if conjectural reasoning’.20 Both 
experiments rely on the imaginative technique that 
allows humans to distinguish between actual and possi-
ble objects and is common practice in imagining alterna-
tive worlds. For example, ‘Cassirer’s analysis of Rousseau’s 
famous state of nature defends this state of nature as an 
imagined object used by Rousseau to vivify what is wrong 
with the France of the Third Estate’ (Cornell 2008, 90). 
For Rousseau, as for Trump and Cornell, it is the juxtapo-
sition between what is and what could be that creates the 
platform for imagining alternatives and, thereby, creating 
change.
This distinction between actuality and possibility, made 
by Kant and emphasised by Cassirer, is key to Cornell’s 
endorsement of ‘moral images of freedom’. For Cornell, 
this philosophical insight is what authorises a belief in the 
power of symbolic projection and an attendant invest-
ment in imagining otherwise. It is what allows her to be 
optimistic about the future; for her, the only thing we 
can be certain of is that we do not know what the future 
holds.21 For some, this may sound like a descent into 
idealism, the worst kind of mind-over-matter thinking 
materialist Marxists have famously rejected. But Cornell 
is quick to point out that the distinction between symbol-
ism and materialism is false and that it fails to recognise 
that materiality is also symbolic.22 For Cornell, drawing 
 20 Ibid., 89.
 21 Ibid., 33.
 22 Cornell elaborates on Cassirer’s rejection of the presumed dualism 
between symbolism and materialism: “All material reality is always 
grasped by human beings as always already symbolised. Capital, as 
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deeply on Cassirer, all phenomena are inextricable from 
symbolic form. This does not mean that she believes all 
transformation will come from imagining otherwise. 
Indeed, she is clear that political struggle and ethical 
commitment (and she does not shy away from a long his-
tory of armed anti-colonial and proletarian struggle) are 
necessary for change.23 However, it is symbolic projec-
tion, which stems from the philosophy of Kant and Cas-
sirer, that undergirds her commitment to the power of 
the imagination in changing the world. The question this 
text seeks to ask is whether such a theory of transforma-
tion is always, or universally, relevant and mobilisable.
3. The Form of Ideology  
(Or an Introduction to Jameson)
Cultural theorist Fredric Jameson famously argues that 
reading and criticism cannot take place in an historical 
vacuum. Rather, all writing and reading is contingent on 
the social and historical context in which it takes place: 
‘our readings of the past are vitally dependent on our 
experience of the present, and in particular on the struc-
tural peculiarities of what is sometimes called the société 
de consommation’.24 So for Jameson, contemporary read-
a symbolic form of life, can only be replaced by another symbolic 
form of life. This is the significance of Cassirer’s insight that there 
is no material and ideal dualism for human beings; our material 
forms of life are always also symbolic”. Ibid.,90.
 23 Cornell, Moral Images of Freedom: A Future for Critical Theory, 90.
 24 The “société de consommation” is translated in English as “consumer 
society”. Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a 
Socially Symbolic Act. (London: Routledge, 1981), xi.
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ing and writing is deeply influenced by the categories of 
thinking and horizon of possibilities that correspond with 
the early twenty-first century and its emphasis on con-
sumerism, and institutionalised liberal-capitalist democ-
racy. But his critique is not limited to the contemporary 
moment – for him, the historical and social relevance of 
time and context is important no matter what epoch you 
are reading or writing in.
Jameson’s insight has great import for intellectuals of 
all sorts. Through his historical analysis of cultural pro-
ducers from Honoré de Balzac to Joseph Conrad, he 
demonstrates that the central themes and tropes of these 
works are historically contingent; they are not ‘the result 
of purely philosophic choices or options in the void, but 
are objectively determined’.25 He takes aim at any univer-
salising theory of critique – whether it be psychoanalytic 
or a crude economical approach – and argues that each 
suppresses its own historical contingency. He claims that 
‘…in its generic form, a specific narrative paradigm con-
tinues to emit its ideological signals long after its origi-
nal content has become historically obsolete’.26 Jameson 
insists then that we must always historicise the cultural 
products we read, as well as the interpretive devices we 
use contemporarily, to understand them not as objective, 
but as products of their time.27 In this way, Jameson does 
 25 Ibid., 96.
 26 Ibid., 174.
 27 Ibid., ix.
  Importantly, Jameson is not suggesting that all cultural texts are 
simply products of class domination at any one particular time, nor 
that this is an accurate understanding of a traditional Marxist anal-
ysis. He critiques Marshall Sahlins on this point who, according to 
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promote a universal theory of interpretation – historical 
analysis.28
Jameson’s insight begs a question of Kant’s, and by asso-
ciation Cornell’s, theory of transformation. Can we say 
that symbolic projection works the same way across social 
and political context and throughout history? Does the 
power of the imagination in visualising change  function 
similarly today as it did in 1790? Certainly, there have 
been many critiques of Kant’s turn to subjective, and away 
from objective, experience in his third book.  Notably, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hannah Arendt claim that 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment radically transforms his pro-
ject from one of seeking out universal values to one of par-
ticularity. As Ian Ward explains,
By encouraging the pure subjectivity of individuality, 
and the total unrestricted ‘free play of imagination 
and understanding’, he [Kant] placed the supremacy 
of freedom above all else, and granted it its own pow-
ers of structure. The pure a priori principle existed 
in its most acutely and purely subjective form, and 
Jameson, suggests as much. Jameson responds: “Sahlins is untrou-
bled by the paradox that Marx himself reserved his most brilliant 
polemic onslaughts for the classical form taken by an instrumental 
theory of culture in his own time, namely utilitarianism”. Jameson, 
The Political Unconscious, 272. For Jameson’s further opposition to 
the hegemony of “materialist critique” (as the new German Ideol-
ogy) see Robert, Kauffman, “Red Kant, or the Persistence of the 
Third ‘Critique’ in Adorno and Jameson”. Critical Inquiry 26, no. 4 
(2000): 682-724, 705; and Hayden White, “Getting Out of History”. 
Diacritics, 12 no. 3 (1982): 2-13, 4.
 28 For other commentary on this seeming paradox and how Jame-
son gets around it, see Geoff Bennington, “Not Yet.” Diacritics 12 
(1982): 23–32, 24; White, “Getting Out of History”, 5; and Jerry 
Aline Flieger, “The Prison-House of Ideology: Critic as Inmate”. 
Diacritics 12. No 3. (1982): 47-56, 51. 
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as Gadamer emphasised, Kant thus opened the door 
to ever more acute relativism in subsequent critical 
philosophy.29
But this criticism is not exactly that of Jameson’s. Rather, 
Jameson emphasises that reading Kant today necessar-
ily involves the transposal and projection of contempo-
rary lenses of morality, politics, and other conceptual 
understandings. So while Kant’s work, according to more 
acutely Marxist critics, takes after the Young Hegelians 
and their ‘commitment to critical consciousness as the 
engine of history’ up against the Marxist imperative that 
revolution is the engine of history, Jameson’s insight is 
that, regardless, Kant’s contributions cannot simply be 
translated from the late eighteenth century to today.30 To 
make such an interpretive leap is to perpetuate what he 
calls ‘liberal ideologies’ and ‘their functional utility in the 
repression of the social and the historical, and in the per-
petuation of some timeless and ahistorical view of human 
life and social relations’.31 But does this mean that Jame-
son is saying that there is no room for the role of symbolic 
projection in transformative change? If so, how else does 
one so committed to the role of cultural production envi-
sion a project of transformation?
Jameson claims that these cultural products need to 
be read and re-written in a way that exposes their social 
and historical contingencies. For example, with regards 
 29 Ward, A Kantian (Re)Turn: Aesthetics, Postmodernism and Law, 262.
 30 Kauffman, “Red Kant”, 692.
 31 Fredric Jameson, Leonard Green, Jonathan Culler and Richard 
Klein, eds., “Interview: Fredric Jameson”. Diacritics 12 no. 3 (1982): 
72-91, 72.
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to psychoanalysis, Jameson explicates how its historical 
situation, rather than universal supposition, might be 
revealed: ‘the conditions of possibility of psychoanalysis 
become visible, one would imagine, only when you begin 
to appreciate the extent of psychic fragmentation since 
the beginnings of capitalism, with its systematic quantifi-
cation and rationalisation of experience, its instrumental 
reorganisation of the subject just as much as of the out-
side world’.32 This is the dialectic element of his argument. 
However, such revelation cannot be experienced by a sole 
individual subject, because they too will always already 
be a product of their social and historical conditioning. 
Jameson compares the individual to the analysand, never 
fully able to reach pure lucidity of their unconscious. In 
order to reach such clarity of thought, what is needed is a 
painful confrontation with a transcendent force, external 
to individual consciousness, able to expose the histori-
cal reality in which the individuals find themselves. For 
Jameson this transcendental could come in the form of 
‘a collective unity – whether that of a particular class, the 
proletariat, or of its ‘organ of consciousness,’ the revolu-
tionary party’.33 It is a painful confrontation because it is 
engaged in a ‘decentering’ or displacement of the central-
ity of the individual consciousness and an opening up to 
an ‘unpleasant reflexivity’.34
Jameson does not simply dismiss cultural products, 
even when they are formations of particular contexts, 
 32 Ibid., 47.
 33 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 273-274.
 34 Ibid., 274.
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as merely ‘ideological’. He productively finds that their 
hidden ideological element only has legs in so far as it 
is accompanied by allusions to utopian thinking. In this 
way, Jameson holds strongly to an advanced conception 
of agency, one that gives subjects credit for willingly and 
optimistically participating in their own management. 
Against the doctrine of mere ‘false consciousness’, and 
along with theorists such as Ernst Bloch, he claims that 
what is happening is not just
… inscribing the appropriate attitudes upon a blank 
slate, but must necessarily involve a complex strategy 
of rhetorical persuasion in which substantial incen-
tives are offered for ideological adherence. We will 
say that such incentives … are necessarily Utopian 
in nature.35
In other words, for Jameson, ideology is always combined 
with utopianism, and this is not necessarily a good or a 
bad thing. For him, we must not deny the ‘co-existence 
of different functions’ in a cultural product; ideology and 
utopian thinking can be divergent and yet occur togeth-
er.36 But it is also key to note that for Jameson, utopian-
ism is not necessarily only a product for the left or the 
right but is always a product of a yearning for collective 
unity; utopianism is not the formation of the collective 
per se but, rather, the images that animate its imagined 
togetherness. He claims that:
…even hegemonic or ruling-class culture and ideol-
ogy are Utopian, not in spite of their instrumental 
 35 Ibid., 278.
 36 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 279.
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function to secure and perpetuate class privilege and 
power, but rather precisely because that function 
is also in and of itself the affirmation of collective  
solidarity.37
But this does not mean he sees utopian thinking as a 
thoughtless or irrelevant strategy. He takes it up, especially 
in later work, as a key potential tool for imagining other-
wise, not unlike Cornell’s use of Kant’s ‘moral images of 
freedom’. The key difference between the two strategies, 
however, is that where Cornell and Kant see their theory 
of transformation as universalisable, Jameson insists that 
all such imaginations are always a product of their social 
and political context. So utopian thinking itself, regard-
less of when or where it is conceived, will always ‘reflect 
a specific class-historical standpoint or perspective’.38 He 
works against the universalising tendency to treat utopian 
thinking as if it can be free from such constraints, as if it 
can rise ‘above all immediate determinations in some all-
embracing resolution of every imaginable evil and misery 
of our own fallen society and reality’.39 And this contex-
tual understanding of utopia is important because it is 
this context that provides the key to truly transformative 
change. Rather than merely imagining a better future, as 
in Cornell and Kant, he insists that the power of utopian-
thinking lies in its suffocation in the present moment. In 
other words, it is its failure that provides hope. Impotence 
 37 Ibid., 281.
 38 Fredric Jameson, “The Politics of Utopia”. New Left Review no. 25 
(2004): 35-54, 47.
 39 Ibid.
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of the imagination in a system that seems impossible to 
change reveals the ideological context within which we 
live; it reminds us of the social and historical box we find 
our thinking confined by. Utopia
…is most authentic when we cannot imagine it. Its 
function lies not in helping us to imagine a better 
future but rather in demonstrating our utter in-
capacity to imagine such a future—our imprison-
ment in a non-utopian present without historicity 
or futurity—so as to reveal the ideological closure of 
the system in which we are somehow trapped and 
confined.40
Whereas Cornell uses Rousseau to expound on the trans-
formative moment between imagining what is and what 
might be (or in a more Kantian formulation, what is and 
what ought to be), Jameson uses Rousseau’s insights to 
emphasise the importance of the gap between under-
standing that the world can and is changing, but the 
system that organises it cannot; utopias occur in these 
times of frustration.41 In other words, it is not the positive 
possibility of the thinking that is the engine for change, 
but rather its negation; in the negation, the ideological 
context of the system is exposed.42 However, the potential 
for change is not impossible; transformation is a reality 
that can come about and be inspired by utopian thinking. 
Even though such visions are not yet realised, this does 
not mean that they are non-existent: ‘utopias in fact come 
 40 Jameson, “The Politics of Utopia”, 46.
 41 Ibid., 45.
 42 Ibid., 50.
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to us as barely audible messages from a future that may 
never come into being’.43
The power of Jameson’s contributions comes from his 
contention that ideology and utopia cannot be separated. 
This reminds us that, when we think along with Kant, 
we do not only need to acknowledge the social and his-
torical context that the German philosopher was writing 
within, but also that any critique of his work as merely 
‘ideological’ must also observe the utopian elements of 
his work. The same follows with Cornell’s theory of trans-
formation. It is not that law is simply an instrument of 
class oppression but, on the other hand, utopian thinking 
cannot merely subscribe to the theory of transformation 
through moral images of freedom. Rather, it is through 
a frustrated thinking of change, one that recognises that 
transformation cannot happen through existing juridical 
institutions, that utopian thinking occurs.44 Whether or 
not that leads to change is not certain, but these are the 
conditions for utopian thinking, according to Jameson.
4. Images of Utopia
Both Cornell and Jameson deploy theories of symbolic 
projection in their competing theories of transforma-
tion. Cornell draws on Kant and Cassirer to contend 
that images of alternative possibilities have the power to 
grant us freedom to imagine otherwise, to think a differ-
ent future and then realise it. Jameson argues that it is 
 43 Ibid., 54.
 44 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 288. 
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not the fulfilled wish fantasies of such projections that 
stimulate change but, rather, their butting up against and 
subsequent revelation of a social and historical context 
and its attendant ideological trappings. As Kathi Weeks 
eloquently summarises, Jameson’s ‘signature contribution 
to utopian studies involves a shift in focus from the posi-
tive content of a utopian vision to its negative function 
of producing an estrangement from and neutralisation of 
the present order of things’45 Certainly, for Jameson, it is 
still necessary to imagine change, but such visions can-
not take on a positive, generalisable form – they must be 
keenly aware of the class composition and context under 
which they are imagined, for it is this that stifles transfor-
mation and this that must be understood and overcome 
for change to happen.
Up until now the focus of my engagement with the vis-
ual has largely relied on the use of image and imagination 
in these competing theories of transformation. But, with-
out counteracting Cornell and Cassirer’s insistence on the 
inherent relationship between symbolism and material-
ism, I want to briefly turn to some more concrete visual 
incarnations of Trump’s project to ‘make America great 
again’. These cues cannot be disassociated from the popu-
lar rhetoric; these symbols are what instantiate the grip of 
the discourse on the collective imagination. They are nec-
essary for the power of Trump and his claims. However, 
the anti-Trump camp has visual cues of its own. These 
 45 Kathi Weeks “Utopian Therapy: Work, Nonwork, and the Political 
Imagination,” in An American Utopia: Dual Power and the Universal 
Army, Slavoj Zizek, ed. 243-266. (London: Verso. 2016), 245.
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competing displays of visuality underscore my claim that 
both form and content are imperative to consider in the-
ories of transformation, and that neither can be merely 
translated as universals, or reduced solely to their socio-
historical context.
One of the most prominent symbols of the Trump 
campaign and presidency is the red ‘Make America Great 
Again’ hat. This visual symbol, adorning the heads of 
Trump supporters across the United States, uses an all 
uppercase white embroidered declaration in what looks 
like Times New Roman font to communicate to those 
who witness it, in no uncertain terms, the ‘America first’ 
politics of the person whose head it sits on.46 Trump’s own 
website features the hat, declaring that ‘the hat became his 
symbol’, along with a short video about the proud Ameri-
can workers that make them.47
This popular hat may be contrasted with another one, 
the counter-symbol to Trump’s jingoistic chapeau: the 
pink knitted ‘pussyhats’ of the national Women’s March 
that took place in Washington, DC in protest of Trump 
and his policies, on 21 January 2017, the day after his 
inauguration. Using the reclamation of production and 
colour popularly associated with women, marchers knit-
ted, crocheted, and sewed pink hats (the patterns for 
 46 This was a slogan deployed by Trump on his inauguration day and 
has since found a home in the title of his approach to foreign affairs. 
For a full transcript of his speech from 20 January 2017 see Cao 
2017. To read the “America First Foreign Policy” see. “America First 
Foreign Policy”, Accessed 25 April, 2017: https://www.whitehouse.
gov/america-first-foreign-policy.
 47 “Donald J. Trump”, Accessed 25 April, 2017m https://www.donaldj 
trump.com/2017.
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which were widely disseminated via the internet) that 
included two small ears to make the wearer resemble a cat 
or kitten.48 The cat theme was part of the marchers’ claim 
that ‘pussies grab back’, a retort to the Fall 2016 scandal 
that revealed a previously audio-recorded conversation 
in which Trump boasted that he could grab women ‘by 
the pussy’ without their consent.49 But the central aim of 
the Pussyhat Project was to make ‘a powerful visual state-
ment’ by having ‘a sea of pink’ descend on DC (Pussyhat 
Project). And indeed, this fuchsia-inspired visual reply 
to Trump’s red snap-back was popularised in journalistic 
photos of the march, and appeared on the cover of Time 
Magazine as well as the New Yorker the following week.50
It is imperative to consider Trump’s red baseball cap 
in the context of Jameson’s critique of universalism. 
With this visual symbol, Trump – like Cornell, Kant, 
and Rousseau – wants to pull on the positive imagina-
tive possibilities of the electorate by encouraging them 
to imagine something better. While the slogan is the key 
part of this approach, it is given visual instantiation via 
the hat. A person wearing the hat tells others, not only 
what their individual politics are, but also that they are 
 48 The knit pattern was originally designed by Kat Coyle, “Pussyhat 
Project”, Accessed 25 April, 2017. https://www.pussyhatproject.
com/faq/.
 49 According to the Pussy Hat Project website, the hats are also about 
reclaiming the term as an empowering one: “We love the clever 
wordplay of ‘pussyhat’ and ‘pussycat,’ but yes, ‘pussy’ is also a de-
rogatory term for female genitalia. We chose this loaded word for 
our project because we want to reclaim the term as a means of em-
powerment” (ibid.). 
 50 The hat was featured on the cover of Time Magazine on Thursday 
26 January 2017 and the New Yorker on Friday 27 January 2017.
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part of a larger movement of hat-wearers. Furthermore, 
the hat embodies Trump’s rhetoric of ‘America first’ as it 
proudly dons the stamp ‘Made in the USA’ on its reverse. 
The video on Trump’s website works hard to embolden 
this narrative, showing labourers working happily in the 
hat-making factory, sharing their enthusiasm for Trump’s 
fulfillment of his campaign promise to bring manual 
labour back to the USA.
And the Pussyhat is not dissimilar. Like the Trump 
hat, it too serves as a visual cue for observers; those who 
don the Pussyhat mark themselves as individuals with a 
particular politic, and as members of a group with a dis-
tinct political affiliation. While it does not use Times New 
Roman to communicate a central slogan, it too mobilises 
a visual aesthetic. Up and against the factory-made sheen 
of a generic baseball cap, the pink headwear communi-
cates clear affinities to DIY, anti-corporate, grassroots 
and feminist principles. Indeed, the popular sharing of 
the knit pattern, which also allows for individual cus-
tomisation, is part of the anti-centralisation politics of the 
Pussyhat Project: ‘Part of the joy of the project is connect-
ing to other women and men who support women’s rights 
in a fresh surprising and warm way’. The Pussyhat Project 
sees their strategy as a caring, empathetic and collective, 
opposition to Trump-supporting Republicans. But aside 
from the content, the pink retort to Trump’s red works 
similarly – in their fundamental form, both hats function 
as an image of universal appeal, with the aim of encapsu-
lating an imagination (via a material symbol) that pro-
motes and prompts transformation. Much like Rousseau’s 
third estate, the hats act as a symbolic gesture to conjure 
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up and expose a gap between what is and what ought to 
be, whether that be for the left or the right.
Further, Jameson reminds us that these symbols can-
not be removed from their socio-historical context. For 
example, the red MAGA hat tells a formidable lie about 
the possibility of revitalising a manufacturing industry 
in contemporary America. Yet economists have empha-
sised that the decline in this sector of employment is not 
primarily the fault of international trade epitomised in 
the rally cries against the amorphous spectre of ‘China’, 
but rather automation. Jobs once held by workers in fac-
tories have been increasingly transferred to robots that 
can complete the work more quickly and for less expense 
to the employer.51 As these jobs have disappeared – at 
an incredible rate of approximately 5.5 million from 
2000-2010 – similar paying jobs in other sectors have 
not opened up, leading to a rise in employment in the 
service sector industry, which is typically non-unionised 
and paid significantly less (Muro 2016). And perhaps 
most telling that this industry is not going to bounce 
back under Trump’s ‘America First’ policies, is the fact 
that, during this time of great decrease in employment 
for the Rust Belt, American manufacturing has actually 
increased, becoming a more productive sector with a 
decreased and less expensive labour force.52
And, the Pussyhat Project too may be in danger of 
forgetting its socio-historical conditions. Combining 
 51 Federica Cocco, “Most US manufacturing jobs lost to technology, 
not trade”. Financial Times (2 December 2016).
 52 Mark Muro, “Manufacturing Jobs Aren’t Coming Back”. Technology 
Review (18 Nov 2016).
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organisational forces with the National Women’s March, 
the hats and the march sought to demonstrate a collective 
unity of resistance to the new Trump Administration, but 
also to catch the attention of representatives of Congress 
in order to steer their agendas towards social and envi-
ronmental justice.53 Although the organising slogans of 
the approximately 500,000 marchers were clearly diverse, 
ranging from Indigenous sovereignty to anti-capitalism, 
the aim of the event mobilised the logic of that aim and 
correlates representation with democracy, part and parcel 
of the existing US political machinery. While organising 
around visibility and increased representation certainly 
has merit, the march has the danger of serving as a one-off 
event that sees its aim only as sending an anti-Trump 
message about personal freedoms for women. Even as 
Jodi Dean emphasises the power of the crowd to dis-
rupt, she remarks: ‘people must self-consciously assem-
ble themselves in settings not determined by capital and 
the state […] The challenge consists in changing politi-
cal actions into political power’.54 Organisers and partici-
pants may see the hats as symbols of hope and struggle, 
but, ultimately, the pink hats may function much like 
their myth-promoting rivals if they are not understood 
within their socio-historical context – a context that 
has seen the rise of a left increasingly oriented to frag-
mented individualism, with minimal attention to the sus-
tained governmental attack on unions (a former force in 
 53 “Women’s March”. Accessed 25 April, 2017: https://www.womens 
march.com/.
 54 Jodi Dean, Crowds and Party (New York: Verso 2016), 22.
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 fighting for socio-economic change), as well as the axing 
of socio-economically-oriented programs such as afford-
able housing, healthcare, food, and other socially neces-
sary subsidies, since the mid-1970s.55 As Jameson himself 
claims, even more sustained and organised movements 
like Occupy have emerged as a result of this failure of the 
left to combat these rollbacks, but this reality is oft forgot.56
Perhaps most importantly, however, both visual cues 
have failed to operationalise the kind of negative dia-
lectic that Jameson claims is crucial for transformation. 
Although both hats embody – and arguably help foster – 
frustration with the current political situation, this anger 
has been so far translated by optical managers into an 
endorsement of the existing capitalist democracy of the 
USA and its two-party system. If you are vexed at the 
loss of manufacturing in the nation and, as a result, feel 
threatened when you see immigrants and people of col-
our with jobs, turn your anger towards the representative 
candidate of the right – get a hat and vote for Trump. If 
you are shocked and dismayed at the popular acceptance 
of misogyny, racism, islamophobia, and climate change 
denying – as evidenced in the election of Donald Trump – 
don your Pussyhat to show your repudiation of the new 
President. This is not to suggest that there is no political 
merit in marching, but that ‘the task of utopianism today 
 55 Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the 
Working Class (New York: The New York Press 2010), 68-74; Dean, 
Crowds and Party, 31-50; Rick Wolff, “Organized labor’s decline in 
the US is well-known. But what drove it?”. The Guardian (2 Sep 
2013).
 56 Fredric Jameson, An American Utopia: Dual Power and the Universal 
Army (London: Verso 2016), 42.
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[may be] rather to propose more elaborated versions of 
an alternate social system than simply to argue the need 
for one’.57 Neither symbol forces an estrangement with 
the existing political-legal institutional reality via an 
exposure of the class composition of their context, which 
might allow for the ideological conditions of the present 
state of things to be exposed; instead, both rely on the 
Kantian-inspired deployment of the positive image and 
its role as a catalyst for transformation.
5. A Return to Originalism
As outlined in the introduction, what is interesting about 
originalism is not the presumed backwardness of its pro-
moters, but rather the theory of transformation that lies 
behind it, which is also shared by liberal leftists who pre-
sume themselves radically distanced to such thinking. 
Indeed, both project future images of a better world in 
order to animate and organise their movements. I asked at 
the outset if the problem was the content of such imagery 
or in fact the very form. What I have attempted to show 
is that it is neither, or, rather, that it is both. Here Jame-
son’s contention about the inseparability of ideology and 
utopia for both the left and the right gives important 
insight to understanding the commonly held theory of 
transformation between the two opposing camps. We can 
understand the call to ‘make America great again’ as one 
both steeped in a social and historical ideological context 
 57 Ibid., 43.
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of neo-liberalism that also deploys utopian thinking in 
amassing an imagined collective unity of disenfranchised 
citizens excluded from ‘Washington’, as the campaign rhet-
oric goes. But we can also analyse Cornell’s ‘moral images 
of freedom’ as part and parcel of a liberal democratic phi-
losophy that presumes the centrality of the individual sub-
ject and its powers of imagination and rationality that sit 
over and above any class-influenced position. Such sym-
bolic projection pulls on hopeful imaginations of and for 
bourgeois freedom. In both theories, the ideological and 
utopian elements cannot be disentangled from each other. 
In addition, Jameson’s focus on the negative potential of 
utopian thinking, up and against Cornell’s holdout for 
the positive, tells us that both the content and the form 
of the theory of transformation must be considered in its 
context in order to reveal the ways in which this context 
shapes and moulds visions of what is possible.
Originalism postulates an immanent relationship with 
the Constitution. Somewhat similarly, the theory of legal 
transformation that Cornell relies on displays a belief in 
an immanent relationship between the self and its histor-
ical conditions; it presumes that there is no disjuncture 
between the two, that moral images of freedom can be 
accessed by the individual’s imagination, unmediated by 
class-position or class-forces. In contrast, Jameson pro-
motes the role of the transcendental in the necessary reve-
lation between individual subject and the non-ideological 
reality of their social and historical conditions. Jameson’s 
position corresponds with traditional anti-originalist 
thought that contends that all juridical reasoning must be 
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keenly cognisant of context. My intention is not to say 
that one theory supersedes the other, but rather to point 
to the differing positions on the role of symbolic projec-
tion and utopian thinking in theories of transformation. 
As the Trump administration embarks on what is a very 
troubling path to restoring what conservatives imagine 
as America’s lost greatness, it is important to remember 
that it is not necessarily merely the form or the content 
of the claims that require analysis – but both. It is not 
merely allusions to a great return or restoration that must 
put us on alert, but also the practice of symbolic projec-
tion itself. We must also understand that this isolation-
ist and xenophobic rhetoric is not merely ideology, but 
also utopian in its thinking – the right, just as much as 
the left, can engage in exercises of imagining collective 
identity that fulfil these fantasies and encourage ideologi-
cal adherence. Moreover, it is not only positive utopian 
thinking that may serve as a helpful tool in comprehend-
ing the situation we find ourselves in, but also – and per-
haps especially – negative utopian thinking that reveals 
the limits of what is possible and what we imagine to be 
possible in the current moment.
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1. Introduction
This essay seeks to listen to the ‘muta eloquentia’ of visual 
arts, in a very specific field, namely, the plastic discourse 
on the eyes, the blindness and the blindfold of justice – 
‘the most enigmatic feature of justice’2 – throughout the 
last centuries of western art history. Why, over the cen-
turies, has the goddess of justice been so often depicted 
with eyes open, with eyes closed, with blindfolds, without 
blindfolds...? What does that mean? What is the reason 
for these changes? These are the central issues of this 
text. Images shape powers, knowledge and invisible argu-
ments, making present all which is many times absent3 – 
above all in those historical times when printed language 
was still not available to diffuse ideas.4 Therefore, the 
immediate objective of this text is to better understand 
law and better understand the art that speaks of law.
Many are the juridical themes apprehended by visual 
arts. Although this writing concentrates merely on the 
visual representations of justice – or, more precisely, 
on just one element (the blindfold) of the very same 
representations –, themes such as law, trials, sentences, 
courts, judges, lawyers, codes, treaties, juridical institu-
tions or legislators have always been profusely found in 
arts in general and especially in visual arts. By electing 
the iconography of justice as an object of investigation, 
 2 Christian-Nils Robert, Une Allégorie parfaite: La Justice: vertu, 
courtisane et bourreau (Genève: Georg, 1993), 13.
 3 Lynda Nead and Costas Douzinas, Law and the Image: The Author-
ity of Art and the Aesthetics of Law (Chicago, Ill.; London: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1999), 37.
 4 Robert, Une Allégorie parfaite, 10.
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this chapter attempts to capture how it is an abstract con-
cept (justice) that is central to the world of law has been 
so many times apprehended and visually reproduced in 
the history of juridical-political thinking. Here, the ico-
nography of justice can represent the pictorial material 
relating to or illustrating the idea of justice and, thus, is a 
key element to provide evidences towards identification, 
description, and the interpretation of the notions of jus-
tice throughout the centuries.
As cultural manifestations that show man’s ‘relationship 
with that which surrounds him’5, art and law have always 
been close throughout history. Therefore, the use of argu-
ments, narratives and artistic knowledge to better under-
stand arguments, narratives and juridical knowledge is 
not unusual, nor is it a recent phenomenon. It is fair to 
acknowledge, however, that, along with modernity, when 
common sense came to see human reason as the only 
objective measure of all things (logocentrism), a growing 
distance between art and law came to exist, which only 
regained power in the twentieth century. Especially due 
to juridical positivism, common sense accepted and dif-
fused the idea that juridical science would be, above all, a 
logical science of Cartesian interpretation of rational and 
objective texts, with no room for semantic uncertainties, 
emotions or even some irrationality of art and aesthetics.
As pointed out by Stephan Prinz, for a great period of 
time law was understood as an exclusively textual science 
(Textwissenschaft) whose strength would reside in the 
 5 Meyer Schapiro, Mondrian: a dimensão humana da pintura abstrata 
(São Paulo: Cosac & Naify, 2001), 8.
162 Marcílio Franca
purest interpretation of legal texts, with no room whatso-
ever for art-like conceptual openness, plurivocity, poly-
semy, anarchy or even some irrationality.6 To the late Prof. 
Cornelia Vismann, jurists are really afraid of images: they 
suffer from imagophobia.7 This essay is meant to bridge 
this distance between arts and law, showing the possibili-
ties of an aesthetic discourse of juridical science, which is 
not only centred around the logocentrism and nomocen-
trism of positive law, but one discourse that registers 
its conviction that law is very far from being only ‘sola 
escriptura’.
2. Jus e(s)t Ars
For didactic reasons, at least four planes of deep interac-
tion between art and law can be accounted for: 1) law as 
an object of art, that is, all those instances when justice 
and law were the subject of masterpieces by great artists 
of painting, literature, cinema, drama, and so on; 2) art 
as an object of law, that is, the countless cases when law 
set itself to regulate, discipline, protect, limit or shape 
the themes, works, liberties or rights of artists; 3) art as a 
right, with its many discussions on the right to culture, the 
right to the protection of artistic heritage, and the exer-
cise of artistic freedom of expression; and, finally, 4) law 
as art, which gives rise to the classic definition of law as 
‘the art of goodness and equity’(‘ius est ars boni et aequo’, 
 6 Stephan Prinz, Juristische Embleme: Rechtsmotive in den Emblemata 
des 16. bis 18. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Lit, 2009), 1.
 7 Cornelia Vismann, ‘Image and Law – a Troubled Relationship,’ Par-
allax 14, no. 4 (2008): 1.
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according to Celsus) and its occasional relations with the 
grammars of law as science and law as technology. This 
essay focuses mainly on the first dimension above.
As can be noticed, such relationships take place in an 
extrinsic perspective of the dialogue between art and law, 
and are more directed to the thematic contents of law and 
art. This quadripartite classification, however, ignores that 
novels, essays, poems, plays, paintings, engravings, sculp-
tures, movies, music sheets and architecture may always 
create innovative juridical arguments and contents, even 
if they do not indicate that law is their major object of 
reflection. Therefore, there is a fifth plane of interaction 
between art and law: art that speaks to law even though it 
does not speak about law. Art and aesthetics – due to their 
non-dogmatism, dynamic complexity, refined under-
standing of the world, openness and creativity – always 
have a lot to say to law, even when words are not used. Not 
by chance the greatest Roman jurists, for example, were 
always seeking the elegantia juris – an aesthetic sense of 
juridicity, guided by a component of beauty and elegance 
for the juridical forms.8 In addition, novels, poems, plays, 
paintings, engravings, sculptures, movies and architecture 
may also create new juridical arguments and contents, as 
they disorganise convictions, undo certainties, liberate 
possibilities, and anticipate the future.9
It is not a coincidence, then, that the oldest book on 
the mute eloquence of images, the Emblematum Liber 
 8 Jerome Frank, ‘Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory 
 Interpretation,’ Columbia Law Review 47, no. 8 (1947): 1259.
 9 François Ost, Contar a lei: as fontes do imaginário jurídico (São Leo-
poldo, RS: UNISINOS, 2007), 13.
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(Emblem Book) was published in 1531 by the Milanese 
Renaissance jurist Andreas Alciatus (1492-1550).10 The 
book by Alciatus is considered the milestone of a new dis-
cipline, ‘Emblematics’, which gathers literary and image 
elements. Ever since jurist Andreas Alciatus published his 
Emblematum Liber, in 1531, more than a few scholars – 
under diverse fundaments and points of view – have 
attempted to highlight these relationships between artis-
tic discourses and juridical categories. In fact, one of the 
first disciplines to care about systematising, organising 
and exposing such knowledge this way was, undoubtedly, 
the ‘juridical symbolism’ (or iurisprudentia symbolica) 
which dates back to the work of art of Italian Giambat-
tista Vico, and whose greatest exponents are Germans 
Jacob Grimm and August Ludwig Reyscher, Frenchmen 
Jules Michelet and Joseph Pierre Chassan and Portuguese 
Theóphilo Braga. In his work Essai sur la Symbolique du 
Droit, Chassan defines the reasons and the object of this 
new discipline named ‘juridical symbolism’ like this:
‘Law, in its external manifestations, has not always 
exclusively coated the form of the word or alpha-
betic writing. To be understood and retained by the 
rude intelligence of the uneducated men of primitive 
times, law needed sensitive images, figurative rep-
resentations and physical signs to speak to the eyes 
and to imagination. These real or animated signs 
were named symbols. Herein we call them juridical 
symbolism, to better characterise their specialty. The 
science that teaches the formation and origin of such 
symbols – and which, using the materials provided 
by erudition, created on symbols, including law in 
 10 Nead and Douzinas, Law and the Image, 7.
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use, a body of doctrine, altogether philosophical 
and practical, a set of rules and precepts that lead 
to explaining the symbols in general and to know-
ing each symbol in particular – is called juridical 
symbolism.’11
For a very long time law was ‘multimedia’. In many occa-
sions in history, law used symbols and images to be dis-
seminated and understood – especially over a long period 
when illiteracy was dominant and the press was inexist-
ent, inaccessible or costly. Especially between the Mid-
dle Ages and modern times, the dignity and the weight 
of images were great, so much so that important juridical 
manuscripts were richly illustrated, forming the relevant 
set of images now known as ‘iurisprudentia picturata’.12
In the early twentieth century, the studies on symbols, 
images, objects and emblems associated with law and jus-
tice greatly developed in Germany, with the birth of a new 
historical-juridical discipline named ‘Rechtsarchäologie’ 
(‘juridical archeology’), founded by Professor Karl von 
Amira, of the University of Munich. Especially between 
the 1910s and 1930s, ‘juridical archeology’ provided 
great contributions in this field, through seminal works 
to comprehend juridical imagery. Today, the theme still 
 11 Joseph-Pierre Chassan, Essai sur la symbolique du droit (Paris: 
 Videcoq fils aîné, 1847), 1-2.
 12 Robert Jacob, Images de la justice: essai sur l’iconographie judiciaire 
du Moyen âge classique (Paris: Léopard d’or, 1994), 11. Two of these 
manuscripts, the Decretum Gratiani (Decree of Gratian, twelfth 
century) and the Sachsenspiegel (literarily meaning Saxon Mirror, 
thirteenth century), contain those which are considered the found-
ing images of juridicity. Great artistic and juridical relevance is also 
given to the Hamburger Stadtrecht collection, 1497.
166 Marcílio Franca
enjoys the special attention of the Max-Planck-Institut für 
Europäische Rechtsgeschichte, Frankfurt (Germany). After 
the 1990s, the rise of several versions of the movement 
‘Law and…’ – such as Law & Society, Law & Literature 
and Law & Humanities – inspired another wave of dis-
semination of aesthetic-cultural studies on the juridical 
phenomenon in the English language.13 At the same time 
in Europe, the dissemination of historical-aesthetic-cul-
tural studies on justice and law also led to the constitution 
of a solid French-speaking school of ‘juridical iconology’. 
Strongly influenced by information technologies, juridi-
cal informatics and the multimedia character of the con-
temporary culture, a brand-new discipline started to be 
shaped in Austria, Switzerland and Germany in the early 
twenty-first century: ‘Rechtsvisualisierung’, that is, ‘juridi-
cal visuality’ (or ‘BilderRecht’, or even ‘Visuelle Rechtskom-
munikation’). This discipline focuses on studying the 
design of juridical information and the multiple modali-
ties of communication of the juridical phenomenon 
throughout history – from richly-illustrated medieval 
manuscripts to contemporary 3-D digital information.14 
‘Rechtsvisualisierung’ is a direct heir to an epistemic-
methodological trend that completely spans the whole 
range of contemporary human and social sciences: the 
renewed role given to images in current society, which is 
 13 Anna Di Robilant, ‘The Aesthetics of Law’, Global Jurist Advances 1, 
no. 2 (2001): 2. 
 14 Colette R. Brunschwig, ‘Rechtsvisualisierung: Skizze eines nahezu 
unbekannten Feldes’, MultiMedia und Recht 12, no. 1 (2009): IX-XII.
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described by Boehme-Nessler as ‘iconocracy’.15 In other 
words, more and more human and social sciences have 
used images to understand and explain the world and law 
is not immune to this trend.
The iconophilia of contemporary human and social 
sciences is, above all, due to three factors: 1) easy access 
to ancient images, due to technological improvements 
in preserving, digitising, storing and researching great 
image banks; 2) easy production and dissemination of 
new images, also due to new technologies for produc-
tion and dissemination (among which are YouTube and 
Flickr); and, finally, 3) the countless images that are con-
tinually produced, consumed and discarded in the most 
accessible media channels, such as cable TV, newspapers, 
magazines, websites, blogs, mobile phones, and so on, 
which has led people nowadays to an essentially visual 
way of thinking. One more issue can be added to these 
three factors, which is the fact that communication via 
images is always faster than communication through text, 
and speed is undoubtedly a central concern of the world 
today.16
In this scenario of excessive visuality in contemporary 
culture it is paradoxical that one of the most frequent 
attributes of iconography of justice is – still today – the 
blindfold. This is one of the main reasons why this essay is 
dedicated to the theme of the blindfold and the blindness 
of justice and not any other of the many controversial and 
 15 Volker Boehme-Nessler, BilderRecht: die Macht der Bilder und die 
Ohnmacht des Rechts (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), 56.
 16 Boehme-Nessler, BilderRecht, 64.
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complex aspects of the iconography of justice, for exam-
ple, the dominant gynecocracy in its representations.17
All these theoretical nuances – from the symbolism 
of law to juridical visuality – are nothing but attempts to 
comprehend that which Professor Rodolfo Sacco once 
defined as ‘mute law’, that is, the very important unwritten 
or unspoken dimension of law.18 In this sense, contradic-
tory as it may seem, by rescuing very old historical images 
of art and law – to be seen in the following chapter, this 
essay – far from fitting into a melancholic laudatio tempo-
ris actii – matches the most contemporary way of thinking 
of social and human sciences: the study of the rhetoric of 
iconosphere (or Bilderwelt) in which we are all immersed. 
Iconosphere (or Bilderwelt) is to be understood as the 
immense and complex network of image meanings which 
we are submitted to in our ‘Media Age’.
3. Blindfold and Eye in the Iconography  
of Justice
The previous sections demonstrated the long-lasting 
familiarity between art, image and law. It is now time to 
examine the juridical iconography throughout past cen-
turies in search of an answer to the central question of 
 17 Robert, Une Allégorie parfaite, 45-51.
 18 Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Mute Law,’ The American Journal of Comparative Law 
43, no. 3 (1995): 455-458, doi:10.2307/840648. ‘In its open texture it is 
necessary to interpret silence, the unsaid. Law does not always make 
a sound. Most of the times it just whispers, waves, suggests with a 
task. Most of the times, sound is reduced to the perception of silence, 
of that which was half-said” - Mônica Sette Lopes, Uma metáfora: 
música & direito (São Paulo: LTr, 2006), 131.
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this text: how, when and why did the iconographic repre-
sentations of justice start to have a blindfold over the eyes 
if, for more than 2000 years, clear unblocked sight was 
one of the main features of justice?
Nowadays, the blindfold is a recurrent element in 
the iconography of justice. Among the many paradig-
matic representations of justice and judiciary power, it is 
enough to remember the austere and solemn sculpture 
in granite by Alfredo Ceschiatti, built in 1961, on show 
at the entrance of the Brazil’s Federal Supreme Court in 
Brasília. However, as pointed out by Erwin Panofsky, the 
figure of the blindfolded justice is a very recent humanis-
tic creation in the history of art.19 For many centuries, jus-
tice was associated with a crystal-clear view of the facts; 
after all, sight was essential for justice to manage well the 
sword and the scale, two other attributes with which it is 
frequently represented.
Geneva, Switzerland, late eighteenth century: due to a 
constitutional provision during the revolutionary gov-
ernment of the Republic and Canton of Geneva, between 
1792 and 1796, the city’s attorney general bore a round 
badge of golden brass about 10 cm in diameter that repro-
duced a big open eye in high relief, to refer to the constant 
and tireless alertness of law.20 At that time, the winds of 
 19 Erwin Panofsky, Studi di iconologia: i temi umanistici nell’arte del 
Rinascimento (Torino: Einaudi, 1999) 151. In fact, there is no image 
of justice wearing a blindfold from before the late fifteenth century 
- Robert Jacob, Images de la justice: essai sur l’iconographie judiciaire 
du Moyen âge classique (Paris: Léopard d’or, 1994), 232.
 20 Here is a description of this item, according to the catalogue written 
by historian of art Waldemar Déonna, Director of the Museum of 
Art and History of Geneva at that time: “N. 819 (anc. 86) - Insigne de 
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‘liberté, égalité et fraternité’ of the French Revolution had 
started to blow all over the European continent and the 
omniscient ‘eye of the law’ was the guarantee of the omni-
present, impartial, secular and objective Rechtsstaat.21 
The popular saying ‘das Auge des Gesetzes wacht’ – ‘the 
eye of law is watching’, was perpetuated by the poetry of 
Friedrich Schiller.22
Much more than a poetic metaphor or a mere saying, 
the image of a tireless ‘eye of the law’ was in fact evidenced 
in the text of article VI of the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen, of August 26, 1789:
‘The law is the expression of the general will. (…) All 
the citizens, being equal in its eyes [law’s eyes], are 
equally admissible to all public dignities, places and 
employments, according to their capacity and with-
out distinction other than that of their virtues and of 
their talents.’ 23
In his famous painting of 1789, which is an allegory of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, French 
painter Jacques François Le Barbier depicts the eye of the 
procureur général sous le gouvernement révolutionnaire de Genève en 
1794. Sur une plaque circulaire de laiton, oeil grand ouvert, en relief, 
symbole de surveillance constante. Diam.: 0,10.” - Waldemar Deonna, 
Collections archéologiques et historiques: Moyen Age et temps mod-
ernes: Ville de Genève, Musée d’art et d’histoire (Genève: Musée d’art 
et d’histoire, 1929), 104.
 21 Michael Stolleis, L’Œil de la Loi Veille – Histoire d’une Métaphore 
(Paris: Mille et Une Nuits, 2006), 38-39.
 22 Verse 301 of the poem Das Lied von der Glocke (1800), by Schiller.
 23 “Article 6 - La loi est l’expression de la volonté générale. (…) Tous les 
citoyens, étant égaux à ces yeux, sont également admissibles à toutes 
dignités, places et emplois publics, selon leur capacité et sans autre 
distinction que celle de leurs vertus et de leurs talents.”
The Blindness of Justice 171
law in a special position. That painting shows France 
holding the broken chains of tyranny and the spirit of the 
French nation holding the sceptre of power, under the 
bright and severe look of law/reason. It must be said that 
‘the eye of the law’ was not a modern invention nor was it 
a creation of the 1789 Revolution, but rather it is a long-
lived cultural constant in the Hellenistic-Roman-Chris-
tian world. Long before the French Revolution, ‘the eye 
of the law’ or ‘the eye of justice’ – alert and controlling – 
was an image of great symbolic value in Europe, be it in 
Greek-Latin numismatics and statues or in medieval illu-
minations.24
Nearly two thousand years before poet Schiller and 
painter Le Barbier, the figure of an observant eye of justice 
(dikès ophtalmós or iustitiæ oculus) had been evoked by 
Greek poet Amiano Marcelino: ‘Vigilavit Iustitiae oculus 
sempiternus’, or ‘the eternal eye of justice has watched’.25 
In 1515, at the height of Italian Renaissance, the Mantuan 
humanist Giovanni Battista Fiera published an interest-
ing pamphlet, in the form of a fictitious dialogue between 
Momus26 and the painter Andrea Mantegna (who had 
died nine years before)27. In this text, after collecting the 
impressions of justice on the most varied traditions, and 
 24 The image can be seen here: http://goo.gl/E2QL9w. 
 25 Stolleis, L’Œil de la Loi, 55-56.
 26 In Greek mythology, Momus – Sarcasm – was the god of irony, mock-
ery, and scoff, insistently critical of the works and deeds of others.
 27 Mantegna was commissioned by Pope Innocent VIII to decorate a 
chapel at the Vatican with an allegory of justice, which made him 
interested in the theme of painting justice (Battista Fiera and James 
Wardrop, De iusticia pingenda: a dialogue between Mantegna and 
Momus = On the painting of justice (London: Lion and Unicorn 
Press, 1957), 10-11 and 28.
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conducting a deep philosophical and theological reflec-
tion, Battista Fiera tries to demonstrate the best way to 
depict justice. In this pamphlet titled De Iustitia Pingenda 
or ‘On the Painting of Justice’, Battista Fiera indicates that 
one of the ways of representing justice is a woman’s body 
with a huge eye in the middle of her face, or perhaps with 
a third eye on the back of her neck to amplify eyesight, 
or even with multiple eyes, similar to the mythological 
figure of Argus Panoptes, the Greek hundred-eyed giant 
hound.28 To Battista Fiera good eyesight was the key to a 
more precise discernment of justice.
In Cesare Ripa’s classic work Iconologia, which collects 
and describes a number of images in several cultures 
and contexts, the author writes in harmony with Battista 
Fiera and refers to justice (according to the indications of 
Aulo Gellio), as a lady ‘with very sharp eyes’.29 Following 
this argumentative line, in his baroque painting Allego-
ria della Giustizia, found at the Palazzo Bianco in Genoa, 
Genoese Giovanni Andrea de Ferrari added a third eye to 
the image, right in the central upper part of the armour 
that protects the chest of the goddess of justice – still in 
the first half of the seventeenth century. Below the sword 
 28 Fiera and Wardrop, De iusticia pingenda, 29-31. Adriano Prosperi, 
Giustizia bendata: percorsi storici di un’immagine (Torino: G. Einaudi, 
2009), 7. In Greek mythology, Argus was Hera’s hound – whose 
task was to watch over Io, one of Zeus’ lovers –, and was killed by 
Hermes by order of Zeus himself. To honour her dog, Hera took 
the hound’s 100 eyes and put them on the tail of the peacock, an 
animal consecrated to her. Panoptes means ‘that which sees all’, be-
cause during sleep Argus would close only 50 eyes while the other 
50 remained vigilant.
 29 Cesare Ripa, Iconologia (Roma: heredi di Gio. Gigliotti, 1593) 108.
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of justice lies the large book of law, which reads ‘incon-
cussa vigeat’.30
Some decades later in the seventeenth century, the 
radical opposition between the clear sight of justice and 
negative biased blindness was the central theme of the 
drawing Partiality by Hubert François Bourguignon (aka 
Gravelot) and Charles-Nicolas Cochin.31 As a matter of 
fact, the lack of sight was an element common to many 
medieval and Renaissance allegories, all of which with 
a strong negative connotation: death, ambition, greed, 
wrath, impetus, ignorance and the Synagogue.
The object of a refined and delicate technique of illu-
mination, the eyes of justice are also the core theme of an 
anonymous eighteenth-century painting, on show at the 
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.32 Special interest in this Neth-
erlands version of Justitia is aroused by the eye-shaped 
medallion between the fingers of the goddess and the 
absence of swords or scales in the painting.
Another exuberant eye-shaped medallion, similar to 
that seen at the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, was painted 
by the Lutheran Scandinavian artist Mathias Blumenthal 
in his Justitia Majestata (1762), currently in the collection 
of the Bergen Art Museum, Norway.33 A direct reference 
 30 See the picture here: https://goo.gl/PBgSTv.
 31 Drawing by Gravelot (Hubert François Bourguignon) and Charles-
Nicolas Cochin published in Charles-Étienne Gaucher, Iconologie 
ou Traité des Allégories et Emblèmes (Paris: Lattré, 1791?, tome 4) 
2v. In the City Hall of Basel, northern Switzerland, there is a fresco 
by H. Bock, where partiality is depicted with eyes wide open. The 
image is reproduced in Robert, Une Allégorie parfaite, 50.
 32 Picture here: https://goo.gl/E0LhTa
 33 Picture here: https://goo.gl/9sAAYd. Apart from painting the rich 
Justitia Majestata, commissioned by the magistrates of the city of 
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to this necklace in the shape of a bright eye, as an orna-
ment of justice, is found in the work of historian Walde-
mar Déonna: ‘justice (…) wears a necklace with a sculpted 
eye around her neck’.34
It must be said that this plastic conception of justice 
endowed with bright open eyes spread outside the Euro-
pean boundaries. In fact, a remainder of this visual strat-
egy is the sculpture of justice located on top of the roof of 
the Museu da Inconfidência, Ouro Preto (Minas Gerais, 
Brazil). 35 The piece, author unknown, is possibly from 
the eighteenth century, when Ouro Preto was still named 
Vila Rica and it was the capital of the Brazilian colonial 
gold rush.
From the classical tradition all the way through the 
Middle Ages up to the European Renaissance (and up 
to the French Revolution, in some places), the image of 
justice was always associated with crystal-clear, sharp, 
unblocked sight, bound to inspire reverence and fear.36 
Limpid vision was, then, the greatest trait of justice. Rep-
resenting justice any other way would only be possible 
in satire or criticism. Acid critique, for instance, was the 
character of the woodcut ascribed to Albrecht Dürer in 
the satirical poem ‘Das Narrenschiff ’(Ship of Fools), by 
Bergen (Norway), Mathias Blumenthal also wrote a detailed manu-
script on the symbolism of every bit of his painting. The originals of 
this precious and unique document (Beskrivelse og kort Explication 
over Det Skildrede Emblematiske Stykke til Raad-Stuen) as well as 
its version in English may be seen at www.euarchives.org or at the 
Library of the University of Bergen.
 34 Waldemar Déonna, Le Symbolisme de l’Œil (Paris: E. de Boccard, 
1965), 286.
 35 Here: https://goo.gl/DWPDwr.
 36 Panofsky, Studi di iconologia, 151.
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Sebastian Brant, published in 1494; this illustration is the 
first time in which justice is seen with a blindfold on.37 In 
his poem, Sebastian Brant – professor at the Law School 
of Basel and devoted catholic – describes a few more than 
a hundred follies and vices of the society of that time, each 
one ascribed to a fool. During the poem, all these fools 
are locked into a large vessel – similar to what Noah did 
with animals in his arc – for an imaginary trip to an island 
called Land of Fools. In this unique and isolated picture,38 
Albrecht Dürer depicts excessive litigation, abuse of pro-
cess and the vice of the powerful ‘men of justice’ of hiding 
the truth in vain subterfuge. Dürer shows one of Brant’s 
fools – wearing the jester’s traditional hat with rattles and 
balancing on a sharp tool to card wool – putting a blind-
fold over the eyes of justice (shown with the traditional 
sword and scale). Justice, who was supposed to be able 
to see, cannot see already due to the humiliating obsta-
cle produced by the ‘Prozeßnarren’, the cunning ‘process 
fools’. The picture by Albrecht Dürer illustrates section 
LXXI (Quarrelling and going to court) of the long poem 
by Sebastian Brant, that refers to such process fools this 
way:
‘I will now speak of the irrational ones who, on any 
subject, want to file suits (...) Many make more mon-
ey on a case than their daily pay, and think they can 
cover the eyes of truth and prevent the judgement 
 37 The first to point out the primacy and the novelty of this wood-
cut ascribed to Albrecht Dürer in Das Narrenchiff was Ernst von 
Möller, “Die Augenbinde der Justitia’, Zeitschrift für Christliche 
Kunst 18, no. 4, (1905): 107-122. This claim has never been dis-
puted ever since by any iconologist of justice.
 38 See the picture here: http://goo.gl/D9dSfg.
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to be over shortly. I wish that those who are fond of 
quarreling in court could have their asses brushed 
with a heavy rake’ 39
Bruno Lacerda adverts that the gesture of putting the 
blindfold over the eyes of justice, mentioned by Brant 
and depicted by Dürer, has a special meaning in medieval 
 culture:
‘Covering the eyes of justice was, at that time, eas-
ily associated with humiliation, contempt, mockery. 
The blindfold handled by the jester not only prevents 
her from seeing, but ‘disfigures her, compromises her 
identity, leads to a kind of blindness that means losing 
sense’. May we remember the biblical image of Christ 
[face covered], insulted and humiliated by the Jews.’ 40
At this point, it is necessary to remember that the buf-
foons or jesters, insane as they were, were the ironic voice 
of conscience that, laughing and making others laugh, 
heavily criticised the institutions around them.41
In the same line as Brant’s severe criticism of the lack 
of sight of justice, an image dated 1550 by Dutch artist 
Dirk Volkertsz Coornhert, currently at the Achenbach 
Foundation for Graphic Arts (San Francisco, USA), 
shows blindfolded justice falling off a restless horse.42 
With her eyes covered, justice is ridiculed, criticised and 
 39 Sebastian Brant, A nau dos insensatos (São Paulo: Octavo, 2010), 205.
 40 Bruno Amaro Lacerda and Mônica Sette Lopes, Imagens da justiça 
(Sao Paulo: LTr, 2010), 31. It is also worth remembering that those 
who were hanged and decapitated had their eyes covered – Robert, 
Une Allégorie parfaite, 92.
 41 Michel Foucault, História da loucura na idade clássica (São Paulo: 
Perspectiva, 1978), 13 and ff.
 42 See the picture here: https://goo.gl/Jd4cYT.
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humiliated. Another very strong image of social criticism 
to justice’s lack of sight is the work of Danish contem-
porary Jens Galschiøt, entitled Survival of the Fattest, 
from 2002. This huge copper sculpture43 – shows justice 
represented as an enormous obese western-looking lady, 
with her eyes shut, atop the shoulders of a pitiable Afri-
can figure. Indifference and social alienation of justice are 
underscored by her lack of sight and by the imbalance of 
the tiny scale she has in her right hand.
Justice, many times equipped with a sword and scale, 
should therefore be able to see, so that freeing her from 
the uncomfortable blindfold would be the State’s duty. 
In early twentieth-century Germany, the government 
passed a norm that forbad any and all representations of 
blindfolded Justice at courts under construction.44
The farsighted and alert eye of justice, so many times 
reproduced in the political-juridical iconography of west-
ern art, is nothing but a lay representation of the vigilant 
‘eye of god’ of the major monotheist religions, which, 
during absolute monarchy, was appropriated and secu-
larised as the ‘eye of the king’, who was the worldly rep-
resentative of the power and justice of God. To medieval 
jurists, justice was (with)in God and, as time passed, God 
himself delegated justice to his earthly representatives: 
the monarchs.45 Through a long process of secularisation 
 43 See the sculpture here: http://goo.gl/swwuG0. The United Nations 
Climate Change Conference – COP15 –, took place in Copenhagen, 
Denmark, between 7 and 18 December 2009.
 44 Ministerialerlaβ of January 18, 1907, apud Waldemar Déonna, Le 
Symbolisme de l’Œil (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1965), 289.
 45 Prosperi, Giustizia bendata, 16-17. 
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of theological concepts, ‘deo est rex’ and ‘rex est lex’ from 
before the French Revolution were followed, after the 
Storming of the Bastille, by ‘lex est rex’, in such a way that 
monarchic absolutism was followed by some ‘legal abso-
lutism’, originating a nearly religious cult of law and jus-
tice in the modern states that were starting to be formed.46
The magnificent copper engraving by Albrecht Dürer, Sol 
Justitiæ, of 1498/1499, translates this political- theological 
confluence between the divine and the secular in the rep-
resentation of a justice that sees all; a justice in which the 
sacredness of the look of the State-judge mingles with the 
sacredness of the look of God.47 This engraving by Dürer 
also raises an additional interesting argument: justice is 
sitting on a lion – a traditional embodiment of power – 
which reminds us that omniscience – of the eye of the 
law, the eye of God, or the eye of the king – presupposes 
omnipotence – of law, of God himself or of the king. That 
painting by Le Barbier on the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen, mentioned above, also depicts the 
theological root of the eye of the law, very much so that 
the French painter included the eye of the law within a 
Trinitarian triangle, an old symbol of the Christian Holy 
Trinity.48
 46 Robert, Une Allégorie parfaite, 34. All this modern process of secu-
larisation of medieval theological concepts constitutes precisely the 
central thesis of Carl Schmitt’s “political theology”.
 47 Here: https://goo.gl/3mbXiN. One reference to the “sun of justice” 
was present at the Bible (Malachi 4,2): “But for you who fear My 
name, the sun of righteousness will rise” (...).” – Déonna, Le Symbol-
isme de l’Œil, 279. The same connection between human justice and 
divine justice can also be noticed in the painting Justitia Majestata 
by Mathias Blumenthal.
 48 Déonna, Le Symbolisme de l’Œil, 285-286.
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It can be noted, then, that the presence of the eye 
that sees all in the modern juridical imagery was not by 
chance. As a matter of fact, images, myths, and metaphors 
relative to the eye and sight were always in the spotlight in 
the culture of humankind: the blind clairvoyant Tiresias; 
the myths of Narcissus, Cupid and Medusa; the tragedy 
of Oedipus; the wife of Lot becoming a pillar of salt in 
the Bible; Orwell’s ‘big brother’ or even the monk Jorge of 
Burgos, the wise blind librarian of The Name of the Rose. 
Shortly before his death in 1958, French art historian 
Waldemar Déonna concluded the manuscript of a beau-
tiful and profound study on the symbolism of sight, pub-
lished posthumously. In that text, an encyclopedic work 
of research, Déonna points out:
‘Of all organs of sense, the eyes are really the most 
 precious. (…) Seeing is getting to know the envi-
ronment, it is knowledge. It is possessing the world, 
dominating it; it is ‘power’ (…)’.49
From ‘windows to the soul’ to ‘mirrors of the world’, the 
symbolic power of the eye has translated, since classical 
antiquity, the struggling dichotomy between essence and 
looks, interior and exterior, superficiality and profun-
dity, empiricism and metaphysics.50 This tension between 
positive and negative in what the look means was to have 
an impact on the image of justice, especially on the con-
trast between the Anglo-Germanic Protestant world and 
the neo-Latin Catholic world. It is precisely not to be 
deceived by the sensitive appearance of things that justice 
 49 Déonna, Le Symbolisme de l’Œil, 1-2.
 50 Stolleis, L’Œil de la Loi Veille, 54. 
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will be represented, from the sixteenth century on, with 
a blindfold, in central urban Protestant Anglo-Germanic 
Europe, firmly confronting the idea of the ‘eye of justice’ 
predominant until then.
The image of blindfolded justice, in the sense that the 
blindfold is a positive sign of its independence, incorrupt-
ibility, critical distancing, proportionality, moderation 
and impartiality before the parties, was first seen around 
1531 in one edition of the Wormser Reformation, a popu-
lar consolidation of Imperial Germanic municipal laws,51 
originally written in the free Imperial city of Worms, in 
1498. In the image taken from the 1531 edition, pub-
lished in Frankfurt by the printer, engraver, book shopper 
and editor Christian Egenolph, justice is blindfolded and, 
apart from the traditional sword, bears a balanced scale 
between a rich a poor man.52 It is interesting to notice that 
that was the beginning of the long process of positiva-
tion and secularisation of the traditional Custom law or 
Canonical law, greatly influenced by the Protestant Ref-
ormation and Humanism. It is in this context of forma-
tion of the European ius commune, in which law starts to 
escape the influence of the Pope and of the Holy Roman 
Empire, that the blindfold on justice’s eyes starts to have 
the positive status of impartiality in European iconogra-
phy. Interestingly, for its influence in Protestant icono-
phobia, justice’s lack of vision, that for so long had been 
a sign of inferiority or mockery, started to be interpreted 
in a positive light: as she is not able to see, justice does 
 51 Franz Wieacker, História do direito privado moderno (Lisboa: 
Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1980), 211-212.
 52 von Möller, ‘Die Augenbinde der Justitia’, 115.
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not risk being seduced, deceived or even corrupted by 
the appearance of images, and is then able to reach unbi-
ased verdicts.53 Once an instrument of disorientation, the 
blindfold is now an instrument of orientation.
As of the publication of that image in the 1531 edi-
tion of the Wormser Reformation, the blindfold (with a 
positive connotation) becomes incredibly well-known 
in a multitude of villages, counties, duchies, and so 
forth. It also became popular in artistic manifestations, 
especially in Protestant bourgeois urban areas of cen-
tral and northern Europe, as a symbol of secularity, 
impartiality and objectivity.54 Interesting examples of 
this period are engravings of the Flemish artisan Cor-
nelis Bos, Iustitia et Prudentia, 1537,55 and Cornelis 
Matsys, also titled Iustitia et Prudentia, 1538.56 Both 
works let out the solemn antithesis between justice’s 
obliterated sight and the very sharp sight of prudence – 
always depicted between mirrors and serpents. The 
serpent and the mirror are recurrent in the allegory of 
prudence. The serpent, cunning, silent, discreet, with a 
penetrating stare, is the symbol of knowledge associated 
with a model of vigilance and discernment. The mirror, in 
turn, symbolises self-knowledge, the careful look around, 
the reflection upon one’s own acts.
 53 Nead and Douzinas, Law and the Image, 24. According to Cesare 
Ripa’s description, “executive justice” would be a “donna, vestita di 
bianco, habbia gli occhi bendati (...). Si veste di bianco, perche il giu-
dicio deve essere senza macchia (...), tenendosi gli occhi bendati, cioè 
non guardando cosa alcuna, della quale s’adopri per giudice il senso, 
nemico della ragione” –Ripa, Iconologia, 108.
 54 von Möller, ‘Die Augenbinde der Justitia’, 118-120.
 55 Picture here: https://goo.gl/5ytM97
 56 Picture here: https://goo.gl/USZWpl
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In 1549, the idea that the blindfold would represent 
the judge’s incorruptibility and neutrality was assimilated 
and reproduced in a Spanish edition of Andrea Alciato’s 
Emblemata, printed in Lyon by Macé Bonhomme and 
Guillaume Rouille, and possibly illustrated by Pierre 
Eskrich or Vase. In the emblem In Senatum boni Principis, 
the figure of a blindfolded prince conducting the discus-
sions at the senate with impartiality translates the idea of 
the true ‘good government’.57
As time passed, blindfolded justice stops represent-
ing criticism, a joke or mockery and starts to represent a 
topographic and institutional rupture of the urban Prot-
estant bourgeois iconoclast and pioneer man in terms of 
the civic organisation of Central Europe with that medie-
val, extremely personal, subjective, custom-law, agrarian, 
religious justice, concerned with appearances. New times 
call for new muses58 in such a way that blindfolded justice 
is now a symbol of the temporal and collective power of 
the borough. Thus, to signal and celebrate this rupture, 
blindfolded justice is then exposed in many public places, 
indoors or outdoors, such as markets, city halls, official 
salons, squares and fountains, however, always away from 
churches and convents, across an area of land extending 
from Siena, in northern Italy, to Belgian Flanders.59
It is worth mentioning the décor of the justice halls in 
public buildings, which go through an aesthetic revolu-
tion: they lose the ‘anachronic’ biblical images such as the 
 57 Picture here: http://goo.gl/K1OVqw. Prosperi, Giustizia bendata, 43.
 58 von Möller, ‘Die Augenbinde der Justitia’, 110.
 59 Robert, Une Allégorie parfaite, 114.
The Blindness of Justice 183
crucifixion of Christ, doomsday or Solomon’s judgement 
and adopt a desacralised iconographical repertoire that 
associates justice with civic, bourgeois and secular virtue. 
This new model of allegory can be seen, for example, in 
the exuberant Fountain of Justice sculpted by Hans Gieng 
in 1543, installed right in the civic centre of the Swiss city 
of Bern.60 Another beautiful representation of blindfolded 
justice is Pieter Bruegel’s engraving Iusticia, 1559. In this 
work, Bruegel created a panel of violent penal punish-
ments and included justice with a blindfold (she is blind 
to the tortures, as well) in the centre of the borough. The 
caption is ironic: ‘the objective of law is either to correct 
those it punishes, through a sentence, make other people 
better, or extinguish evil so that others can live a safe life’, 
which well summarises the secularised punitive philoso-
phies of modern times.61
Blindfolded justice – planted in the most visible sites 
of the boroughs –, now signals, evokes and adverts to the 
existence of a new European public order, whose jurisdic-
tion is secular, implacable and immune to personal com-
mitments. For this reason, Prof. Christian-Nils Robert 
 60 Picture here: https://goo.gl/FzbWkY. Apart from Bern, the centres 
of Frankfurt, Nurnberg, Solothurn and Aarau also have Fountains 
of Justice (Gerechtigkeitsbrunnen or Justitiabrunnen). The fountain 
in Frankfurt (J. Hocheisen, 1611) has no blindfold, whereas the 
ones in Nurnberg (B. Wurzelbauer, 1585-1589), Solothurn (L. Per-
roud, 1561) and Aarau (H. Henz, 1643) are all blindfolded (Robert, 
Une Allégorie parfaite, 30-31, 73-74 and 87.
 61 Picture here: http://goo.gl/8Ye60B. Michel Porret, ‘Mise en images 
de la procédure inquisitoire,’ Sociétés & Représentations 18, no. 2 
(2004): 46.
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states that this image of martial blindfolded justice is one 
of the founding images of the modern state.62
It is right to say that blindfolded justice may be unbi-
ased and free from the corruption of senses, but it (she) 
is not necessarily blind.63 With or without the blindfold, 
blindness was never believed to be a characteristic of jus-
tice. In Phaedrus, Plato proposed the distinction between 
the ‘eyes of the soul’ and ‘eyes of the body’, to denote the 
differences between essential or profound knowledge 
and unfinished or superficial knowledge; justice – be it 
worldly or divine – is seen as the virtue (in fact, one of the 
‘cardinal virtues’, side by side with prudence, courage and 
temperance) of going further than the mere visible super-
ficiality of facts, of things, of passions and circumstances. 
Many are the authors, by the way, that register this poten-
tialising approximation between the inability to see and 
knowledge, underscoring many times that it is necessary 
not to see to be able to see better:
‘Oedipus, for example, in Sophocles’ tragedy, gives 
us (...) important elements for this analysis. (...) One 
of the highlights of this tragedy takes place when, 
‘seeing’ that he’d had his own mother after killing his 
father, Oedipus awfully blinds himself. We might say 
that he blinded himself because he did not want to 
see it. However, in Heidegger’s super sophisticated 
interpretation, Oedipus blinded himself to better be 
able to see his pathetic situation.’ 64
 62 Robert, Une Allégorie parfaite, 20.
 63 Prosperi, Giustizia bendata, 10.
 64 Affonso Romano de Sant’Anna, O Enigma Vazio: Impasses da Arte 
e da Crítica (Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2008) 11. Also referring to the 
blind who see more and better, innovative people such as Michel 
Reilhac, in France, or Andreas Heinecke, in Germany, have been 
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Therefore, in order to overcome that dichotomy between 
blindfolded justice and the eyes of justice, what is visible 
and what is invisible, the superficial and the profound, 
some iconographic sources are doubtful as they represent 
the eyes of justice, as if they were trying to escape a sim-
plifying or Manichaean dichotomy. There are interesting 
examples, old and new, of such enigmatic, polynomic 
and bipolar iconography, in which it is possible to affirm 
whether or not justice is blindfolded65 or if the blindfold 
is being put on or taken off, based on the incidence of 
wind. 66
Still about duplicity, even though not as an element 
of doubt but rather an element of certainty, there are 
three very complex examples in antiquity. The first one 
is La Ivstice by Louis Testelin, possibly between 1680 and 
1740.67 This allegory shows two childlike figures, one with 
organising all around Europe over the past ten years a number of 
artistic and gastronomical experiences in total darkness, under-
scoring the tactile, olfactory, auditory and gustative sensations 
of the public. In 2004, Edouard de Broglie and Etienne Boisrond 
founded in Paris the restaurant Dans le Noir?, famous for serving 
haute cuisine in the dark. The concept of eating in the dark to po-
tentialise taste came about shortly before that, in 1999, with the 
restaurant Blindekuh (German equivalent to Blind man’s bluff), in 
Zurich, Switzerland.
 65 Cover of Tractatus de iudiciis by H. Vultejus (Hermanni Vulteji), 
1654 (Cassellis: typis Salomonis Schadewitz: impensis Sebaldi 
Köleri) (http://goo.gl/2yA6f8). Justitia by Jost Amman for publisher 
Sigismund Feyrabend (circa 1564), mentioned in Otto Rudolf. Kis-
sel, Die Justitia: Reflexionen über ein Symbol und seine Darstellung 
in der bildenden Kunst (München: C.H. Beck, 1997) 45 (https://
goo.gl/OdTvtM).
 66 Ivstitia ascribed to Flemish painter and engraver Jacob de Gheyn II, 
1593 (http://goo.gl/YkMYyj).
 67 Picture here: https://goo.gl/Xks3CK.
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a blindfold and the other without, apparently pictured 
as a child and his guardian angel. Testelin gave blind-
folded justice (the child) the sword, symbol of power and 
monopoly of legitimate violence of the State that applies 
the law. The other figure, justice without the blindfold (a 
calm guardian angel), which inspires, restrains and guides 
the impetus of the blindfolded child, has a scale, symbol 
of thoughtful judgement and reflection. Reflection and 
impetuosity, prudence and violence, reason and passion, 
Apollonian and Dionysian, all of these antithetical pairs 
emerge from Testelin’s illustration but are far from consti-
tuting features typical of childlike figures. Here is another 
provocative paradox of art: convergent duplicity.
The second example of the affirmative duplicity in the 
pictorial discourse on justice is the image of the two-faced 
justice, like the Latin two-faced god Janus, by Joos Dam-
houder on the cover of the Praxis Rerum Criminalium, 
1567.68 In that representation, justice looks to both sides 
simultaneously (four centuries ahead, Picasso would use 
this iconographic resource again!). Here again the justice 
without the blindfold has a sword whereas the one with 
the blindfold carries a scale.
The positive aspect in all such enigmatic, polysemic, 
ambivalent and bipolar representations resides in the fact 
that both this last two-faced representation of justice and 
those showing two justices – one with a blindfold and the 
 68 Double-faced justice in the book Praxis Rerum Criminalium, by 
Joost Damhoude (Antwerp: Joannem Bellerum ed., 1567, p. 433). 
See here: http://goo.gl/w163GP.
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other without – escape a true/false or positive/negative 
reductionist opposition in the juridical iconography. In 
this way, they assimilate the very complexity of the task of 
interpreting/applying law, which, after all, like the Latin 
Janus, is also a two-faced operation. That is, the person 
who interprets/applies the law must look at the past with 
one face – written law, the solidified preceding cases and 
the consolidated doctrine so far – in order to elucidate 
the given law up until that very instant whereas, with the 
other face, they must look to the future ahead and, there-
fore, seek improvement, reinventing and modernising the 
juridical order, or else allow law to disconnect from real 
life and lose its legitimacy and up-to-dateness. This con-
stant relationship between the past, present and future of 
the juridical text is very well depicted in the last images 
herein discussed
As a matter of fact, this time continuum is not exclu-
sive of juridicity. Paraphrasing Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
it may be said that the reality and the power of the 
enunciation both of law and the work of art ‘cannot be 
reduced to the original historical horizon’, in such a way 
that both law and art seem to ‘have their own present’, 
a ‘timeless present’, always up to date, always simultane-
ous, always evenly matched.69 In other words, this is the 
‘world’s perpetual novelty’, as stated by Alberto Caeiro 
(Fernando Pessoa) in ‘O Guardador de Rebanhos’ [The 
Shepherd] (1914). All in all, this is the difficult task of the 
 69 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hermenêutica da Obra de Arte (São Paulo: 
WMF Martins Fontes, 2010), 1-2.
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contemporary ‘ hermenaut’, be it related to law or any of 
the fields of knowledge and art: to constantly and con-
tinually navigate between this dense network of meaning 
formed by past, present and future, reviewing, reappro-
priating, deviating, rediscovering, reducing, expanding 
or transposing contents so it does not lose its references 
or its up-to-dateness. With the typical wisdom of the 
great poets, Fernando Pessoa – once again – sums up very 
well the infinite constancy of this hermeneutical search in 
his poem ‘A Montanha por Achar’ [The Mountain to be 
Found], 1934:
If truth exists at all,
One shall see it is all about
The search for the truth,
Because life is all but half.
4. Conclusion: Thinking Art; Feeling Law
Despite all modern and contemporary rhetoric of the 
blindfold as a sign of impartiality and independence, up 
to today, the call for a clear and limpid sight of juridical 
events is still very present in the common sense of the 
population and in the imagery of justice. Both icono-
graphic models of justice (with and without the blind-
fold) still coexist and debate in several fields of law: one 
example is the controversial value of proof that an ‘eye-
witness’ still has today in criminal cases. Another par-
ticular fact is very eloquent in this regard: only in 2009 
did the Brazilian Judiciary admit its first blind judge. He 
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had been disqualified in the health check phase of a civil 
service exam twenty years before.70
Historically permeating virtue and vice, praise and 
criticism, wisdom and obtuseness, imagophilia and ima-
gophobia, idolatry and iconoclasm, the blindfold of jus-
tice is, without a trace of doubt, an aesthetical element of 
great complexity. For many centuries justice was always 
represented with a limpid and sharp sight until the Prot-
estant Reformation and the diffusion of the press in the 
sixteenth century came to consolidate the image of blind-
folded justice. Justice always blindfolded – from then 
onwards – became the soul of the free city.
From those historical milestones, juridical rationality 
starts to have a predominantly textual form and to be hos-
tile towards all that produces semantic uncertainty and 
conceptual openness, which leads to the growing disre-
gard of the artistic image and recourse to nomophilia and 
nomolatry in positivist juridical rhetoric.71 As a matter of 
fact, since common sense started to see human reason as 
the only measure of all things, the disregard for art only 
grew. Not by chance, in the French courts of enlightened 
despotism, was the sad fable of the ant and the grasshop-
per, immortalised in the verses of Jean de La Fontaine, 
very popular.
However, nowadays, due to the huge visual appeal of 
our culture and, especially, due to juridical information 
 70 In 1997, President Bill Clinton nominated blind lawyer Richard Conway 
Casey as Federal Judge at the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, which generated controversy in the whole country.
 71 Robert Jacob, Images de la justice: essai sur l’iconographie judiciaire 
du Moyen âge classique (Paris: Léopard d’or, 1994), 165.
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itself, little by little law is becoming once again more per-
vious to arguments born in the visual, aesthetic or artistic 
spectrum. The countless forums of academic discussion 
(institutions, projects and publications) which care about 
this theme nowadays, and the ever more frequent pres-
ence at courts and hearing rooms of highly technological 
graphic schemes, CCTV camera images, magnetic reso-
nance imaging or CAT scans and even 3D virtual scale 
models (as evidence or argumentation tools) – all this 
signals the presence of an ‘iconic turn’ or a ‘pictorial turn’ 
in our contemporary mediatic law.
After this more general register, one specific considera-
tion on the blindfold of justice must be made: behind all 
the iconographic alternation seen throughout this text 
there is another debate, an epistemic-methodological 
aspect, which is much more relevant. First and foremost, 
the polysemy of the blindfold of justice throughout his-
tory reveals, in fact, that much more important than 
knowing if the best or most adequate iconography of jus-
tice is that with or without the blindfold, the question that 
matters to jurists and iconologists of law is the phenom-
enological issue of comprehending justice. The debate on 
the blindfold is, between the lines, a debate on the very 
issue of comprehending justice: what is truly understand-
ing justice? How can someone comprehend it? Through 
sight? Through intellect? Through both? What is the best 
way to comprehend and feel it? Through the objective 
visual experience, be it the line or the letter, or through a 
reflection detached from the senses that deceive, corrupt 
and pervert us? Which is more relevant: seeing the (in)
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justice of things or listening to the (in)justice of things? It 
is the answer to these methodical-epistemological ques-
tions that is in the subtext of the iconographic debate 
reproduced throughout this text.
All these questions reveal that the precise moment 
when art and law cross ways is the complex moment of 
comprehension/interpretation: since they are cultural 
objects, art and law constantly reinvent, recreate, review 
and reinterpret the world and only make sense if they are 
interpreted/comprehended by their recipients. Art and 
law are the world’s inventors and inventions, continu-
ously disclosing the dialogue between man and reality. 
Therefore, both the work of art and the juridical norm 
are to be interpreted/comprehended, and are a way of 
interpreting and comprehending the world around. Law 
and art require this constant hermeneutical dimension of 
comprehension and interpretation. This comprehension/
interpretation is far from being static: it is inexhaustible, 
dynamic, alive, plural, reinventing and reviewing itself 
and updating at each moment.
The images that depict justice in its deepest entireness 
are those that put aside the mere debate on physiognomy, 
allegory, blindfold or eye, and underscore the very herme-
neutic character and the dimension of comprehension/
interpretation/application of the juridical phenomenon.
This is precisely the intaglio engraving on the cover 
of Leggi e Costumi del Cambio che si Osservano nelle 
Principali Piazze di Europa e Singolarmente in quella di 
Livorno, a book by the commercial law specialist Pompeo 
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Baldasseroni, published in 1784, in Pescia, by Stamperia 
di Gio. Tommaso Masi e Compagni.72
In this figure, with a humble look on her face, justice 
drops her sword and scale to talk with Hermes, the myth-
ological Messenger of Olympus, about the tortuous paths 
of law and right. The Latin quote found below the engrav-
ing – ‘qua te ducit uia dirige gressum’ – is a passage from 
Virgil’s Aeneid, Book I, line 401, meaning: ‘Just proceed, 
and wherever the road takes you, direct your step’.73 This 
Virgilian appeal quoted by Pompeo Baldasseroni may be 
understood today, more than anything else, as a call to 
remain on the hard path of hermeneutics, an undoubt-
edly laborious track, yet impossible to avoid, be it in law 
or in art. As Inocêncio Mártires Coelho says, ‘any inter-
pretation is always on its way (…) Interpretation meets 
no finish line.’74
This hermeneutic approach reminds us of the beauti-
ful fresco painted by Antonio Fedi at the Palazzo Pitti, 
Florence, 1815.75 That painting shows the god of justice 
with no blindfold, a witness of the world’s injustice, next 
to Hermes, the messenger of Olympus, who – holding a 
caduceus – seems to guide her through the tortuous path 
 72 Picture here: https://goo.gl/xs6B3K
 73 In Virgil’s text, it is Venus, mother of Aeneas, disguised as a hunter, 
who advises her son to follow the path of righteousness and go meet 
Phoenician Queen Dido and ask her for help.
 74 Inocêncio Mártires Coelho, Da hermenêutica filosófica à hermenêu-
tica jurídica – fragmentos (São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010), 136.
 75 Antonio Fedi (1771-1843), detail of the fresco Allegoria della Gi-
ustizia, painted in 1815, Salla della Giustizia, Palazzo Pitti, Florence 
(Italy). Here: https://goo.gl/h3utqP.
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of comprehension/interpretation/application of law. Once 
again there is constant wandering, no end or beginning.
For enticing and provoking the contemporary ‘herme-
naut’ into deepening, refining, reviewing, radicalising, 
improving and restarting the constant and inexhaustible 
exercise of interpretation on the fabric of the unsaid, the 
work of art that has, perhaps, best translated all the com-
plexity of justice so far is displayed precisely in the high 
relief sculpture La Giustizia, by Italian Livio Benetti, on 
show at the Museo Valtellinese di Storia ed Arte de Sondrio 
(Italy). It is a non-figurative work that, by bewildering 
the observer/reader, chooses to step away from the easy 
way of the ‘prêt à penser’.76 Bewilderedment starts with 
the fact that La Giustizia is a contemporary work (1975-
1976) even though it establishes a dialogue with many 
baroque elements: the folds and curves, the labyrinthine 
multiplicity, the fluidity of the mass, the rounded angles 
and corners, the swirly turbulent shapes, the overflowed 
matter.77 Livio Benetti’s La Giustizia escapes the tradi-
tional and sensible associations with the heroic, mythical 
or religious themes that commonly represent justice.
What it indeed does – as it is difficult to read and as 
it deconstructs shared knowledge78 – is to arouse vig-
orous sensations, expressions and states of mind: awe, 
doubt, perplexity, admiration, astonishment, surprise, 
 76 Livio Benetti (1915/1987), Virtú Cardinali: La Giustizia, 1975-1976, 
high-relief plaster cast, Museo Valtellinese di Storia ed Arte, Sondrio 
(Italy). Here: https://goo.gl/V3rUYJ
 77 Gilles Deleuze, A Dobra – Leibniz e o Barroco (São Paulo: Papirus, 
2009) 13-15.
 78 Paulo Ferreira da Cunha, Filosofia Jurídica Prática (Belo Horizonte: 
Fórum, 2009) 359.
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uneasiness, disorientation. These feelings that arise from 
the surprise at the unusual shapes and the expressiveness 
of the winding curves of the labyrinth-like sculpture – 
Gadamer collected all these sensations under the concept 
of Betroffenheit – shatter the unshakeable certainties and 
make us, undoubtedly, remember that which Tobias Bar-
reto – the great Brazilian writer and jurist – used to teach 
in the mid-nineteenth century: ‘not only is law something 
that you know, it is something that you feel.’ In addition, 
in the poetic wording of Justice Carlos Ayres Britto, of 
the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, ‘perhaps it is some-
thing one feels first of all or even before intelligence, for it 
cannot be forgotten that the noun ‘sentence’ itself comes 
from the verb to sense’.79 Due to this indispensable sen-
sitivity, law is far from being only ‘sola escriptura’; law is 
also the constant search for the emotional intuition of 
righteousness. This is the lesson of Livio Benetti: prior to 
being read or looked at, justice must be felt.
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The Florence Picpoems
picpoet
Picpoetry is the process of combining iphoneography and 
instant text writing. It is a practice initiated by picpoet, 
an iphoneographer, writer and performer. Picpoems are 
immediately uploaded on picpoet’s account on Instagram 
and also fed into picpoet’s website picpoet.net. The text 
draws from the visual of the photograph but also attempts 
to capture the multisensorial atmosphere of the particu-
lar time and space in which the photos are taken. The text 
must be written quickly while immersed in the specific 
space, and remain unedited, in an imitation of automatic 
writing, but with the atmospheric imprint on it.
The Florence Picpoems is a series commissioned by Ric 
Mohr and Nadir Hosen, the organisers of the Interna-
tional Symposium on Technologies of Law and Religion: 
Representation, Objects and Agency that took place in the 
Prato Centre of Monash University in Prato, Tuscany, on 
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the 13-15 June 2016. Part of the symposium was a guided 
visit to the Monastero di San Marco in Florence. Picpoet 
was asked to create a series of picpoems drawing from the 
visit to the city of Florence in general, and the visit to the 
monastery in particular.
The picpoems reflect on such issues as law and justice, 
legal spatiality and temporality, agency, digitalisation and 
AI in relation to the law, objects and materiality, bodies 
and movement, and so on. The connection between the 
textual and the visual is tight and parallel, yet not descrip-
tive. This allows questions on the relevance of the law in 
terms of affective, embodied and spatialised movements 
to emerge both pictorially and textually, and ultimately 
left unanswered.
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every morning she would sweep. she’d start from inside the villa, 
then the little balcony, and then little by little, she would sweep 
the roofs around her, and the antennas, and the palazzi, and the 
birds and clouds, even the big court hall at the end of the hori-
zon, till all the city would be swept away, and before her a vast 
white sheet would flap in the wind. now I can set my own way, 
she thought. now I can move in any way I want.
we are striations, craving for smoothness.
200 picpoet
chop me up. there are others coming this way. same others. same 
skin same breath same world, assemblages of oneness, jelly sin-
gularities of wholeness. a whiff of a summer breeze lifting that 
drape you placed in front of our being - this is all it takes for the 
wave of the other law to blind us.
we are awake, slumberous eyes of an anthropocenic chain.
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a force of invitation. you are now in, parasite and host at the 
same time, pulling my entrails and commanding my desires. 
this is not an ethical hotel where we serve faces on platters and 
otherness as first dish. this is the beast of all our fears, settling a 
conflict without judge, following the violence between our bod-
ies. theatre and presence, residual technologies of self.
we have grown up, beyond little numerical moralities, and we 
are afraid.
202 picpoet
liquid never, airy nowhere, our digitalisation feels complete. we 
are such stuff as nothing is made of, riding space like demons 
at night, defying time like gods’ repose. we carry a secret in our 
pocket, the way of our whole where nothing is not part of it 
and where all parts dissect into fractal furthermores, brittle law-
scapes of pixelled collapse. something is laughing somewhere at 
us. it might be the battery, it might be the real future.
we are never whole, we are never part.
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come in. this gate is for you. I’ve opened it with my stat-
utes, I’ve carved it around your shape, all paragraphs sec-
tioning your limbs. can’t you see? it’s the perfect fit. it is 
what you’ve always desired. it is your wetness, your dark-
ness, your aftertaste. it is so soft that it’ll feel like a part of 
your own body, an extension of your saliva, a pool of arms 
holding you up in dream of other worlds. come in. we are 
waiting. we are the guardians of the gate.
no? it’s ok. this gate will never leave you.
204 picpoet
every afternoon, my inhumanity tickles my thighs, rising force 
of a geology without logos. in the evening, all is smoothness: I 
lay where I’m laid, drenched in the whispers of my biology. I am 
tired of this body, you see? all human, no space for the screams 
that gallop through my mind and my veins when all is silent. 
and so we try to silence it.
we are inhuman stories of a mineral flesh.
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hold my object like a planet rests on a god’s lap: gently and with 
future streaming through your fingers. this is my armour, the 
boundary of my life, poor technology against death. preserved, 
my object lasts aeons of falls. even when your hand, sometimes 
revolutionary, often in ignorance, lets it fall, it bounces back 
 following its own just emplacement.
we are hands holding while breaking, lest we fall.
206 picpoet
she kept on digging, nails and teeth screeching on the surface of 
the earth. she had this idea, sliding on the light that she thought 
was coming heavenway: she had to see behind. the world a fruit 
lost in the palimpsest of the city, rotting but pure still. so she 
thought and so she dug. the world got thin like a petal and her 
nails and teeth dust - and the behind is still behind.
we are surfaces turned inside.
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we would ride that cement carpet flying high into the city of or-
der. we would speak with the soaring birds. we would dive with 
them, clouds heavy with the tears of gods, air bloated with the 
fumes of the padding boats.
our happiness was easy, precious and polluted.
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Indeed, even if law’s perspectival view is bound to be 
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all radically interdisciplinary, are drawn from 
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